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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis focuses on international intervention and statebuilding in post-
2001 Afghanistan. It offers an alternative lens, a network lens, to understand 
the complexity of internationally sponsored state re-building and 
transformation. It therefore analyses how political power is assembled and 
flows through political networks in statebuilding, with an eye to the hitherto 
ignored endogenous political networks. The empirical chapters investigate the 
role and power dynamics of Afghan political network in re-assembling and 
transforming the post-2001 state once a political settlement is reached; how 
everyday political network practices shape the nature of statehood and 
governance; and subsequently how these power dynamics and practices 
contribute towards political order/violence and stability/instability.  
 
This thesis challenges the dominant wisdom that peacebuilding is a process 
of democratisation or institutionalisation, showing how intervention has 
unintentionally produced the democratic façade of a state, underpinning by 
informal power structures of Afghan politics. The post-2001 intervention has 
fashioned a ‘network state’ where the state and political networks have 
become indistinguishable from one another: the empowered network 
masquerade as the state. This study suggests that a new political order is 
emerging in post-2001 Afghanistan where political stability is a function of 
patron-client relations, opportunistic practices of bargaining and expropriation 
of public resources for political network gain as well as the instrumentalisation 
of identities. In light of this analysis, it concludes with the implications of the 
research findings for the future of Afghanistan. It posits that a successful 
international military exit from Afghanistan and post-2014 state survival may 
depend primarily on the political stability of the empowered political networks.  
 
This research is based on extensive fieldwork, including participatory 
observation and interviews (more than 130 interviews) with key informants 
over 16 months in Afghanistan.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“More questions? Your team was here just three months ago. What benefit 
would your questions bring to me? The river is completely dry and all our 
crops are destroyed. We have nothing to eat,” Baba Kohisaaf uttered, looking 
straight into my eyes with suspicion but also, a longing for compassion. Baba 
Kohisaaf was over sixty but looked much older as years of war and poverty 
had left their mark.  
 
The Yamchi village in the Sayyad District of Sar-i-Pul province of Northern 
Afghanistan is an ethnic-Uzbek village, located on a dry barren hilltop. The 
agricultural land around the village is predominately Lalmi (rain-fed) and rises 
over a plain of stepped, terraced fields with a few irrigated lands at both sides 
of an ephemeral river-stream. The village is home to roughly one hundred 
families. The influence of the famous ethnic-Uzbek strongman, Abdul Rashid 
Dostum, is visible in Sayyad district and in the village itself through the district 
governor and several commanders who occupy key positions. In 2008, 
Afghanistan experienced one of the most devastating droughts in the post-
2001 international intervention. My Afghan colleagues and I were sent by 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), an independent policy 
research organisation based in Kabul, to the Yamchi village in order to carry 
out fieldwork research for the “Livelihood and Food Insecurity” project. Our 
task was to interview as many households in the village as possible.  
 
Baba Kohisaaf’s household provided an excellent case study due to their 
never-ending battle with poverty, a backdrop to the struggle for his daughter’s 
divorce approval. For this he was required to manoeuvre around local district 
and provincial government procedures while exhausting every means, legal or 
illegal, to achieve his goal. On one hot Sunday afternoon, I found myself taken 
aback by Baba Kohisaaf’s recent sufferings. It was mesmerising to hear him 
articulate, in broken Dari-Persian dialect, the details of his struggle. He spoke 
of how he had regularly bribed provincial judges, failed to comprehend the 
complex bureaucratic rules and procedures, and felt cheated by almost every 
official he had dealt with. Although he was defeated by the formal system, he 
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was able to obtain a letter from the powerful Uzbek-ethnic strongman, 
General Abdul Rashid Dostum, using a distant informal kinship connection to 
a neighbouring village commander. The letter, of which Baba Kohisaaf did not 
know the content, as he could not read and write, terrified the provincial judge 
who instantly approved the case.  
 
As I went through the questionnaire which was related to the household 
livelihood standards and their coping mechanisms, I asked him for his 
thoughts about the last theme, international intervention and aid effectiveness. 
His short reply was profoundly affecting to me, as a young post-graduate 
student coming back to the country of his birth. After a long pause, sighing, he 
said: “Two months ago a German doctor came to the village clinic. Hearing 
about his presence, the Taliban descended from the mountains and killed 
him. The Germans, a week later, distributed a sack of wheat and ten-kilos of 
cooking oil per household in the village.” Whilst looking at the children playing 
by the mosque, he added, “I hope the Taliban kill another German so we get 
wheat again.”  
 
Arguably Baba Kohisaaf’s extreme cynical reply should be expected in this 
context, where local people’s expectations of the post-2001 international 
peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts have not been met. One could also 
argue that it is in the embedded “cynical reasoning” (Yurchak 1997) and 
“hidden transcript” (Scott 1990) of these villagers that one may understand the 
complex relationships between ordinary Afghans and international 
intervention organisations. On that hot afternoon in Yamchi village I realised 
that one has to go beneath the veneer of formal institutions to observe the 
more important informal aspects of international statebuilding and governance 
in Afghanistan. Baba Kohisaaf’s stories also revealed an important puzzle to 
be solved. I had to ask the question: how could the post-2001 Afghan state 
survive when state institutions were corrupt, weak and fragmented along 
political-economic and identity-based divisions, and struggling to provide 
basic functions for its citizens. The classic liberal peace choice theory expects 
post-conflict states either to reform by pursuing shock-therapy 
democratisation, principally through multi-party elections, or collapse following 
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an intervention. It asserts that for the state to survive it must provide certain 
basic services to its citizens, exercise autonomy and possess coercive 
capacities. The post-2001 state remains stable despite failing in respect to all 
these factors. The obvious answer seems to be that the ongoing presence of 
the international coalition forces is required in the country. Yet, in large areas, 
such as the Sayyad district international military forces have little noticeable 
presence. Whilst this explanation may be partially valid, it does not explain 
how and why the post-2001 Afghan state remains effective in performing as 
the state as this thesis reveals and powerful in the everyday life of ordinary 
Afghans. The story of how the post-2001 Afghan state came to be assembled 
and survives sheds light on the processes and outcomes of international 
peacebuilding and state formation efforts. 
 
This chapter introduces the key research questions, objectives, concepts and 
arguments of the thesis. Section I provides a brief critique of the current 
discussion on the post-2001 state and the nature of statehood in Afghanistan. 
It proposes a political network approach to the study of international 
peacebuilding and state formation. Section II outlines a new explanation for 
the relationship between informal endogenous political networks and the 
state, one that makes explicit the co-constitutive and network character of 
peacebuilding and state formation, discussed below. The latter part of this 
section offers a conceptualisation of political networks in statebuilding. 
Section III details the research design and methodology. The final section 
provides a summary guide to each individual chapter.  
 
I. The Post-2001 Afghan State  
 
The September 11 Al-Qaida attacks in the US triggered an international 
peace support intervention in Afghanistan. The interventions and 
peacebuilding efforts, which followed, were part of a multilateral and multi-
dimensional process involving the dominant forms of peacemaking and 
peacebuilding favoured by leading states and international organisations. On 
the 5th December, shaped by rapidly evolving events on the ground, the 
international community as well as the four main Afghan political groups 
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invited to the internationally mediated Bonn Conference concluded an 
agreement about provincial arrangements pending the re-establishment of 
permanent government institutions (known as the Bonn Agreement). 1  The 
Bonn Agreement provided a political framework for re-assembling and 
transforming the post-2001 state. Through a grand power-sharing bargain at 
Bonn, the former Mujahedeen tanzim (military-political network forms of 
organisations) leaders and commanders, who had assisted in temporarily 
defeating the Taliban and who possessed the necessary coercive 
organisational capacities, were given the task of re-assembling the state and 
establishing the interim government. The Bonn Conference gave legitimacy to 
this power structuring because of the agreed logic of a “light footprint” 
approach to peacebuilding (Suhrke 2009);2 however the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) was only deployed to Kabul, leaving the periphery 
unassisted. By 2008 this intervention was one of the most intrusive, long-
lasting and costly missions since the early 1990s. At its peak in 2009, it 
involved approximately 140,000 international coalition troops on the ground. 
 
The recent shift in emphasis from peacebuilding to statebuilding has made 
‘the state’ the central object of international intervention. However, there has 
been no single authoritative account of the post-2001 Afghan state. Many 
studies (Ottoway & Lieven 2002; Ghani et.al. 2005; Rubin 2006) of post-2001 
international intervention and peacebuilding efforts discuss the state either 
partially or in passing. Moreover, these studies generally attempt to address 
the role and impact of international efforts to build formal state institutions. 
Maley (2002 & 2006) and Goodson (2003) highlight the failure of the 
                                                        
1  The first group was the Northern Alliance (NA) Jihadis, a loose coalition of former 
Mujahedeen groups who had fought one another during the civil war (1992-6) but had formed 
a united front to counter the Taliban offensive.  Among them, the most dominant political 
network was Jamiat Tanzim (political-military structures) which in turn was dominated by its 
military wing, the Panjsheris of Shura-yi-Nizar.  The Rome group was associated with the 
former King, Zahir Shah. The Peshawar group was linked to Gilani, supposedly representing 
the old seven Sunni Mujahedeen groups in Pakistan. The final group – known as the Cyprus 
group – was associated with Humayoun Jareer in Iran. The Rome group was selected to 
balance and represent the Western interests, the NA were the winners against the Taliban 
while the two smaller groups were arguably selected to please Afghanistan’s neighbours, in 
particular Iran and Pakistan. 
2 Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN envoy to Afghanistan explained a light footprint approach as: “the 
[UN] interventions should avoid the creation of parallel institutions and dual systems which 
undermine local authority, hinder coordination and precipitate competition” (2007: 4). 
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international community at Bonn to resolve elites divisions and their impact on 
state re-building. Suhrke, examining the impact of the international 
peacebuilding effort, suggested that donors have created a “rentier state” 
because of their “tight embraced” approach to statebuilding (2009: 243-4). 
She argued that the Afghan state has become closely tied to the power of 
foreign troops and capital, which essentially undermines the legitimacy of the 
state. Ghani et al. (2005) asserts that the Afghan state suffers from a 
“sovereignty gap” because of its primary dependence on donors, a condition 
characterised as “quasi-sovereignty” by Jackson and Rosberg (1982). Both of 
these studies condition the survival of the state to the continuation of 
international funds and military presence. In another critique, Johnson and 
Leslie (2004), both practitioners with years of working experience in 
Afghanistan, argue that the perceptions, strategies and objectives of 
international intervention conflict with the Afghan people’s understanding of 
their country, which subsequently undermines the creation of a democratic 
state.  They argue that the international interveners risked manufacturing a 
“narco-state” which maintains itself through the drug trade. As the planned 
2014 NATO-led withdrawal approaches there is more emphasis on the 
regional aspect of the Afghan state, the “bad neighborhood” effect. 
 
Many of the above analyses characterise the post-2001 Afghan state as 
“weak”, “fragile”, “corrupt”, and even as a “narco-state”. This characterisation 
of the Afghan state is consistent with the dominant liberal peace evaluation, 
which measures success in terms of the state’s formal institutional capacities 
to exercise autonomy and sovereignty. 3  According to this institutionalist 
approach to statebuilding it is hardly surprising that many of the above 
analysts are skeptical about the survival of the state in post-2014 Afghanistan. 
Key figures in statebuilding studies have argued for the establishment of 
strong state institutions that should contain inter-elite competition 
(Chesterman 2004; Paris 2004; Fearon & Laitin 2004). As noted by 
                                                        
3 A state is usually considered ‘strong’ if it possesses a combination of state autonomy and 
capacity (Evans et. a. 1985; Migdal 1988). It must have both infrastructural and despotic 
power (Mann 1986).  Autonomy is often referred to as the state’s ability to formulate interests 
of its own, independent of societal forces. Capacity is defined in terms of the state’s ability to 
implement strategies to achieve economic, political and social goals (Barkey & Parikh 1991: 
526).  
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Heathershaw in relation to peace in post-conflict Tajikistan, sceptics have few 
resources with which to explore the nature of peace when it does not imitate 
the ideal ‘liberal peace’ (2009:2). The same can be said about the nature of 
the statehood in Afghanistan where it does not conform to liberal democratic 
statehood assumptions and criteria. Statebuilding approaches which focus on 
the role of formal institutions and organisations in providing a structural 
framework of incentives neglect the more important informal politics of 
statebuilding: the role of endogenous informal political networks their daily 
practices such as patronage, illegality and opportunism.  
 
A number of studies have attempted to address these inadequacies by 
employing various micro-level analyses to explain the nature of statehood in 
Afghanistan. Giustozzi (2004 & 2007) and Mukhopadhyay (2009) have 
highlighted the role of “warlord politics” and “strongmen politics”, which they 
argue have guaranteed stability. Bhatia and Sedra (2007) expose the central 
role of local commanders and powerbrokers in the constitution of the Afghan 
army. A more insightful account, Goodhand (2010), underlines the role of a 
war economy in supporting the Afghan state. Recent policy studies have 
crudely positioned the Afghan state alongside the predatory elites and their 
corrupt practices (Cordesman 2010). A more comprehensive account of the 
post-2001 state and statehood is provided by Coburn (2011b) who examines 
the dynamics of endogenous social groups in the small Afghan town of Estalif, 
north of Kabul. In this ethnographic work, he tries to explain how peace is 
maintained at a local level in rural Afghanistan where the state seems to be a 
mere “useful fiction”.  
 
This thesis builds on these studies to address the puzzle of how the Afghan 
state survives. In doing so, it offers an alternative lens, a network lens, to 
understand post-2001 international peacebuilding and state formation efforts 
in Afghanistan. Whilst most of the studies mentioned above frame 
Afghanistan’s three decades of conflict and development in relation to the role 
of elites, this study contends that elites must be understood first and foremost 
in relation to the political networks they constitute and represent, as discussed 
in section II.II. This thesis thus employs a different analytical approach, a 
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political network approach by examining the role and power dynamics of 
informal endogenous political networks of organisation (political networks) in 
statebuilding and state formation. This approach will also analyse the impact 
of the power dynamics and practices of political networks on state survival 
and the political order. Political networks are understood as distinct open-
hierarchical structures whose members are interdependent on each other’s 
power and resources for political outcomes in an informally structured and 
continuously renegotiated arrangement. A more detailed conceptualisation of 
political networks is provided in section II.III.  
 
There are two main driving rationales for this approach. First, the post-2001 
state re-assembling process cannot be reduced to the formal agreement in 
the Bonn Conference. Whilst the Bonn political settlement had serious 
consequences on state re-assembling (Chapter 5), the post-2001 state cannot 
be detached from Afghanistan’s continuous historical struggle for state 
formation and statehood. This analysis adheres to the recent view that post-
conflict states are never built entirely by either internal or external actors but 
are subject to ongoing processes of formation (Herring & Rangwala 2006; 
Heathershaw 2012; Bliesmann de Guevara 2008). Berman and Lonsdale 
distinguish state-building as a ‘a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of 
control’ from state formation, which is ‘an historical process whose outcome is 
a largely unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, negotiations and 
compromises between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-
offs constitute the “vulgarisation” of power’ (1992: 5). As Chapter 4 highlights, 
Afghanistan’s last forty years of violence have been dominated by a pattern of 
war-making, peace-making (the 2001 Bonn Conference was the only most 
recent example of an internationally mediated and highly flawed political pact), 
intervention and statebuilding (first by the Soviet Union and then by the 
Western countries).4 The post-2001 state and statehood must be understood 
by analysing the continuities and changes in the power dynamics of local 
political networks during this period, which is discussed in Chapter 4.   
                                                        
4 Previous political settlements since 1989—the 1989 Rawalpindi Accord, the 1991 Peshawar 
Agreement and the 1992 Macca Accord—have all fallen short of resolving the problem of 
political network competition. 
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Second, the post-2001 state must not be treated as a unitary entity, exhibiting 
an unproblematic and uniform organisational structure. We must contend with 
the recent studies of the anthropology of the state in Central Asia, which sees 
the state as a “contested field” subject to material and symbolic competition 
and conflict between rival political forces (Collins 2002; Schatz 2004; Reeves 
2009; Rasanayagam 2011; Reeves, Rasanayagam & Beyer 2014). The post-
2001 state in Afghanistan is essentially a “complex strategic terrain”, to use 
Jessop’s (2000: 4-9) phrase, where competing local political networks occupy 
key strategic parts then attempt to expand their power and interests. As such, 
the role and power dynamics of local political networks and their day-to-day 
practices are fundamental to our understanding of peace and statehood in 
post-conflict situations. This thesis addresses two principle research 
objectives: (a) what are the impacts of power dynamics within political 
networks on the process of state formation over a medium term once a 
political settlement is reached; and (b) how political network practices 
contribute towards state survival/collapse and peace/violence. This study is 
therefore explicitly concerned with the role of endogenous political networks in 
peacebuilding rather than the international peacebuilding impacts on the local. 
The how rather than why question is important. To ask the why question 
requires one to control all the variables and explanations (e.g. the explicit role 
of external actors such as NGOs, private firms, donors and their level of 
investment) including those that are ‘external’ to this specific research context 
(e.g. the formal hegemony of state sovereignty in international politics). 
However, by asking the how questions, this thesis incorporates these actors 
into the analysis through the proposed political network approach, bringing the 
focus to bear on their power dynamics and daily performances. How is the 
post-2001 state re-built and transformed as the result of power dynamics 
between competing endogenous political networks? How political order and 
state stability is achieved? How are informal political networks embedded in 
formal state institutions? A focus on informal political networks raises 
questions about the processes and outcomes of international statebuilding 
and state formation which go beyond the case of Afghanistan. 
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II. The Network Politics of International Statebuilding: A Neglected 
Element  
 
In the last decade the focus among students of international peacebuilding 
has shifted from peacebuilding to statebuilding, prioritising institutionalisation 
over liberalisation (Paris 2004; Chesterman 2004; Doyle & Sambanis 2006). 
Statebuilding is generally considered a particular approach to peacebuilding. 
Chesterman defines statebuilding as “constructing or reconstructing 
institutions of governance” (2004: 1-2). Paris and Sisk refer to statebuilding as 
the “construction or strengthening of legitimate government institutions in 
countries that are emerging from civil conflict” (2009: 1). It involves imposing a 
set of practical measures designed to shape society and its polity by 
introducing democratic practices, an open market economy, re-building and 
modernising the state and its institutions (Paris 1997). From the late-1990s, 
some critics have pointed out the failure of “liberal peace” to address the root 
causes of war (Duffield 1999; Paris 1997 & 2000; Doyle & Sambanis 2000), 
the impact of peacebuilding missions on societies in which they operate 
(Heathershaw, 2008; Bliesemann de Guevara, 2012), and the aims and 
motives of the actors involved in sponsoring and implementing peacebuilding 
activities (Richmond 2004; Chandler 2010).  
 
The more recent critical literature (Richmond 2011A; MacGinty 2011b) has 
shown how statebuilding practices depart from liberal peace discourse and 
objectives, and produces a “hybrid peace” as the result of international-local 
contestation and compromises.  Most of these works are considered major 
breakthroughs in the field, as reminded by Heathershaw (2009: 3); such keen 
responses in fact reflect the weakness of the field of inquiry. They have not 
only overlooked the informal aspects of international statebuilding, but also 
the role of local forces in shaping the strategies and practices of statebuilding. 
Whilst the “hybrid peace” literature has provided a significant shift in 
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incorporating endogenous actors, institutions and structures into statebuilding 
processes, Richmond’s framing of hybrid liberal-local structures remains 
implicitly oppositional. Also, the hybrid peace approach reduces the 
examination of local actors to analysis of the failures of the elites whilst also 
treating the liberal peace as a homogenous discourse and practice. A 
systematic account of the co-constitutive and intertwined international-local 
power dynamics has yet to be produced with a particular focus on the network 
character of statebuilding as well as with an eye to the hitherto ignored 
endogenous political networks and their role in the process of re-assembling 
and transforming the post-conflict state.  
 
This thesis analyses how political power is assembled and flows through 
political networks in statebuilding processes. The complexity of international 
statebuilding and statehood cannot fully be captured by international relations 
lenses of macro-categories of nation-state and civil society or by conflict 
resolution lenses of conflict management. Most statebuilding literature would 
acknowledge the existence of networks but would see them as a means to an 
end – the progressive accumulation of national sovereignty by a hierarchical 
organisation (the state). They also generally treat networks as a residue of 
state and civil society. Against these, this thesis suggests that networks are 
an enduring and constitutive part of international statebuilding. A focus on 
networks goes against the state-centric, elite-centric and object-subject 
analyses which dominate the literature. In a context where the state is either 
fragile or eroded and economic-political and cultural-political divisions govern 
local politics, a network approach enables us to go beyond the methodological 
constraints which limit power politics to opposed dichotomies of state-society, 
visibility-invisibility, formal-informal, and public and private. It helps us to 
better understand how complex political-economic (both licit and illicit) and 
identity networks connect a diverse web of politicians, insurgents, drug 
traffickers, arms smugglers and local powerbrokers in constituting and 
transforming the post-conflict state and producing the state effect. A network 
approach to statebuilding offers a more nuanced way to account for everyday 
politics and practices that often go unexamined in statebuilding. A further 
conceptualisation of political networks is provided below (section II.III). A 
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network approach to statebuilding and state formation makes two conceptual 
moves in the literature: (1) from the institutional and structural effect to the 
informal network character and (2) from the behavioral aspects of 
peacebuilding and state formation to its daily performance, discussed in 
section II.III.  
 
The purpose of the below first section is simply to show the network character 
of international statebuilding, addressed by some recent scholarly work 
(Ohanyan 2008; Natsios 2005; Evans & Davies 1999) before presenting the 
core argument of this thesis. It merely attempts to show that international 
networks (e.g. policy, service implementing networks) have become an 
integral feature of post-conflict statebuilding.  
 
II.I. International Networks and Statebuilding  
 
The re-building and transformation of the post-conflict state is the outcome of 
interactions between a diverse set of international actors and institutions and 
their distinct objectives and practices. The peacebuilding industry imports and 
assembles a varied network of administrative expatriates (e.g. experts, 
technicians and politicians), international aid agencies (e.g. the World Bank, 
UN agencies), service delivery Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
ethical discourses (e.g. human rights, freedom of expressions, child labour) 
into the post-conflict space. This complex and crowded field is best described 
by Paris as a  ‘loosely structured network’, because it constitutes a system 
that is neither a ‘market’, where interaction is based on pursuing individual 
goals with little sense of sharing common objectives, nor a ‘hierarchy’, a 
system of top-down command management (2009: 61). International 
peacebuilding missions like those in post-2001 Afghanistan suffers from a 
lack of joint planning and coordination, information-sharing and most 
importantly a hierarchical command structure. In such a confused and rapidly 
transforming setting, statebuilding actors and organisations are tied into a 
network of interdependency without being properly coordinated. Both 
international and local actors recognise that their purposes could not be 
achieved independently and thus all actions became mutually interdependent. 
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Formations such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC), Independent Election Commission (IEC) and National Solidarity 
Program (NSP) are essentially network assemblages, exported from one 
post-conflict context to another. 
 
The privatisation of tasks through the integration of state-non-state actors, 
including intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), NGOs and private 
transnational firms, has become a key feature of post-conflict statebuilding 
(DeMars, 2005; Richmond, 2005; Natsios, 2005)5. Collaborative governance 
literature suggests that international organisational structures are becoming 
more network-based to deal with globalised challenges (Mandell 2002; Stone 
2000; Schneider & Hyner 2006). Ohanyan (2008) found that network linkages 
and relations have deepened collaboration among donor governments and 
their aid agencies which helped to formulate policies and coordinate program 
objectives in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2009: 233) 
asserted that governments in international arenas are more likely to operate 
under network structures when 1) issues call for quick action; 2) uncertainty is 
pronounced; 3) their preferences differ from rival domestic agents; and 4) 
there is a desire to avoid spoilers. These conditions are often fulfilled in armed 
conflict/international intervention contexts. Network collaboration based on 
interdependency produces network structures which help to share 
information, increase governance capacity, reduce differences and integrate 
diverse approaches and strategies (Slaughter 1997; Khagram 2006). The 
Peacebuilding Commission is one such permanent network structure, set up 
with the aim of filling a hole in the institutional arrangement of peacebuilding 
by bringing greater coherence to the myriad activities of agencies both inside 
and outside the UN. In post-2001 Afghanistan, donors regularly set up ad hoc 
network policy formations such as the ‘donor discussion group’ and ‘coalition 
coordination committee’ to better achieve their objectives.  
 
                                                        
5 In the 1970s government resources going directly to developing countries accounted for 70 
per cent, presently this number has reversed to 15 per cent. The other 85 per cent flows 
through non-state actors (USAID 2006 in Ohanyan 2008: 1). Similarly, the European Union 
Commission Humanitarian Aid Office relied on NGOs to channel 60 per cent of its finance 
(Reindrop, 2001). 
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Service delivery and implantation network structures are also expanding. 
NGO network formations like the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief 
(ACBAR), Afghan Women Network (AWN) and Afghanistan Civil Society 
Forum (ACSF) are established to facilitate coordination mechanisms, 
organise common objectives, share information and promote interests. 
Natsios (2005) highlighted the significant role of NGOs in implementing 
organisations for IGOs, serving as institutional extensions of the liberal peace 
statebuilding process. Their strategic position in international statebuilding as 
expert organisations (e.g. Human Rights Watch), democracy promotion (e.g. 
Democracy International, National Democratic Institute), microfinance (e.g. 
Danish Refugee, Care International, Aga Khan Foundation) define their power 
in peacebuilding network governance. In post-conflict settings, the IGO-NGO 
network structures act as bridges between local-international actors and 
organisations. Evans and Davies (1999) highlighted their important role as 
“policy transfer networks” transferring administrative and institutional 
knowledge and memory from one post-conflict state to another. Ohanyan 
(2008) has also documented this policy transfer from Bosnia to post-2001 
Afghanistan in the microfinance sector.  
 
Network collaborative structures in statebuilding are sites of power politics for 
domination and influence. Although interdependent on each other’s efforts, 
international donors and their aid agencies often do not share a common 
policy strategy to statebuilding. Each international donor has its own 
institutional bias and orientation which results in a highly fragmented 
implementation process (Caplan 2005). This is evident in post-2001 
Afghanistan, where statebuilding is pursued in multiple and fragmented forms 
producing multiple competing institutional arrangements. In Afghanistan, more 
than forty international donors contributed towards security provision and sub-
national institutional-building efforts, each pursuing their own priorities, 
approaches and implementation policies in their region.6 Several studies have 
                                                        
6  In the north and northeast, the Germans are mainly responsible for security and 
peacebuilding efforts, in Helmand the British and in Kandahar the Canadians. A closer look at 
the security sector reform is revealing. Whilst the Germans in the north have advocated a 
longer-term approach in training the Afghan civilian police, in the south the Americans have 
focused on establishing a counter-insurgency police force with as little as two weeks’ training. 
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shown that among NGOs these power politics arise over specific 
programmatic orientations and priorities (Ohanyan 2008), policy 
implementation (Stone 2001) and competition over funds (Rigby 2001) which 
have a significant effect on the statebuilding process. Rigby (2001) found that 
network collaboration does not always help resolve coordination problems nor 
produce optimal results. Ohanyan (2008) established that inter-organisational 
conflicts and power contestation produced fragmented policies in Bosnia and 
Afghanistan and in many cases loss of policy control by individual IGOs and 
their supporting states. The heterogeneity of network statebuilding efforts 
refutes the dominant claim that liberal peace is a homogenous discourse and 
practice. Network power contestation in international statebuilding is further 
complicated when one adds the power dynamics of endogenous political 
networks to the equation.  
 
II.II Endogenous Networks and Statebuilding7  
 
The liberal peace approach to peacebuilding has been criticised for failing to 
realise that post-conflict liberalization can engender further local inter-elite 
battles while failing to tackle the root causes of conflict (Paris 1997; Duffield 
1999). Stedman (1997) defined the role of non-cooperative elites in the 
implementation of peace settlements as spoilers, and advocated the 
strategies that international “custodians of the peace” can adopt to induce, 
socialize or coerce into the terms of the political settlement. Leading figures, 
since then, have argued that the post-conflict state must be constituted 
through strong formal institutions (Chesterman 2004; Paris 2004). In recent 
years, Richmond (2011) and MacGinty (2010) have brought our attention to 
the contextual role of endogenous actors and their power relations with 
international statebuilding in producing a local-international hybrid peace. 
Similarly, Barnett and Zurcher (2009) have argued that existing approaches 
                                                                                                                                                              
Similarly, in the area of counter-narcotics, the Germans and Dutch have advocated the 
legalisation of the poppy, Americans have favoured a complete eradication while the British 
have employed a soft strategy of limited coercion combined with introducing alternative 
livelihoods. Interesting – one might wonder if the interventionist forces are dividing rather than 
uniting the state with these divergent policies. 
7 The local here is understood as anything that is not international (e.g. nation-state, sub-
national, and regional).  
 23 
are systemic-centric, focusing on international actors, treating domestic 
politics as “constraints” and thus failing to incorporate fully the preferences 
and strategies of local actors, thereby ignoring domestic politics. In their 
recent work comparing Afghanistan with Tajikistan, they argued that both 
cooperation with an accommodating elite, and conflict with spoilers are the 
two least likely outcomes for an international peacebuilding mission from a 
total of four possibilities. They argued that state and sub-national elites are 
often able to protect factional interests whilst retaining a veneer of stability – 
an outcome of “compromised peacebuilding”.  A further option is that of 
“captured peacebuilding”, where “state and local elites are able to redirect the 
distribution of assistance so that it is fully consistent with their interests” 
(Barnett & Zurcher 2009: 24-25). These conclusions provide better 
explanations for post-2001 political order in Afghanistan, and they raise 
important questions about who and what has compromised or captured 
peacebuilding processes beneath the surface of formal politics.  
 
This thesis shares Barnett and Zurcher’s concerns yet starts from the position 
that post-conflict political elites must be understood first and foremost with 
respect to their political networks and the hierarchical authority structures that 
they both constitute and represent. Local politics cannot be reduced only to an 
analysis of elites and their orientation for or against an internationally 
mediated political settlement. Three of the four main political groups gathered 
at the 2001 Bonn Conference were mainly representatives of the former 
seven Sunni groups and eight Shia Afghan Mujahedeen groups (known as 
tanzims); they originated in the 1980s and fought one another between 1992-
2001. These tanzims were at best network forms of political organisations 
because of their open-hierarchical structures. Sinno (2008: 1) described them 
as highly decentralized and continuously renegotiated arrangements involving 
field commanders who provided their loyalty, support and assistance to a 
party in return for the resources necessary to maintain their resistance 
activities. These tanzims were able to perform a number of essential tasks 
such as coordinating military actions, mobilising resources for providing 
services and manipulating information to achieve their objectives of defeating 
the Soviets. They built extensive webs of connections with tribal chiefs, village 
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mullahs, commanders and community leaders in the region under their control 
(Roy 1990). According to Sinno (2008) the tanzims’ network structure and 
their modes of operation made them a formidable resistance force against 
Soviet intervention and were ultimately responsible for their success.  
 
In the post-2001 setting where the state institutions and structures were 
eroded, and indeed some were missing, the international intervention and 
statebuilding organisations found themselves relying on these former 
Mujahedeen tanzims to re-assemble and found the interim government 
(Chapter 5). Following the 2001 Bonn Conference power-sharing 
arrangement these political networks came to occupy a strategic part of the 
state through which they expanded their power and interest by constituting the 
state administration and bureaucracy. As Chapter 5 shows the state and 
political networks became undistinguishable from one another in post-2001 
statebuilding wherein the established networks masqueraded as the state. 
However, in the post-2001 period these former tanzims underwent a process 
of re-structuring in terms of their organisational capacity, internal structure and 
power relations. Since, they have further splintered into smaller sub-networks 
whilst new ones have also emerged with stronger links to international 
statebuilding organisations. To understand the post-conflict statehood and the 
state we must pay particular attention to the informal role of these political 
networks and the impact of power dynamics amongst them.  
 
II.III Conceptualising Political Networks in Post-2001 Statebuilding  
 
What, though, are “political networks” whose everyday practices this research 
studies? To locate the work theoretically within an existing diverse and fast-
expanding literature on network and organisational studies requires some 
conceptual clarification. While the study of social and policy networks has 
developed over the last half of the century, a focus on political networks has 
largely been neglected. In fact, this might be the strength of this study.  
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The network as a concept is confusing.8 However, as Rhodes (2006: 434) 
commented, the large number and variety of articles published on networks, 
especially on organisational networks and policy networks testify to the 
continuing usefulness of the term. One can identify two dominant types of 
network in most studies: network-as-relations and network-as-governance. 
The network-as-relations discourse focuses mainly on the individual level 
relationships and the structure of these relationships within the network. Early 
anthropologists (Mitchell 1969; Kapferer 1972) explored how individuals and 
groups were linked together and how their relational characteristics affected 
social outcomes using such concepts as positions, density, centrality and 
links. In the 1990s sociological studies broadened the focus from a concern 
with individual relationships amongst actors to the structural characteristics of 
networks, introducing concepts such as ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992; 
Wasserman & Faust 1994), ‘social capital, ‘brokerage’ and ‘enclosure’ (Burt 
1992 & 2005). For instance, the term network was used to explain how elites 
occupy important positions within organisations and how this helps/hinders 
access to political and economic opportunities (Powell & Smith-Doerr 1994; 
Podolny & Page 1998; Granovetter 1974; Burt, 1992) and how agencies 
coordinate and integrate their activities for better outcomes (Heinz et. al.,).  
 
Recent studies in public policy (Rhodes 1997 & 2006), public management 
(Provan & Kenis 2008; Kickert et al., 1997; Kooiman 1993), organisation 
theory (Powell 1990) and international relations (Kahler 2009; Martinez-Diaz & 
Nagaire 2009) have employed the concept of the network as a mechanism of 
coordination, or what has often been referred to as network governance. The 
network-as-governance conception considers networks as an alternative 
mode of operation between the Weberian hierarchical state and neoliberal 
theories of delivering public services through private markets. Networks are 
treated as units of analysis. In one of the early influential papers in economic 
sociology, Powell (1990) argued that networks are distinctive forms of co-
                                                        
8 The network as a concept has been understood variously as a ‘theory’ in early anthropology 
(Barnes 1972; Mitchell 1969), a ‘metaphor’ in international relations and politics (Emirbayer & 
Goodwin 1994), a ‘method’ in social network analysis (Scott 2000; Wasserman & Faust 
1994), and as an analytical tool in organisational theory in sociology (Powell 1990; Podolny & 
Page 1998). 
 
 26 
ordinating economic activity. He questioned the dominant paradigms that 
conceptualise networks as a hybrid of market and hierarchy. Rhodes (1997) 
asserted that an emerging form of governance is replacing the traditionally 
hierarchical structures that are network-based. He stressed the task of 
governance being carried out by flexible and diverse self-organising and self-
regulating inter-organisational networks (Rhodes 1997: 15). In these terms 
governance is therefore about managing networks.  
 
This study builds on these network-as-governance studies to conceptualise 
informal endogenous political networks in statebuilding processes. As defined 
above, political networks are informally arranged open-hierarchical structures 
whose members are reliant on one another’s resources, subject to 
continuously renegotiated arrangement. Political networks are treated as 
autonomous political structures with their own structural characteristics, 
modes of conflict resolutions, and bases of legitimacy. In post-2001 
Afghanistan both the former Mujahedeen political networks and the newly 
established ones are hierarchically arranged entities around a charismatic 
leader while retaining network-like structures in terms of their institutional 
arrangements, patterns of exchange, flows of resources and reciprocal lines 
of information. Therefore political networks are conceptualised as hybrid 
forms of network and hierarchy, which is elaborated in Chapter 3. This is 
consistent with recent public management literature (Agranoff & McGuire 
2003; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004), which assert that a distinction between these 
concepts is superfluous and misleading. Agranoff and McGuire (2007: 83) 
understand networks both as open-hierarchical arrangements and 
collaborative, which they term ‘collaborarchies’. A key feature of political 
networks in statebuilding is the ability of their members to exit the network at 
any time if he/she does not find it advantageous. In fact the flexibility, fluidity 
and constantly re-negotiated arrangement of political networks in post-2001 
statebuilding is their strength, as pointed out by Granovetter in his path-
breaking thesis, “the strength of the weak ties” (1974).9   
                                                        
9 The concept of the “strength of weak ties” suggests that loose-knit networks can have 
greater resource-gathering potential for the individual (ego) than close-knit networks, because 
the members of dense networks are shaken down more quickly, and the reach to other 
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Some of the most important aspects of political networks are their power 
dependency relations. In post-2001 international statebuilding in Afghanistan, 
where political networks have constituted the state (Chapter 5), resources and 
power-dependency relations have determined the structure of relationship 
between nodes both within a political network and among political networks 
themselves. Power lies in the strategic positioning of nodes within a complex 
web of interdependencies in building, sustaining and strengthening links 
across international-local actors and organisations. In relation to the politics of 
networks, Lake and Wong (2009: 129) have argued that nodes are (1) 
cognizant actors able to formulate and carry out utility-improving choices; (2) 
alternative outcomes which have distributional implications for nodes, 
favouring some over others; and (3) variable in the power or influence they 
possess.  
 
Rhodes and Marsh (1992) and Rhodes (2007) model of power-dependency is 
particularly useful to this analysis. They argue that structural relationships 
between political institutions are based on patterns of resource-dependency 
relations, often with conflicting interests, goals and strategies. The 
relationships are shaped by an asymmetry of power dynamics in which those 
who are resource rich within the network tend to dominate those who are 
resource poor. Various forms of negotiation such as persuasion, bargaining 
and ‘power games’ take place among these networks, where they maneuver 
with one another (Rhodes 1997: 11). These are game-like interactions, rooted 
in trust and regulated by the rules of the game, which are negotiated and 
agreed by network participants (1997: 53). Klijn and Skecher (2007: 598) 
referred to this as the ‘instrumental conjecture’ on networks, that powerful 
actors increase their capacity to shape and deliver public policy. Bargaining is 
seen as key to the functioning of political networks (Rhodes 1997; Agranoff & 
McGuire 2003). Chapters 6 and 7 shows how these power-dependency 
                                                                                                                                                              
potential sources of support is more circumscribed. Weak ties, on the other hand, are often 
bridges into other social realms and potential sources of support. The “strength” part of the 
argument is contained in the following two propositions: 1) Weak ties facilitate the flow of 
information from otherwise distant parts of a network; 2) Weak ties help integrate social 
systems. 
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relationships work based on practices of bargaining and exchange, which help 
political networks to expand their power and interest within the post-2001 
state.  
 
There are, however, a number of caveats that we must place on this political 
framing of political networks and our study of post-conflict state and 
governance in large. First, Rhode’s model reflects a well-functioning 
Westminster model of government and stable inter-governmental policy 
networks. In post-2001 Afghanistan, the role of political networks must be 
analysed within the context of re-assembling and re-building the state. We 
must ask the question, how do political networks constitute the state and 
subsequently how do conflicts among them produce order/disorder and 
stability/instability? Given the fiercely contested and conflictive space of the 
state in the immediate intervention and statebuilding period, one has to 
analyse the power dynamics of political networks during moments of conflicts 
and contestations. Second, the principle focus of the above public and policy 
management literature is the formal inter-governmental networks which 
overlook the role of informal networks. A study of informal political networks in 
statebuilding brings our attention to the notion of network effectiveness, 
discussed further in Chapter 3. Network effectiveness is critical for our 
understanding of the power dynamics of political networks and their impact on 
the post-2001 state. However, network effectiveness in post-2001 
statebuilding in Afghanistan means examining the day-to-day network 
practices that are often illegal, informal and opportunistic (Chapter 6 and 7).  
 
Third, in post-2001 Afghanistan, the constitutive nature of political networks 
within the state makes it almost impossible to differentiate between 
administrative and bureaucratic networks. We need to consider political 
networks as a ‘competent boundary-spanners’, a concept proposed by 
Agranoff and McGuire (1997) and Williams (2002). A boundary-spanner 
moves within and across all levels of the state, leading to questions about the 
boundaries of the state. Fourth, much of the literature on policy networks 
struggles to account for the changes occurring over time. They concentrate on 
static snapshots of particular networks at any one moment. Recent work by 
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Bevir and Rhodes (2004) has addressed this shortcoming by providing a 
‘decentred approach’, a bottom-up approach to network analysis. The political 
network approach offered here examines the dynamics and processes of 
political network transformation over time within different contexts, 
documenting continuities and changes. Finally, an analysis of political 
networks requires exploring not only the power relations and practices within 
and among competing political networks, but also their links to local 
communities. Political networks are embedded in social contexts that they 
claim to represent (or manipulate). Therefore, we must analyse the 
relationship between political networks and the wider local communities they 
attempt to manipulate to consolidate the bargaining positions within the new 
political order (Chapter 6).   
 
 
III. Research Design and Methodology 
 
A political network approach to post-conflict statebuilding and state formation 
is different from the dominant approaches in network and organisational 
studies because it focuses on day-to-day network performances. Most 
network studies analyse either the types of networks (Sinno, 2008), the 
internal structure of networks (Knoke 1990; Burt 1992), or strategies used in 
managing networks to explain outcomes (Kickert et al, 1997; O’Toole 1997). 
This thesis stresses that although the basic make-up of political networks is 
important, it tells us little about the impact of their day-to-day practices on the 
post-conflict state. With this in mind, the thesis employs ethnography, 
including participatory observation and in-depth interviews, in order to collect 
data and develop the main framework. Ethnography provides a rich inductive 
approach within which to frame the analysis as well as allowing for immersion 
in the field over a long period of time. 
 
Conventionally, ethnography was defined as the overt or covert participation 
of the ethnographer in “the daily lives of the people who are his/her subjects 
for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is 
said, asking questions, collecting whatever data is available to throw light on 
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the issues that are the focus of the research” (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983: 
1). Ethnography is therefore equated with participant observation as the 
defining method. However, a number of ethnographic studies have gone 
beyond this simple account, highlighting the role of “hidden transcripts” (Scott 
1985 & 1990), questioning the validity of people’s claims, suggesting that 
ethnography’s core value is its ability to “peel the onion skin” of reality (Allina-
Pisano 2009), and probing whether there is any such thing as reality separate 
from the researcher that is discoverable (Wedeen 2004). Studies that 
examine daily political performances argue that what is discovered is the “type 
of performance” that the subject provides to the researcher. As argued by 
Wedeen (2004), the key principle is not about whether the ethnographer is an 
insider or outsider, or how accurate or inaccurate participants will be; rather 
that each voice should be interpreted as what perspectives, practices and 
assumptions it reveals. Combining the conventional and new approaches to 
political ethnography, Schatz argues that ethnography requires first 
“immersion” and then “sensibility” to the meaning people under study attribute 
to their social and political reality (2009: 7-8).  
 
Schatz’s understanding has been the central premise on which this fieldwork 
was carried out. In divided societies like Afghanistan, where trust is low and 
uncertainty high, people’s positions and sub-texts constantly shift as settings 
change and events unfold. Early on in the fieldwork, I became conscious of 
this on a rainy day in early March 2011, sitting in the back seat of a shared 
taxi. A conversation about pollution in the city stared among the three other 
passengers as the rain intensified. The middle-aged woman who had been 
offered a front seat by the young Panjshiris passenger, abiding by the 
society’s gender segregation norms, claimed that over-population was the 
main reason for the pollution in Kabul city. The discussion deepened when 
she complained with irritation that it was the fault of immigrants arriving from 
the provinces, commenting, “I am from Kabul but I don’t go to live in Kunar or 
Panjshir”. Offended by her comment, the young Panjshiri passenger 
indignantly responded, “Kabul is the capital city, it is for all Afghans.” The 
driver, a government employee, who claimed to be from Kabul, 
wholeheartedly supported the woman’s position. As the debate heated around 
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identities and who was entitled to live in Kabul city, the other passenger and I 
listened quietly to the debate. The conversation suddenly took a different 
twist, as soon as the woman got off. At the time of her departure the driver 
looked at the young Panjshiri passenger and I and uttered, “Ei zan ajab kalla 
kharab bud [What a big-headed woman]”. The gossiping continued. 
 
Understanding the fluid and shifting performances of the actors and the 
attributed meanings they offer is challenging. On several occasions I found 
myself falling into the trap of “ethnographic seduction” described by Robben 
and Nordstrom (1995: 83), in other words being led astray by informants. I 
found that political actors (e.g. politicians, government officials, tribal elders) 
constantly employed strategies of persuasion, manipulation, deception and 
concealment to function within a system based on patronage and 
opportunistic practices. Clients often exaggerated what they knew and how 
well they were connected to others and on some occasions simply lied for 
symbolic and material gains. This was evident in the Wolesi Jirga during the 
2010-2011 Special Court crisis (Chapter 7) and the 2009 presidential election 
(Chapter 6) where political actors constantly employed such strategies to 
undermine their opponents and to conceal their illegal and opportunistic 
practices. This ambiguity and strategy of concealment was the primary cause 
of difficulty whilst trying to draw a clear line as to who is connected to whom 
and at what levels, except at the network core. Overcoming this challenge 
meant supplementing the participatory observations with multiple interviews 
(more than 130 interviews), and waiting for events to settle before a reliable 
account could be determined. 
 
One of the key criticisms levelled against political ethnography is the effect of 
the researcher, generally referred as “the researcher bias”. Positivists have 
argued that an explicit standardised set of experiments and interview 
procedures help minimise the researcher bias, therefore improving the validity 
of data. I contend with recent ethnographic studies (Wedeen 2009; Pachirat 
2009; and Walsh 2009) which argue that validity is bound to be affected given 
the level of ethnographer’s immersion in the context. However, they have 
asserted that an ethnographer’s role is not so much to produce knowledge as 
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to provide new ways of seeing and thereby challenging existing categories of 
practice and analysis (Schatz 2009: 15). My experience in the field revealed 
that the ethnographer’s effect differed from one context to another. Attending 
a large event or a campaign rally was different to conducting observations in a 
small village where one’s presence was noticed immediately. In some 
contexts, I was overly immersed in local areas, actively participating. As an 
Afghan researcher, I was expected and even sometimes manipulated into 
participating in political discussions. And in a society where kinship-based 
relations are strong, where cultural obligation and reciprocity dictates most 
actions, I found myself often acceding to my informant’s demands, whether to 
check a youth movement’s political template, to comment on a political 
statement or to attend dinner gatherings for a related government official. In 
some cases I found myself being the subject of interrogation, as my 
informants would ask me about the on-going US intervention, their goals and 
objectives. My own age, sex and ethnicity as an ethnic-Hazara might have 
arguably affected the data collection. Certainly, I had better access to men 
and their spaces and ethnic-Hazara informants were more receptive to my 
questions. In a country where gender-segregation is strictly practiced the data 
collection was constrained by gender imbalances. My access to women and 
their spaces was partial and limited. However, given that most of these 
political networks cut across ethnic boundaries I seldom had problems in 
accessing key figures within different networks.  
 
On a practical level, the fieldwork was a mix of covert and overt ethnographic 
study. For observations in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) or candidates 
campaign headquarters during the 2009 presidential election, the fieldwork 
was covert. However, during interviews, informants were told clearly about the 
aims and objectives of the research. The covert element was necessary 
because requesting formal access in most occasions would have been 
rejected immediately. First, the concept of research often has negative 
connotations in the Afghan context and the majority of the population are not 
aware of academic research and how it is used. Once a distant family friend 
innocently asked me to help him get employed in the British intelligence 
services, assuming that that’s what research meant. In another incident, an 
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MP understood my research to be similar to NGO work carried out for the 
purposes of spying for donors. In one occasion, a female journalist thought I 
was the son of Mohammad Mohaqqeq, the leader of one of the political 
networks, whose surname meant “researcher” in Persian. Second, with the 
high level of corruption and illegality in Afghanistan most informants wouldn’t 
want to be exposed by speaking to me. To gain access meant establishing 
rapport with an extensive network of connections including the gate security 
guards, secretaries and election campaign officers, some of these were MPs 
and state officials who informed me of key events, house gatherings, corrupt 
dealings and illegal practices. In addition to my own friends and work 
colleagues in the parliament, media, government and civil society 
organisations this extensive network helped me gain access to places, people 
and events.  
 
The fieldwork was always subject to elements of unpredictability and 
uncertainty. For example it was almost impossible to schedule timely 
observations in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House). Political ethnography 
requires adaptability to fieldwork uncertainties and taking contingency 
measures. I was once held for five hours in a sub-campaign office because 
the organisers could not find enough people to transport to the main event. 
Eventually, when we arrived, the campaign had ended. The fieldwork was not 
without its risks in war-torn Afghanistan. During the 2009 presidential election, 
as I entered Abdullah’s election campaign office in North Kabul, I saw two 
men being assaulted by security guards. They had been accused of spying for 
the Karzai team. One of the guards approached to search me. Panic took hold 
as I had my morning notes in my pocket. Luckily, I was rescued by another 
guard, who I had befriended, telling him I was “one of them”. Henceforth, I 
took extreme precautions for my safety as well as the identity of my 
informants. During the last months of my fieldwork, when I moved into a new 
house, I was dumbfounded when an Afghan Intelligence Officer paid me a 
visit and enquired about my identity. I was safe but I knew that I was being 
watched.  
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The formal PhD ethnographic research on which this thesis is based was 
carried out over fourteen months in Afghanistan between March 2011 and 
June 2012. Political ethnography was carried out mainly in Kabul city; 
however, several trips were made to the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif in the north 
and Jalalabad in the east. Both observation and interview methods (more than 
130 interviews) provided the primary data for this study. The data for Chapter 
5 draws mainly on interviews with key political informants. Chapter 6, which 
examines the dynamics of political networks during the 2009 presidential 
election, is based on the author’s two month long ethnographic fieldwork in 
three districts of Kabul city (Dasht-e-Barchi, district 13; Chaharrah-i-Sarsabzi 
and Khairkhana, district 11; and Kart-e-Naw, district 8). The data for this 
chapter was collected before I began my dissertation research. Observation in 
the two main presidential candidates’ headquarters was complimented with 
more than twenty interviews and a few focus discussion groups. Chapter 7 
builds on the author’s four months of observation in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower 
House) between June 2011 and October 2011 during the 2011 Special Court 
(SC) crisis. During this time I interviewed over forty MPs, political network 
leaders, powerbrokers, international donors and government officials. To 
ensure the interviewees’ safety, I have kept their identities anonymous 
throughout this thesis. However, I have included the list of interviews and 
informants in the Appendix (Table 1). Indirectly, this research benefited from 
four years of professional work experience in Afghanistan, where I was 
involved with several research and policy organisations, including the 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) and the UK Department 
for International Development (DfID).  
 
Chapter 5 explores the consolidation of power by Karzai in the centre and Gul 
Agha Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor in the periphery. It highlights the key 
network practices that have enables political networks and centres of power to 
consolidate their power. Noor and Shirzai are excellent cases to observe how 
the post-2001 state was re-assembled but also to explore the complexity of 
the relationship between political networks in the centre-periphery. The 2009 
presidential election and the political economy of the Wolesi Jirga through the 
case of 2010-2011 Special Court (SC) crisis provides an excellent window to 
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observe power dynamics among competing political networks in a moment of 
network mobilisation, formation and re-formation. These cases serve as a 
microcosm for the broader examination of governance and statehood in the 
post-2001 statebuilding period. The 2009 election shows how power 
dynamics was at play during a moment of contestation which provided a 
further platform for their negotiation and re-negotiation with two candidate-
patrons, namely the incumbent Karzai and Abdullah. The SE crisis highlights 
the political economy of the Wolesi Jirga to witness the display and active 
utilisation of network practices of patron-client relations, opportunism, 
bargaining and the instrumentalisation of identities in one of the most 
important institutions of post-2001 international statebuilding. The latter two 
cases are similar in that they pertain to the institutions of democratic politics. 
However, the selection of these cases were by chance in that they were the 
main central moments of political network contestation at the time of fieldwork.  
 
 
IV. Overview of the Thesis    
 
This thesis is structured into two major parts. Part 1 provides a literature 
review of post-conflict peacebuilding accounts and theories (Chapter 2), and 
offers the analytical framework in which I explain the impact of the power 
dynamics of political networks on statehood and state survival (Chapter 3). 
Part 1 also highlights the process of state formation and its key features of 
statehood since its formation in the mid-18th century (Chapter 4). Part 2 
provides empirical evidence showing how competing political networks came 
to constitute and transform the state (Chapter 5) and explores the power 
conflicts, contestations and compromises between rival political networks 
during moments such as the 2009 presidential election (Chapter 6) and the 
2010-2011 Special Court crisis in the Wolesi Jirga (Chapter 7).  
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview and critique of the main theoretical and policy 
discussions involved in peacebuilding literature since the end of the Cold War. 
It situates these discussions around three paradigms: the transformative 
peace, the critique peace and the hybrid peace. The aim of this chapter is to 
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advance our understanding of peacebuilding by bringing the focus explicitly to 
the network character of international peacebuilding, before paving the ground 
to address the central questions of this thesis: how and what peacebuilding is 
constituted of and how the co-constitutive power dynamics of international-
local shapes peace/violence and order/disorder. This chapter maintains that 
international peacebuilding must pay especial attention to the role of informal 
actors and organisations, particularly to the endogenous political network 
forms of organisations. It asserts that the relationship between international 
statebuilding and these endogenous political networks is not necessarily 
conflictive or competitive but “co-constitutive”.  
 
Chapter 3 offers an analytical framework, one that is substantiated in the 
analysis of endogenous political networks constituting the post-conflict state. It 
theorises the relationship between political networks and the state. As such, it 
attempts to provide an explanation to the central role of endogenous political 
networks in the process of state formation and transformation once a political 
settlement is reached, and their essential role in constituting a complex 
peace. The analytical framework hypothesises that political stability and state 
survival in post-conflict spaces depends on the power dynamics and network 
practices of interdependent political networks within the state. A political 
network is likely to survive and political order is most likely to be established if 
political networks performs at least two of the following features of network 
practices effectively: (a) Patron-client relations in expanding their clientele, (b) 
opportunism and illegality to accumulate wealth for distribution, and (c) 
instrumentalisation of identity-based divisions to maintain links with the 
constituencies they claim to represent. The analytical framework hypothesises 
that the power dynamics among competing yet interdependent political 
networks produces three possible outcomes in relation to political order and 
stability; these are (1) balanced-network equilibrium, (2) co-optation by the 
dominant network (regime), and (3) relapse to conflict. The most ideal 
outcome is balanced-network equilibrium and the least is relapse to conflict. 
The post-2001 Afghanistan provides an excellent case to test these 
hypotheses and propositions.  
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Chapter 4 details the historical processes of state formation and statehood in 
Afghanistan since its modern formation in the 18th century. The rationale is 
simple. To understand the post-2001 state we must consider Afghanistan’s 
continuous historical struggle for state formation and statehood, which has a 
much longer heritage and far greater implications than are often discussed in 
the literature. It illustrates that the present logic of network governance and 
statehood in Afghanistan has emerged historically and sociologically over the 
preceding centuries. This chapter details this history through the lens of the 
network in order to establish the historical precedents of the empirical 
chapters. It shows how the founder of the Durrani Kingdom in the 18th century 
set up a “network kingdom” as a model which his successors subsequently 
built upon and expanded. This chapter argues that the main reason for the 
vicious cycles of violence and state collapse in Afghanistan was the failure of 
Afghan rulers to maintain a balanced equilibrium among rival political 
networks. Network practices of personalised loyalties, patron-client relations 
and manipulation of identities were key historical features of state formation 
and governance in Afghanistan at this time. The second part of the chapter 
shows how Afghanistan’s last three decades of violence have been shaped by 
power struggles between different Mujahedeen tanzims, and concludes by 
arguing that post-2001 international statebuilding and state formation in 
Afghanistan must be understood within the context of these continuities and 
changes in power dynamics. 
 
The empirical chapters demonstrate how the theoretical propositions and 
hypothesis described in the earlier chapters can be applied. Chapter 5 shows 
how international interveners ‘rented’ peace and stability by empowering the 
main former Mujahedeen tanzim leaders and commanders in helping to re-
assemble the state within a built-in war economy. It details how the 2001 
Bonn conference and its power-sharing arrangements set in motion an 
internal war (2002-2009) between rival networks over the state. Between 
2002 and 2004, Karzai and his largely Western-educated Pashtun 
technocrats used their positions in the internationally sponsored state to co-
opt or coercively remove their rivals from power. Following the 2004 and 2005 
presidential and parliamentary elections, the balance of power shifted from 
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technocrats to the former Mujahedeen networks. The latter part of Chapter 5 
details how Gul Aga Shirzai and Atta Mohammad Noor consolidated their 
power in the periphery, building extensive centres of power in their region. 
Chapters 6 and 7 reveal how the power dynamics among rival political 
networks was played out during moments of contestation and crisis, such as 
the 2009 presidential election and the 2010-2011 Special Court crisis. They 
show how political networks maintained themselves within the new political 
order by building extensive patron-client relations, engaging in illegality and 
opportunism as well as manipulating Afghanistan’s identity-based divisions, 
particularly along ethnic lines in order to mobilise support and maintain some 
degree of legitimacy. Both chapters suggest that the dynamics of political 
networks have further exacerbated inter-network conflict and the identity-
based division and client-based features of Afghanistan’s state and society. 
 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) explores some of the implications that 
stem from the theoretical and empirical claims made in this thesis. It deals 
with the question of state survival and political order in the context of post-
2014 international withdrawal. It rejects many of the current claims that the 
Afghan state is likely to collapse and argues that a successful international 
exit from Afghanistan is contingent on the stability of the empowered political 
networks that currently constitute the Afghan state as well as the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF) and the outcome of the ongoing 
reconciliation and negotiations with the Taliban. It contends that the Afghan 
state is likely to survive, more or less in its present form, in the post-2014 
period because of the power dynamics of political networks which have 
interlocked them in a complex bargaining and exchange system, such that 
any attempts by political networks to destabilise the status quo would 
essentially undermine their own interests. A reduction in external resource 
flows (e.g. military contracts and aid programmes) will affect the magnitude of 
exchange and bargaining but arguably will not weaken their relative abilities to 
buy loyalty, given their control over the Afghan economy (both licit and illicit). 
The last section of this chapter will consider the implications for future studies.  
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Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Paradigms and Practices:  The Network  
                   Politics of Peacebuilding 
 
Introduction 
 
With the end of the Cold War, international peacebuilding has become one of 
the most dominant theoretical and policy issues in the international arena. The 
current international peacebuilding debate within academic and policy circles 
has been centred on the nature and effectiveness of peace and the aims and 
motivations of the peacebuilders. The primary focus has been on assessing 
the actions of external actors and how to improve the effectiveness of their 
practices. A serious consequence of such framing has been the neglect of 
politics and political power, more seriously the role and power dynamics of 
endogenous political forces.   
 
This chapter maps out the theoretical and policy discussions in post-conflict 
peacebuilding since the early 1990s, investigating the gaps and shortcomings 
of the current debate. It situates the intellectual and policy debates in 
peacebuilding within the following three main evolving paradigms: (1) the 
transformative peace, (2) the critique peace, and (3) the hybrid peace. This 
chapter is structured as follows. Section I discusses the emergence of 
transformative peace, exploring the various discourses that attributed to the 
founding principles of ‘peacebuilding’ as articulated by the UN. Section II 
provides an overview of the critique peace paradigm, highlighting and 
critiquing the practical/operational and normative aspects of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. It argues that a fundamental failure of the critique studies has 
been the neglect of the local. Section III explores the shortcomings of the 
recent debate offered by the hybrid peace, which suggests that the interaction 
between international-local produces a ‘liberal-local hybrid peace’. It shows 
that whilst the hybrid peace makes a significant contribution to peacebuilding 
in their attempt to incorporate endogenous forces in their study, their analysis 
remain implicitly oppositional. Section IV demonstrates how this study’s 
analysis departs from the hybrid peace thesis by brining the focus to the 
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network character of international peacebuilding. It highlights the co-
constitutive aspect of the international-local dynamics in re-assembling and 
transforming the post-conflict state and argues that these intertwined relations 
and their network mode of operations are fundamental to our study of 
international statebuilding. 
 
I. The Transformative Peace 
 
The end of the Cold War saw an increase in the number of peace operations. 
Between 1988-1993 the UN carried out a total of twenty peace missions, 
more than it had conducted during the Cold War (Bellamy & Williams 2011). 
While some of these missions followed the logic of traditional peacekeeping- 
mainly ceasefire monitoring- others exhibited a more comprehensive 
transformative operation known as post-conflict peacebuilding. Peace 
missions expanded to include a significant civilian component to transform 
state-society relations, a break from traditional peacekeeping missions of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of a host nation. The traditional 
peacekeeping missions were restricted by the international principle of 
‘national sovereignty’ and non-intervention. The UN article 2 (7) of the Charter 
prohibited the organisation from intervening in matters “essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state”. However, the 1989 Namibia mission 
(UNTAG) mandate envisaged a more comprehensive and transformative 
operation including monitoring elections and the Disarming, Demobilising and 
Rehabilitating (DDR) of former combatants (Weiss et. al, 1994). The emerging 
post-conflict peacebuilding missions rapidly moved away from the normative 
guiding principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force (Diehl 
1994; Durch 1994). In 1992, the UN in Bosnia and Somalia deployed troops in 
the midst of ongoing civil wars with the authorisation to use force, if 
necessary. Monitoring elections, considered as the most effective way to 
contain failed states and their disorderly elites thus became an integral part of 
UN missions. 
 
The early successes of UN missions in Nicaragua (1990) and Namibia (1990) 
were recognised by Boutros-Ghali in 1992 with the publication of the report, 
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An Agenda for Peace. The report provided a new taxonomy of peace 
operations for the post-Cold War world order and outlined the categorical 
distinctions in peace missions between peacekeeping, peace-enforcement 
and post-conflict peacebuilding. 10 It provided the UN with a new visionary role 
as a progressive autonomous agent of peace, development and global justice 
after years of marginalisation (Sabaratnam 2011:15). Post-conflict 
peacebuilding, as a more comprehensive mission, was defined in pragmatic 
terms as “action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 
1992:11). By the late 1990s, post-conflict peacebuilding emerged as the 
dominant mode of conflict management. The Brahimi Report in 2000 sealed 
the dominance of peacebuilding with its comprehensive definition: “activities 
undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace 
and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more 
than just the absence of war.” As a result, the sustainability of peace came to 
require a longer term deployment of multinational forces to provide security, 
assist and monitor elections and disarmament, protect human rights, reform 
and strengthen government institutions, and promote political participation 
through liberal democracy.  
 
The broadening of the international peacebuilding agenda as a 
comprehensive peace programme was the result of three main interlinked 
developments in the fields of democracy, security, and development in the 
1990s, associated with the liberal peace discursive and practical framework 
(Paris 1997; Duffield 1999; Richmond 2005). This is investigated below in 
detail. Heathershaw (2008) and Richmond (2008) conceptualised liberal 
peace as a set of normative frameworks rooted in liberal principles of 
representation, accountability, and market economy, which are projected onto 
post-conflict societies by external actors. Heathershaw (2008:7-8) further 
deconstructed the liberal peace theoretical developments into three discursive 
                                                        
10 The report defined peacemaking as the deployment of military and/or police personnel, 
subject to the consent of all the parties concerned. Peace-enforcement was defined as a 
heavily contingent force authorised to use force for other than self-defence (Boutros-Ghali 
1992:11). However, in recent years the distinctions between peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding have become increasingly blurred.  
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components: (i) peacebuilding-via-democratic reform (the original 
configuration which he refers to above as ‘democratic peacebuilding’), (ii) 
peacebuilding-via-civil society (‘civil society’), and (iii) peacebuilding-via-
statebuilding (‘statebuilding’), which reflect the below agendas.  
 
Liberal Democracy 
 
The end of the Cold War and the triumph and spread of liberal democracy had 
a profound impact on the expanding and broadening of the peacebuilding 
agenda. It reinforced the hegemonic liberal internationalist ideas in the new 
world order (Fukuyama 2004; Held 1998). Liberal democracy was conceived 
as the most effective political system to govern the world population. In an 
influential article, Michael Doyle (1983) claimed that democratic states seldom 
engage in war with other democracies, a theory which came to be known as 
the ‘democratic peace thesis’. In another study, Oneal and Russett (1999) 
found that liberal economic policies contribute to peaceful relations among 
democracies. The democratic peace theory made a compelling argument 
asserting that liberalism is intrinsically peace-promoting because of its internal 
democratic forms of government and their relations to the wider world. Liberal 
democracy is thus promoted as the best political framework, and statebuilding 
as the best tool to address the root causes of conflict. ‘Democratic validation’ 
of peace agreements reached by competing political leaders is seen as a 
necessary step and a critical turning point in the peacebuilding process in 
arbitrating and regulating political, social, economic and ethnic tensions that 
could threaten peace (Reilly 2002).  
 
The long-lasting benefits of democracy for peace were noted by Boutros-Ghali 
in his 1992, An Agenda for Peace, report when he proclaimed, ‘there is an 
obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law 
and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace 
and security in any new and stable political order’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 34). 
Creating the conditions for democratic change became a fundamental policy 
framework for the UN, upon which lasting peace can be built. One of the 
leading scholars in the field reminded, “there is simply no more just or 
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legitimate way to peacefully manage differences among contending social 
groups than democracy, however difficult it may seem to move from violent to 
electoral competition” (Sisk 2001:786). Subsequent US and European 
development aid agencies (i.e., USAID & DfID) have included the fostering of 
democratic practices as a central cornerstone of their program objectives.  
 
Security Studies  
 
The securitisation of failed states in the early 1990s played a significant role in 
expanding the peacebuilding agenda. The early 1990s experienced a 
significant change in the nature of conflicts from interstate to intrastate. Before 
1989, only 5 of the 15 UN missions dealt primarily with intrastate conflicts. 
From 1989 to 2000, there were 38 UN peacekeeping missions, all but five of 
which, were deployed in regards to an intrastate conflict (Bellamy & Williams 
2011:94-96). Kaldor (1999) and Duffield (1999) highlighted different 
fundamental characteristics of these wars, dubbing them as the “new wars”. 11 
These readings of conflict and insecurity corresponded with the publication of 
three foreign policy books, The Coming Anarchy by Robert Kaplan (1994), 
Saving Failed States by Helman and Ratner (1992) and William Zartman’s 
(1995) edited volume, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration 
of Legitimate Authority, which dictated the 1990s security studies intellectual 
and policy climate. They asserted that “failed states” have replaced “rogue” 
and “conquering” states as the main security and developmental threats to the 
Western liberal world. Helman and Ratner (1992: 3) characterised failed 
states as “a disturbing new phenomenon”, spreading from Africa through the 
Middle East and Central and East Asia and called for the international 
community to take an “ethical responsibility” to intervene in these places 
(1992: 3). 12  In 1994, the US Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of 
Intelligence created a “State Failure Task Force” to empirically monitor the 
                                                        
11 Stathis Kalyvas (2001: 99), on the other hand, has compellingly argued that the distinction 
drawn between post-cold war conflicts and their predecessors may be attributable more to the 
“demise of readily available conceptual categories than to the existence of profound 
differences”. 
12 Helman was the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and Deputy to the 
Secretary of State for political affairs in the 1990s. Ratner, at the time, was a US State 
Department’s legal advisor.  
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performance of states around the world and create new legibility based on 
specific liberal categorisations. The failed states discourse was incorporated 
in the UN General-Secretary Boutros-Ghali report, Supplement to the Agenda 
for Peace (1995: Section 13). The September 11 attack on the US in 2001 
reinforced further the securitisation of the failed states, which was reflected in 
The 2002 US National Security Strategy, “America is less threatened by 
conquering states than by failing ones”.  
 
The problem of global insecurity, poverty, underdevelopment, war and conflict 
are alleged to be found in the widespread existence of dysfunctional states. 
The lack of state capacity was seen as the principle reason for state failure 
and collapse by both neo-institutionalists (Jackson 1990; Krasner 2004) and 
neo-functionalists (Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2002). This new focus on state 
capacity within the donor agencies and policy communities has produced an 
extensive set of guidelines and frameworks to engage with fragile states 
(USAID 2005; DfID 2006). For instance, the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) defines “fragile states” as lacking “either the will or the 
capacity to engage productively with their citizens to ensure security, 
safeguard human rights, and provide the basic function for development.” 
Crocker (2003) demonstrated how it is possible to proactively engage in 
building the capacity of states to address the causes and symptoms of state 
failure. The introduction of the USAID Fragile States Strategy program was 
the result of such change in focus. 
 
In their review of state capacity literature, Hanson and Sigman (2011) 
identified three underlining dimensions of state functions: extractive capacity, 
coercive capacity and administrative capacity. Zartman (1995) highlighted four 
functions of the state as key to state success: (1) effective government and 
the rule of law, (2) the state as a symbol of identity, (3) territorial control, and 
(4) an effective economic system. In another study, Jackson (1990) made an 
important distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ sovereignty. He argued, 
while negative sovereignty relates to the formal legal conditions under which 
states enjoy rights of non-intervention, positive sovereignty relates to 
capabilities of the state to provide political welfare for its citizens. Many post-
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colonial states did not acquire their sovereignty internally as a result of any 
evidence of capacity to rule (‘empirical statehood’), but externally from the 
state-system conferring them juridical qualifications (‘juridical statehood’).  
 
Such focus on state capacity has had a profound impact on the normative 
framing and practices of peacebuilding. This discursive power enables liberal 
peace to place developing countries’ states onto a continuum progressive 
order on which Western liberal states are labelled as “strong” while 
developing countries’ states are widely characterised as ‘neopatrimonial’ 
(Medard 1982), ‘weak’ (Migdal 1988), ‘quasi’ (Jackson 1990), and ‘pre-
modern’ (Cooper 2003). According to Chandler (2010) such conception of 
sovereignty has essentialised on the one hand “sovereignty-as-capacity” and 
on the other “sovereignty-as-responsibility”. Thereby, the formal political and 
legal right of self-determination has been conflated with the question of state 
capacity (Chandler 2010:48). Such articulation of securitisation of failed states 
places the blame firmly on failed states, thereby, concealing the failure of the 
international system and its illiberal practices, therefore legitimizing 
international intervention and statebuilding (Chandler 2010).  
 
Economic Development  
 
The third development, which broadened the peacebuilding agenda, emerged 
from economic development. While scholars and policy-makers in security 
and peace studies were preoccupied with peacebuilding and state failure, the 
economic development community was also beginning to move in a similar 
direction (Sabaratnam 2011:18). In the 1990s, prompted by concerns over the 
effectiveness of aid and stagnant underdevelopment in developing countries, 
the Bretton Wood institution concluded that the principal cause for 
underdevelopment is the lack of institutional capacities of the state. The World 
Bank, therefore, stretched its policy frontiers by endorsing “good governance” 
framework as a core element of its development strategy. The World Bank 
(1992: 1) defined good governance as the “ manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources 
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for development.” 13  This was a significant shift in the Bank’s focus from 
traditional financial and economic aspects of the market activities to the 
politics of development (Santiso 2001). Subsequently, the Bank proposed a 
number of policy reforms to condition aid, which became essentially an 
extensive “governmental and social reengineering” (Santiso 2001:3). The 
1997 World Bank’s World Development Report and its 2000 strategy report, 
Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank 
Strategy (WB 2000) and the 1999 policy paper, Governance Matter by 
Kaufmann et. al., outlined the centrality of good governance conditions and 
objectives in these debates. A key consequence of such framing has been the 
merging of security agenda and the development agenda (Duffield 1997 & 
1999).  
 
To recap, the intimate marriage of democracy, development, and security 
agendas in peacebuilding as part of a single discourse on humanitarian 
intervention (Richmond, 2004; Heathershaw, 2008) has become the most 
significant transformative paradigm shift in peacebuilding. The totalising reach 
of this discourse is evident in Boutros-Ghali’s 1993 speech: ‘without peace 
there can be no development and there can be no democracy. Without 
development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to 
fall into conflict. And without democracy, no sustainable development will 
occur; without such development, peace cannot long be maintained’ 
(1993:271). The Responsibility to Protect document by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) set the legal basis 
for international intervention. This effectively situated sovereignty in its 
‘positive’ and ‘empirical’ sphere making intervention a necessitating force 
(Chandler 2010: 3). As such, the transformative peace has justified a more 
aggressive intervention and peacebuilding in the new global order.   
 
 
 
                                                        
13  The World Bank Report identifies the following six dimensions of governance: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
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II. The Critique Peace  
 
Failed peace missions in places like Rwanda, East Timor, and Bosnia raised 
serious questions about the effectiveness of peacebuilding missions and its 
liberal peace normative assumptions.14 A critique literature emerged exposing 
the key practical and normative shortcomings of peacebuilding missions. 
Although, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the diversity of the 
critique peace, two main strands of the literature stand out: (1) the problem-
solving, those studies questioning the practices and effectiveness of 
peacebuilding; and (2) the critical studies, those questioning the normative 
assumptions of the so-called liberal peace, and the motivation of its powerful 
actors.15   
 
The Problem-Solving Literature 
 
The first set of peacebuilding critique literature, from an 
operational/instrumental level of analysis, questions the rapidly expanded 
mandate of the UN peacebuilding missions to deliver humanitarian and 
political projects. Featherstone (2000) highlights that there is often a gap 
between the statebuilding practices and theory, which led to the failure of UN 
missions. Diehl (1994) questions whether the UN has actually been able to 
develop a truly comprehensive approach to deal with complex political 
emergencies. Others explicitly charge that the expanding mandate of 
peacebuilding missions are undermined by the UN’s under-resourced 
capacities (2000 Brahimi Report; Hampson 1996; Chesterman 2004; Chopra 
2000). Operation-wise, some critics in East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone 
advocate more assertive interventions, while others prefer a more ‘light 
footprint’ approach like the one in Afghanistan (United Nations, 2002:11, 
Chesterman 2002).16 Croker et al. (1996) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) 
                                                        
14 The debate on the usefulness of peace operations is ongoing; however, the general feeling 
among many scholars is that peace operations overall make a positive difference to peace 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2004; Fortna 2003).  
15 For a good review of the diverse categories of liberal peace literature see Meera 
Sabaratnam (2011).  
16 In post-2001 Afghanistan, the UN mandate was limited to providing technical, humanitarian, 
and financial assistance to the newly formed indigenous government with a few thousand 
 49 
explored the importance of overcoming the coordination problem in 
peacebuilding while Jeong (2005) investigated the possibilities of a more 
systematic approach, exploring the themes of peacebuilding design, 
operational imperatives and coordination with the local and endogenous 
dynamics. 
 
The discussion offered by the problem-solving literature locates the failure of 
peacebuilding missions in various technical and practical deficiencies and 
inadequacies. However, as argued by Paris and Sisk (2009:11-12) this 
argument is “superficial with no substance”. Zurcher (2011) finds that none of 
the above arguments are systematically associated with success or failure 
across a substantial number of cases. Instead, Paris (2004) and Doyle & 
Sambanis (2006) offered a more insightful explanation for the failure of peace 
missions. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) highlight that the “quick fix” and “short-
term” nature of the transformation in post-conflict settings cannot stabilise and 
overcome conflict dynamics. They argue that the proposed policy approach of 
holding quick elections combined with “shock therapy” economic liberalisation 
has a destabilising affect. Paris (2004) proposed greater ‘institutionalisation 
before liberalisation’ as he argued that aggressive economic liberalisation 
policies often destabilise post-conflict countries where state institutions are 
either non-existent or fragile. Influenced by the broader institutionalist 
theorists in economic development (Knack & Keefer 1997; North 1990) and 
international relations (Jackson 1990; Krasner 2004), Paris and other 
institutionalists in peacebuilding played an instrumental role in shifting the 
peacebuilding theoretical and policy focus towards statebuilding as the 
dominant approach to peacebuilding. Since then, the focus of peacebuilding 
has shifted away from the bottom-up “civil society” approaches to 
statebuilding: the re-building of state institutions and capacities.  
 
The functionalist-institutionalist explanations have come under heavy criticism 
for reducing post-conflict statebuilding to technical and objective processes 
                                                                                                                                                              
ISAF forces in Kabul. Many policy analysts contend that the “light footprint” was a key factor 
in the current political instability and insecurity in Afghanistan (Chesterman 2004; Chopra 
2002). 
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(Hameiri 2007). This is essentially a form of anti-politics (Ferguson 1995) 
ignoring the more important political dynamics of peacebuilding (Cousens & 
Kumar 2001). Richmond (2004) and Chandler (2004) pointed out that the 
formulation offered is one of peace-as-governance– in which peace is a 
methodological challenge for the international community. In an attempt to 
provide a more nuanced explanation for the failure of peacebuilding missions, 
analysts have highlighted in recent years the underlying tensions and 
contradictions in post-conflict statebuilding (Paris & Sisk, 2009; Jarstad & 
Sisk, 2008). Barnett, et. al., (2007) asserts that intrinsic tensions and 
divergences within peacebuilding make peace operations challenging.  
 
In a more detailed and influential edition, Paris and Sisk (2009) identify the 
following five tensions and contradictions in statebuilding which raises more 
questions than it attempts to answer. First, no matter what the intentions are, 
statebuilding by liberal peace is an intrusive process, which could inflame anti-
foreign resentments. Second, intervention would favour some local forces 
over others, thereby fuelling tensions. Third, the liberal peace values are 
bound to clash with local values, traditions and practices. Tajdbakhsh (2011) 
in her comprehensive survey finds how this was the case in Afghanistan.17 
Fourth, statebuilding cannot make a clean break from the past; therefore, it 
results into hybrid forms of political and social organisation, which often 
generate conflicts and transformation tensions. Finally, there are tensions 
between long-term imperatives of peacebuilders and short-term imperatives of 
local elites (spoilers), which could hamper economic reconstruction, security 
reform and transitional justice. These tensions highlight an important 
dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding, the power dynamics between 
international-local actors, organisations, and networks. As the empirical 
chapters in this thesis suggest, (Chapter 5 in particular) although the 
relationship between international-local is much conflictive and oppositional, it 
                                                        
17 First, it turned out that many Afghans did not understand the concept at all. ‘There is no 
peace in Afghanistan’ was a common reaction, so ‘why talk about liberal peace? It is a 
fantasy.’ Then the dichotomy between the liberal model with tradition and religious values 
was highlighted and the inherent tension between collectivism and individualism in Afghani 
society. Many respondents told the interviewers that Islam offered a much better solution. 
With democracy as an imbibed value in Islam, liberal peace may well go fine with religion. But 
there are reservations; certain limitations have to be kept.  
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is also co-constitutive. It is this important aspect that often goes unexamined. 
This is discussed in more detail below in section IV.  
 
The Critical Studies Literature 
 
The critical studies literature (Richmond 2004; Duffield 1999; Pugh 2004; 
Chandler 2006; Heathershaw, 2008) asserts that problem-solving approaches 
are found upon particular normative assumptions and values that are 
problematic in the first place. 18  It highlights the dynamics of power in 
peacebuilding, particularly, its discursive power and thereby the primary 
motivations and goals of the actors involved. A critical perspective points out 
that peace operations attempt to create and recreate a distinct type of 
international order which works to maintain the status quo: the hegemonic 
domination of the liberal peace. In this view, liberal peace intervention is an 
attempt to create legibility in parts of the world that have been over-coded.  
 
Duffield (2007) in his new book, Development, Security and Unending Wars, 
develops on his earlier work on the merging of security and development, 
highlights the regulatory mechanisms of the global governance of ‘liberal 
peace’ through interventionist management of the behaviour of those deemed 
‘at risk’. Jabri (2010) suggests that the standardised components of the liberal 
peace essentially represent a Western imposition of its values and liberal 
goals on the context that it intervenes to transform, which is essentially 
Western ethnocentric. Williams (2005) shows how liberal peace is using 
illiberal means in its promotion of liberal values, a key finding of this thesis 
too. To neo-Marxist scholars like Pugh (2006), liberal peace is a political 
mechanism employed by the capitalist global political economy to exploit the 
periphery. According to Pugh, peace operations are an integral part of the 
                                                        
18 Tajdbakhsh and Richmond (2011) maps out the variety of analytical frameworks which 
critical perspective draws upon as follows: (1) communitarian critiques problematise liberal 
assumptions of liberal values, (2) social constructivist critiques criticise peacebuilding 
literature for treating it as technical and depoliticised whilst ignoring the role of values and 
identities, (3) critical international theory approaches highlighting the hegemonic power 
relations and interests in peacebuilding, (4) post-modern frameworks highlighting the 
universality of the liberal peace as a single form of modernity, and (5) post-colonial critiques 
challenge the division between the global and the local, focusing on the local context and 
highlighting the hybrid nature and outcome of interventions.  
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world ordering project that engages in  ‘aggressive social engineering’, 
whereby the private sector is privileged over notions of the common good, 
often with profound human consequences (Pugh 2006: 153). Chandler (2006) 
characterises statebuilding missions as the practice of “empire in denial” in 
which external actors colonise non-Western institutions. 
 
In recent years, the critical literature has moved beyond the suggestion that 
liberal peace is a problematic construct projected onto post-conflict contexts, 
in exposing how it is a site of contestation and conflict between diverse 
international and local forces. Heathershaw (2008) and Richmond (2005) 
have unpacked the hegemony of liberal peace to show the contested and 
unstable nature of the peace hidden by contemporary hegemonic discourse of 
liberal peace, propagated at many levels by a myriad of Western actors, 
institutions and organisations. Heathershaw (2008) reveals the inherently 
contentious nature of peace both with regard to its general rationales and 
specific modes of operation. Richmond (2005 & 2007) questions the treatment 
of liberal peace as a monolithic entity by dis-assembling ‘peace’ to illustrate 
the variety of peace on offer: victor’s peace, constitutional peace, institutional 
peace and finally civil peace, which he argues have been evolving over the 
centuries in the liberal European imagination and found recent expression in 
peacebuilding.19 He develops the concept of ‘positive peace’ and ‘structural 
violence’ and expands these concepts – through a broad-ranging discussion – 
to offer an interpretation of ‘peace’, which is simultaneously indebted to critical 
security theory and critical theory.  
 
The critical studies literature has made significant contributions to our 
understanding of the assumptions and processes of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding. However, it has remained a state-centric and system-centric 
approach. More importantly, the expanding debate on the liberal peace, as 
                                                        
19 Victor’s peace derived from, amongst other things, Europe’s experiences with fascism in 
the Second World War. Militarism and military strength does play an essential and 
instrumental role in underpinning the other components of liberal peace. Constitutional peace 
emphasises the importance of democracy, trade and cosmopolitanism in fostering peace. 
Institutional peace refers to the normative and legal frameworks of international institutions 
that regulate their behaviour. Finally, civil peace focuses on citizens, participation and human 
rights as conditional for peace. 
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pointed out by Paris (2011) and Sabaratnam (2011), has become increasingly 
distant from the concerns of the policy discourse. Paris (2011) suggests that 
peacebuilding studies have reached an ‘impasse’ because the debate on 
liberal peace has increasingly departed from the study of international 
intervention. It seems that the critique is driven by “a life of its own, only 
vaguely related to the analysis of policy practices and implementation and 
seemingly happy to squeeze every problem of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding into the framework of the critique of the liberal character of 
interventions” (in Campbell, Chandler & Sabaratnam 2011: 3).  As Paris 
maintains, peacebuilding has effectively become ‘ghettoised’ and cut off from 
the field of international relations (2000:27-44). Moreover, critical 
peacebuilding has downplayed the diversity of approaches, priorities and 
power dynamics amongst the international interveners that often dominate the 
multi-actors and multi-dimensional operations assembled in places like 
Afghanistan. Finally, both problem-solving and critical approaches overlook 
the complex power relationships between international-local forces in 
statebuilding. The critical literature has come under criticism for its neglect of 
the local.  
 
III The Hybrid Peace 
 
The hybrid peace literature (Richmond 2011b; MacGinty 2010) has emerged 
as a response to address the above shortcomings in peacebuilding by 
incorporating an emerging literature that attempts to ‘bring the local back in’ 
(Lederach 1997; Sending 2011). These studies criticise peacebuilding for its 
failure to engage with local dynamics and processes. Richmond (2011b: 227) 
notes that the international peacebuilding debate is internationalised rather 
than localised in failing to engage with everyday life other than in basic 
emergency and narrow security terms. Barnett and Zurcher (2009) argue that 
existing approaches are systemic-centric, treating domestic politics as 
“constraints,” and thus failing to fully incorporate the preferences and 
strategies of local actors. Other studies ask to pay more attention to the 
contextual processes (Sriram 2009; Jeong 2005; Berdal 2009). Sriram (2009) 
offers an engaging case study, highlighting how contextually-sensitive forms 
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of justice have been articulated; demonstrating how ‘justice’ has diverged 
from broader peacebuilding ends and thereby dismissing the notion that 
justice is a cure. These studies argue that policy reports, such as the ICISS’s 
2001 report on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and Anderson’s 1999 doctrine of ‘Do 
No Harm’ are essentially mere lip service to ideas of local participation and 
ownership. These policies and practices do little to emancipate the general 
population (Jacoby 2007: 536–537). They essentially see this as a 
romanticisation of the indigenous local elements that often employs slogans of 
‘ownership’, ‘participation’ and ‘sustainability’ which cannot be conceived as 
cure-alls (MacGinty 2010).  
 
In recent years, a number of leading analysts have suggested that the 
interface between international-local produces a “liberal-local hybrid” peace 
(MacGinty 2010, 2011; Richmond 2011). Richmond (2011a) offers an 
insightful framing of hybrid peace drawing on subaltern and post-colonial 
studies. He asserts that the literature has treated local forces and its elites as 
either powerless with no agency of itself or has blamed them for their 
predatory and pathological behaviour and for failing to understand the benefits 
of liberal peace (Richmond 2011a: 3). He observes how liberal peace, as the 
dominant discourse, has dominated the local by de-politicising the local 
influences, cultures, customs, and histories as well as its political, social and 
economic systems. The liberal peace, as a “knowledge system and epistemic 
community”, has its own bias reflecting the narrow interests, norms, 
institutions, and techniques of the dominant actors (2011a: 3). He argues that 
the local which has its own agency, interests, values and objectives resists 
the liberal peace hegemonic dominance, therefore exposing the goal of 
international intervention. These tensions inevitably create “hybrid forms of 
peace” where the local-liberal tensions shape and reshape statebuilding. In 
effect, local and international actors (not discrete categories) are rarely able to 
act autonomously. He further points out that a hybrid peace is an “everyday 
form of peace” as it represents both the capacity of international liberal and 
local peacebuilding actors and projects to engage with each other for the 
benefit of the local version of peace (Richmond 2011a: 17). In Richmond’s 
analysis hybridity is an emancipatory outcome for the benefit of the local. 
 55 
 
In another interesting work, MacGinty (2010, 2011a) suggests that the 
process of hybridisation is the result of macro-level and micro-level processes 
of peacebuilding, both top-down and bottom-up interaction of actors, and 
powers and interests. He questions the vertical ‘silos’ of interaction whereby 
there is a straightforward top-down chain of power and resources from the 
international actors to national governments, to local communities and 
individuals in society (2011:211). Subsequently, the agency of the local actors 
and their power, which could lead to subversion, exploitation and resistance, 
has been overlooked. He develops an analytical framework for the study of 
hybridity. In MacGinty’s conceptualisation (2011a: 67-69), the process of 
hybridisation occurs and re-occurs as a result of four contributing interaction 
elements: (1) the coercive power of the liberal peace to impose their version 
of peacemaking; (2) the incentivising power of the liberal peace by offering an 
attractive narrative of emancipation and progress; (3) the ability of local 
communities to resist, negotiate with, and subvert the liberal peace (the point 
is to recognise the agency of local actors); (4) and the ability of local 
communities to create and maintain alternatives to liberal peace which could 
reflect their needs, interests and power relations. This is a dynamic framing in 
which all four elements interact to constrain and distort the activities of the 
others.  Hybrid peace, thus, is in a constant state of flux and reflects a 
multilevel and multi-issue exercise of cooperation and contestation. This is 
because hybridisation takes place across all aspects of the peace process 
and implementation, and will differ from issue to issue and context to context, 
resulting in the emergence of different forms of hybridity (MacGinty 2011).   
 
The hybrid peace literature is a significant shift from the previous 
transformative and critical studies paradigms in incorporating the endogenous 
elements. However, the hybrid peace suffers from a number of shortcomings. 
Some have charged against the very essence of the hybridity asking whether 
these relations actually result in hybrid forms. In Hameiri’s words, these are 
“new forms of political rule and statehood” (2012: 197). Others like Chandler 
(2010) has pointed out that a focus on the outcome of relations between 
international and local misleads us in overlooking what really matters, which is 
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the illiberal peacebuilding practices leading to the failure of missions. Severine 
Autesserre (2010) finds the failure of peacebuilding not in liberal-local 
tensions/divergences but in the culture of internationals- embedded in their 
social routines, practices, discourses, and the technologies they use. 
Autesserre concludes that the internal culture of UN staff in Congo blinded the 
peace mission to properly emphasise the local causes of conflict.20  
 
Although Richmond (2011:229) explicitly asserts that he is opposed to “new 
binaries”, his framing of liberal-local hybrid peace implicitly remains 
oppositional. As Heathershaw (2012) noted, MacGinty’s hybrid framework 
remains constrained by his analytical framework which is essentially a 
bifurcation of an ideal-type of local-indigenous and international-liberal. The 
proposed binary is both reductive and partial. The post-2001 international 
peacebuilding experience in Afghanistan questions the dichotomy drawn by 
the hybridity literature. It suggests that the power dynamics between 
international-local is co-constitutive as much as it is conflictive or oppositional. 
As such, it is the intertwined power dynamics between international policy and 
service networks and endogenous political networks as well as their network 
mode of operations that is fundamental to our understanding of international 
peacebuilding. A focus on the co-constitutive power relations between these 
brings our focus to the network character of international statebuilding, which 
is briefly discussed in the following section.  
  
 
IV. The Network Character of International Statebuilding 
 
As outlined in the introduction, international peacebuilding is a “loosely 
structured network” and a “collaborative process”. The post-conflict state is 
therefore being re-built as the result of intimate interaction between a diverse 
set of international and local actors, organisations and practices. Political 
power in peacebuilding is assembled in and flows through international 
                                                        
20 The peacebuilders are trained to work on superstructures and are socialised to focus on predefined 
tasks and performance guidelines which means that they can inevitably identify conflict at national and 
regional levels, thereby, overlooking the local dynamics of conflict. 
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administrative and policy networks and local political networks. Peacebuilding 
imports a mass group of expert organisations and practices onto the post-
conflict setting to help re-assemble the state. These actors and organisations 
are tied to one another in complex resource interdependency relations whose 
mode of operation is network-based. They depend on each other for 
information sharing to improve coherence and coordination, and to develop 
and implement strategies and objectives to achieve ends. Service delivery 
and implementation network structures are therefore an expanding feature of 
post-conflict statebuilding. At the same time, at local level, endogenous 
political organisations come to play an essential role in helping constitute and 
transform the post-conflict state, following the power-sharing agreement. As 
argued in the introduction and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, in 
prolonged conflicts like Afghanistan, local organisations are at best “network 
forms of organisations” (political networks) because of their distinct open-
hierarchical structures, interdependent flows of resources and exchange of 
information.  
 
The interaction between the international-local actors and organisations 
create complex and wide-ranging networks that connect local businessmen, 
private security firms, international contractors, military commanders, custom 
officials, criminals and even insurgencies to the flow of exchanges, bargains 
and even opportunism in statebuilding as shown in Chapter 6. In a post-
conflict setting where state institutions and structures have become eroded or 
disappeared following a civil war international intervention and statebuilding 
finds itself depending upon local political networks to re-assemble and 
transform the post-conflict state and its modern institutions. The hybrid 
political order thesis is informing (De Waal 2009). De Waal suggests that the 
international-local power dynamics takes the form of a “patrimonial inclusive 
buy-in” (2009:103). He showed how international peacebuilding creates 
network relations with local patrimonial networks in support of agreed 
constitutional provisions and power sharing. In his analysis, the relationship 
between international-local resembles a “patrimonial marketplace” where 
loyalties are negotiated and bought within an “auction of loyalties” (2009:103). 
He argued that this often takes place without international statebuilding 
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realising that it is involved in the political marketplace, helping the winner to 
take it all while de-legitimising the losers’ claim to any share of national 
patrimony.  
 
Indeed, as Chapter 5 shows, the post-2001 state emerged as the result of 
such a contract, a “grand bargain” characterised by Goodhand (2010) 
between international donors and the four main invited political networks at 
the Bonn conference in 2001. International interveners ensured peace by 
making bargains with local political network leaders and commanders. This 
way, the former Mujahedeen networks and their clientele came to play a 
significant role in international statebuilding processes. However, the 
empirical chapters in this thesis highlight a more complicated and fluid 
dynamics than the one offered by the rationale choice “marketplace” hybrid 
order thesis. Individual interests and rational thinking do not always dictate 
political actions. As the case of Afghanistan uncovers, political actions are 
governed by complex rules of exchange, societal code of conduct, and 
complex hierarchies of power which cannot be rationalised (Goodhand 2005; 
Coburn 2011). They are reinforced through series of different strategies 
including interfamilial marriage, gifts, partnerships, and societal reciprocities 
bases on identity-based divisions such as ethnicity, tribe, clan, and kin.   
 
The network character of international statebuilding is consistent with several 
recent studies that have showed international statebuilding does not 
fundamentally change the dynamics of power relations at the local level, but it 
often reconfigures and re-articulates pre-existing political networks and their 
practices (Narten 2009; Sending 2011). In Kosovo, Jens Narten (2009) found 
that international statebuilding negotiated peace with local elites, which 
subsequently helped maintain existing state-society relations. In fact, as the 
experience of Afghanistan reveals power dynamics and practices are driven 
by pre-existing governing political network relations and practices such as 
patron-client practices, opportunism and informal bargaining. The entrenched 
endogenous political-economic networks were compounded with corruptions 
and opportunism, spanning across a complex web of local and international 
connections, the result of three decades of war and conflict. In fact, illegal and 
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opportunistic practices are not mere ‘shadows’ (Nordstrom 2001), ‘informal’ 
(Roitman 2003) or ‘extra-legal’ (Duffield 1999) as suggested by some 
scholars. As this thesis uncovers, these are a key component of everyday 
statebuilding practices, fundamental in producing a complex peace, discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3. Studies in other regions have found that international 
intervention and global linkages enable local criminals and politicians to divert 
intervention in their favour (Nordstrom 2001; Roitman 2003). Pugh (2006) 
highlighted how international statebuilding provides substantial economic 
benefits to local political-economic networks and their elites and multinational 
corporations. The empirical chapters in this thesis will try to show how 
historically grounded informal institutions of patronage, rent-seeking and 
corruption have been adopted in post-2001 statebuilding, contributing to 
political order and stability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I outlined and critiqued the main theoretical and policy debates 
in international peacebuilding in the last two decades. I showed how these 
discussions have evolved since the early 1990s within three paradigms: the 
transformative, critical studies and hybrid peace. One of the key shortcomings 
of transformative and critical studies has been their neglect of the local and its 
power dynamics. Although, the hybrid peace has made a significant 
contribution in filling this void, it has overlooked the co-constitutive and 
network relations between the international-local. The latter section provided 
an explanatory analysis on the network character of peacebuilding. A focus on 
networks in international statebuilding helps us make a conceptual shift from 
the institutional and structural affect to the informal network character of 
statebuilding. Seeing post-conflict statebuilding through a network lens 
enables us to better analyse the transformative process of peacebuilding.  
 
The main purpose of this chapter was to highlight the network character of 
international peacebuilding and emphasize the important role of endogenous 
political forces in statebuilding which is often overlooked in the literature. As 
outlined in the introduction, this thesis is less about the role of international 
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networks on post-conflict statebuilding but more about the explicit role of 
endogenous political networks on international statebuilding and state 
formation. What and how the post-conflict state is constituted and how this 
composition produces (not produces) peace and order should be central to 
peacebuilding studies. It is important to theorise the power dynamics between 
endogenous political networks and the post-conflict state. This is discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: Political Networks and the Post-Conflict State  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is an attempt to theorise the relationship between the power 
dynamics of political networks and the post-conflict state. In doing so, it offers 
an analytical framework, one that is grounded in the analysis of informal 
political networks to explain how peace and political order is constituted. It 
hypothesises that political order and stability is a function of power dynamics 
and network practices among interdependent political networks within the 
state. This chapter begins by situating the post-conflict state in the broader 
theoretical discussion. Section II then draws a clear distinction between 
political organisations and political networks. Section III identifies three 
mutually re-enforcing network levels of analysis: individual network, whole 
network and community level, and describe how the functioning of political 
networks affect network effectiveness (section IV). Section V details   three 
main features of network practices which it argues contribute towards 
sustaining political networks: (1) patron-client practices, (2) opportunism and 
illegality, and (3) instrumentalisation of identity-based divisions. The final 
section, suggests that the power dynamics among competing political 
networks produces three possible political outcomes in relation to political 
stability: (1) balanced-network equilibrium, (2) co-optation by the dominant 
network (regime), and (3) relapse to conflict.  
 
I. Re-assembling and Transforming the Post-Conflict State 
 
Conflict management and peace studies literature suggest that political 
settlement and power-sharing amongst the warring groups have a major 
impact on conflict dynamics and subsequently the success of peace 
(Hampson 1996; Sisk 1996; Reilly 2002). In settings where the international 
statebuilding follows a political settlement arrangement, endogenous political 
forces play a vital role in re-building the state. Following an agreed power-
sharing framework, political groups come to control strategic parts of the 
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state, thereby filling in the state administrative apparatus and the 
bureaucracy. In Afghanistan, the new international statebuilding environment 
enabled former Mujahedeen tanzims to constitute the post-2001 state, further 
helping them to consolidate power (Chapter 5). As such, the state institutions 
(i.e., constitution, parliament, elections, human rights commission) and 
arrangements (i.e., electoral law, financing arrangements) emerged as the 
result of contestation, negotiation and bargain among competing political 
networks across multiple administrative levels (Chapter 5). In post-conflict 
countries where the state institutions are missing or eroded, the state 
bureaucracy arises to exist in the shadows of and in subordination to political 
networks because the structural details of state bureaucracy emerge out of 
the political process as they are connected to the strategies and motivations 
of political networks that exercise public authority. The underlying organisation 
of expanding bureaucracy thus becomes thoroughly political.  
 
The politicisation of bureaucracy and administration produces further 
dependencies and bargaining as political networks come to constitute the 
post-conflict state. The re-assembled post-conflict state is far from the 
international statebuilding’s objective of building a Weberian rational-legal 
bureaucratic state, differentiated along vertical organisational lines, based on 
rationality and division of labour. In such complex web of interdependencies, a 
ministerial or intergovernmental reshuffle, even at the low level, translates into 
a significant restructuring of network power dynamics within several 
ministries. This means that the state re-assembling takes place in a 
fragmented and divisive way, reflecting the diverse and often conflictive 
interests of political networks who exploit every opportunity to pull the 
direction of the statebuilding in their favour (Heathershaw & Lambach 2008). 
The fragmented nature of the re-assembled state is against the dominant 
functionalist-institutionalist and structuralist analyses that see the state as a 
cohesive homogenous entity driven by its own singular interest. 
 
Once having taken custody of key state positions, political networks limit 
access and privileges to members only. This is what Douglas North (2009) 
terms the limited-access state. North’s framing of historical state order is 
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informing for our analysis of the post-conflict state. North (2009) identifies two 
historically different social orders, which he argues have shaped the historical 
state formations in most countries: the limited-access state and the open-
access state. North asserted that the limited-access state has been the 
natural default social order because it aligns the interests of powerful 
individuals to forge a dominant coalition in such a way that limits violence. 
Elite members within the coalition agree to respect each other’s political and 
financial privileges and resources. By limiting access to privileges of the 
empowered political networks (i.e., patronage, rent-seeking), they create 
credible incentives to cooperate rather than fight each other, knowing that 
violence will reduce their own rents (2009:19). Rent creation is a fundamental 
contributing factor to stability. North (2009:19) understands rent as a return to 
an economic asset that exceeds the return that asset can receive in its best 
alternative use. He treats the state as a single entity or a super-organisation 
run by a coalition of smaller organisations, which work to safeguard political 
order and stability. 21  According to North, most Western states are open-
access, where the state has been transformed from its natural state as a 
result of the development of a strong social capital upon which civil societies 
thrive and formal institutions take roots (North 2009:7). One serious 
shortcoming of liberal peace international intervention and statebuilding is that 
it treats post-conflict states with an open-access state logic, which is far from 
realities on the ground.  
 
Douglas North’s historical framing could be applied to our understanding of 
the relationship between the endogenous political networks and the post-
conflict state. However, we need to explain explicitly how political networks 
maintain themselves within the state and how power dynamics among them 
shape political order and peace. Before addressing this, we need to make a 
distinction between political networks and political organisations.  
 
 
                                                        
21 According to North (2009:7), organisations are perceived as tools that individuals use to 
increase their productivity, to seek and create human contact and relationships to coordinate 
the actions of many individuals and groups and to dominate and coerce others.  
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II. A Distinction Between Political Networks and Political Organisations 
 
Political networks in post-conflict statebuilding are hybrid forms of networks 
and hierarchies. Organisations were conventionally considered hierarchical 
whilst networks were seen as horizontal and everywhere. In orthodox public 
management literature, organisations were defined as “patterns of precisely 
defined jobs organised in a hierarchical manner through precisely defined 
lines of command and communication” (Morgan, 1986: 27). However, as 
Powell (1990) suggests it would appear less useful in the twenty-first century 
to compare hierarchy and network when hierarchies look less like an 
organisation at this time of emerging bureaucratic organisation. Recent public 
management literature (Agranoff & McGuire 2003; Kickert & Koppenjan 1997; 
Koppenjan & Klijn 2004) suggests that a clear-cut distinction between 
organisations and networks is superfluous and misleading. These analysts 
argue that inter-organisational networks are open-hierarchical arrangements 
and collaborative. Agranoff and McGuire (2007:83) term them 
‘collaborarchies’. They argue that we must go beyond the simple 
generalisation that networks are managed non-hierarchically and could be 
found everywhere.  
 
As detailed in the introduction, political networks in post-conflict statebuilding 
are hierarchically arranged entities while remaining network-like structures in 
terms of their institutional arrangements, patterns of exchange, 
interdependent flows of resources, and reciprocal lines of information. They 
are self-organising entities with their own distinct open-hierarchical structures. 
These are informally structured whose members are interdependent on each 
other’s resources and power relations, which facilitates their collaboration. In 
the immediate international intervention in post-conflict countries when the 
formal state institutions are either missing or eroded, existing political 
networks as alternative modes of organising and governance play an 
important role in helping re-build the post-conflict state. As Swedberg 
(1994:25) pointed out networks offer an effective alternative mode of 
organising in facilitating political activity in circumstance where there is no 
central authority.   
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Table 3.1: Distinctions between Political Networks and Political Organisations 
 
 
Political networks in post-conflict statebuilding are managed differently from 
political organisations in regards to differences in the form of authority and the 
direction of the flow of authority (Agranoff & McGuire 2003). In a political 
organisation, planning, designing and leading is centrally controlled by and 
through a clear command and control structure. In political networks, authority 
is dispersed in hybrid forms (vertical and horizontal) and may not necessarily 
flow through a precise command and control mechanism. Authority in a 
political network is collective. In a political network, a single central authority, 
a hierarchical ordering and a single organisational goal do not exist. Political 
networks in statebuilding are fluid entities and membership fluctuates as 
events unfold, moments of rent-seeking arise, and crisis occurs; however, 
they generally present themselves as a unitary actor in political arenas. 
Authority might be centralised around a charismatic leader in a political 
network; however, the task of a political network leader is to guide 
interactions, set rules of the game, manage and direct actors and resources, 
and arbitrate conflicts and disputes. The central node has as much authority 
as the network members allow him to Possess. The important role of political 
networks is discussed in section IV.  
 
 Political Organisations  Political Networks  
Organisational 
settings 
Single authority 
structure 
Hybrid form of hierarchy and networks, 
divided authority structure, 
interdependency, exit anytime, 
Goal structure Activities are guided by 
clear goals and well 
defined interests 
Various and diverse set of goals and 
interests 
Authority Hierarchical, clear 
command and control 
structure 
Dispersed authority, hybrid authority 
(vertical and horizontal), mediator, trust 
and reciprocal relations, bargaining  
Management  Centralised planning 
and guiding 
organisation 
Co-managing, co-steering and co-
guidance 
Flow of 
information 
Built-in mechanisms of 
hierarchical information 
sharing/ subject to 
manipulation 
Higher information sharing capacities, 
thicker information, the strength of the 
weak ties  
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Power-dependency is a central feature of political networks, highlighted in the 
introduction of this thesis (Rhodes & Marsh 1992; Rhode 1997).  Members 
within a political network as well as political networks among themselves exist 
with one another in a resource and power-dependency relations. In this 
interdependent relationship, some actors sit in positions of an extensive 
opportunity context which provides them with greater access to knowledge, 
financial resources and authority (Burt 1992). In post-conflict contexts like 
Afghanistan, this intense politicking enables critical nodes to raise the 
prospect of their bargaining among interested parties and constantly negotiate 
pacts. The distribution, and types, of resources within a network explains the 
relative power of actors (individuals and organisation). Knoke (1990) in one of 
the most comprehensive studies of political networks argued that power in a 
political network is inherently ‘relational’ and ‘situational’. Power is a 
relationship of one social actor to another and it is specific to a situation. It is 
dynamic and potentially unstable (1990:2). Power is not an end in itself but a 
tool to achieve goals. Given that each individual within a political network and 
each political network collectively have its own agency, there is an intense 
power politics involved in deciding, shaping and implementing policies and 
strategies. Contest, negotiation and bargaining over policies and decisions 
among the varied political networks become a routine practice in 
statebuilding.  
 
This raises the prospect of increased bargaining among interested parties as 
opposed to organisations (Bogason & Toonen 1998: 205). This is because 
political networks are goal-directed structures in which actors 1) are able to 
formulate and make utility-improving choices; 2) alternative outcomes have 
distributional implications for actors, favouring some over others; and 3) 
actors vary in the power or influence they possess (Lake & Wong 2009:129). 
In such conditions political actors manipulate others in the network to produce 
desired outcomes. Political networks are evolving structures that are 
reinforced, renewed and reproduced ” to borrow Bourdieu and Passeron’s 
phrasing (1977). In post-conflict spaces, the immediate success of political 
networks depends on collaborating with one another in re-assembling and re-
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building the state. This might change in later stages if one political network 
emerges as the dominant player and if others weaken.  
 
High information-sharing capacity is another key aspects of political networks 
in post-conflict statebuilding, enabling political networks to translate decisions 
into actions quickly as shown in business studies (Powell 1990; Uzzi 1997). 
Organisations on the other hand exhibit built-in mechanisms of hierarchical 
information sharing, which could be subject to manipulation by the leadership. 
In political networks, information is dispersed and readily available because of 
the logic of “strength of the weak ties” (Granovetter 1974). Kaneko & Imai 
(1987) found that information passed through networks was thicker than that 
obtained from the market and organisations. Powell (1990:304) asserted that 
the most useful information is not the one that has flowed down the chain of 
command; rather it is the one that is obtained from someone with whom one 
had dealt in the past and found it to be reliable. In business studies, Alter and 
Hage (1993) argued that networks not only provide opportunities to access 
information as shared sources, but they also provide opportunities to 
transform information into new learning and adapting opportunities. Finally, 
exit is another important feature of political networks in post-conflict 
statebuilding. Political networks are voluntary with entry and exit determined 
by the actors themselves rather than mandated by any “higher” authority. In 
an organisation, individuals find it difficult, either for formal or informal 
reasons, to exit, whereas in political networks, even those with some degree 
of sanctions, exit is easier. This is particularly useful in conditions of flux like 
post-conflict settings, where uncertainty is high and network practices of 
opportunism, bargaining and rent-seeking are the rules of the game. 
 
III. Network Effectiveness and Levels of Analysis 
 
Recent studies in public management on network effectiveness have 
broadened our focus from a concern with individual relations among network 
members to an examination of the multiple interactions that comprises full 
networks (Milward & Provan 2000; Provan et. al. 2005; Provan & Kennis 
2008). Provan et. al. coined the term, whole network, which he defines as “a 
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group of three or more organisations connected in ways that facilitate 
achievement of a common goal…formally established and governed and goal 
directed rather than occurring serendipitously” (2008:480). They argued that 
network effectiveness must be measured at the “whole network” level in 
relation to its multiple interactive components rather than the organisational 
level of analysis (Provan et. al. 2008: 480). This is reflective of recent network 
studies that suggest networks must be analysed in a multi-level and multi-
theory dimension (Monge & Contractor 2003). This rationale could guide in 
our analysis of the complex network relations in post-conflict settings like in 
post-2001 Afghanistan (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Levels of Analysis 
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In post-conflict settings, political networks exhibit a three-level interaction, 
involving (1) the whole network, (2) the individual network, and (3) the local 
community level, depicted in Figure 3.1. Each level is mutually interdependent 
on the other for their ability to influence political outcomes. The whole network 
is comprised of several competing individual networks connected to one 
another by a complex set of resource and power-dependencies. While each 
individual networks might be part of a whole network of common interests or 
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opportunism, they constantly compete with each other over influence, 
allegiances, state positions and resources.  
 
Within a situation of interdependency of resources and asymmetry of power, 
each individual network competes, negotiates, and bargains over the 
statebuilding political and financial resources in an attempt to pull the direction 
of statebuilding and state formation in their favour. Individual networks are 
embedded in communities they claim to represent. This is not to say that each 
community is tied to a single individual network; however, several individual 
networks might compete in the same community along identity-based 
divisions (e.g., ethnic, linguistic, religious and tribal) for material and symbolic 
gain. This was the case during the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan 
where opposing networks competed in different districts to gain community 
votes (Chapter 6). Individual networks play the critical role of gluing the whole 
network together. They ensure internal cohesion within their individual 
networks, maintain ties with local communities and provide connections 
across individual networks within the state, represented by vertical lines and 
horizontal arcs respectively. In essence, they function like an intermediary or 
broker, connecting a wide spectrum of actors, networks, and organisations at 
the local and international levels.   
 
In moments of rupture and bargains like the 2009 presidential election 
(Chapter 6) or the 2010-2011 Special Court crisis (Chapter 7), these 
embedded individual networks play an instrumental role in manipulating 
identity lines to mobilise local communities to get the vote out, thereby expand 
their bargaining power. The individual networks may choose to ally with or be 
co-opted by different whole networks, especially the dominant one, to ensure 
the maintenance of their privileges and property within the state. Or they may 
harness the power of the masses to mobilise against opposing political 
networks. While individual networks tend to be relatively stable with 
occasional potential for splintering, whole networks are often temporal, fluid 
and spatial. Whole networks forms, re-forms and re-structure as events 
unfold, crisis continues, local socio-political balances change, and positions 
and resources shift. This is best seen during the 2010-2011 Special Court 
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crisis in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House), where two distinct whole networks 
around the crisis was formed one centred on President Karzai and the ad hoc 
Support for Rule of Law (SRL) around Haji Zahir. Both the SRL and the 
President Karzai whole network were composed of many individual networks 
and centres of power stretching from the centre to the local community level. 
Chapter 5 shows how between 2002-2004 Karzai was able to pursue a mix 
policy of coercion and accommodation in removing the key former 
Mujahedeen individual network leaders while co-opting their network clientele 
to his whole network in expanding and consolidating his power, but then from 
2007 onwards he brought them back to power at the expense of his allied 
technocratic elites. However, the case of the 2010-2011 Special Court 
(Chapter 7) in the Wolesi Jirga, on the other hand, demonstrated that Karzai’s 
whole network was successful only to the extent that powerful individual 
networks allowed him to be. During the crisis, confronted by these influential 
political networks, Karzai eventually backed down from his decision to remove 
63 sitting MPs from the Wolesi Jirga, a year of prolonged parliamentary crisis.  
 
 
IV. Political Network Effectiveness and Network Practices 
 
The success and failure of post-conflict statebuilding and state formation 
depends on the effective functioning of both whole networks and individual 
networks. Most network studies focus on the properties of networks: what 
networks are, how they are structured, how they operate, and how they 
develop. Network effectiveness is hardly discussed. O’Toole’s (1997) asserts 
that if we are to take networks seriously, we must understand whether they 
work. In this thesis, network effectiveness is considered in terms of their ability 
to survive and expand their power within the state. Network effectiveness is 
achieved if political networks are able to (1) maintain and consolidate political 
power within the post-conflict state, (2) accumulate financial gains for 
resource exchanges, and (3) maintain strong ties with their local communities. 
The ability of political networks to perform these functions is bound to vary. 
Some political networks might have excessive financial wealth but low political 
power base (constituency mobilisation power) while others might enjoy higher 
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mobilisation power but low financial wealth. For a political network to be 
effective it needs to achieve at least two of the above functions.  
 
In post-conflict statebuilding, particularly in those that have experienced a 
prolonged war, network effectiveness is a function of the following three main 
features of network practices: (a) patron-client relations for political expansion; 
(b) opportunism and illegality for wealth accumulation; and (c) 
instrumentalisation of identity-based divisions for political mobilisation. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, existing informal network governance logics and 
practices such as patronage, illegality, and rent-seeking do not disappear in 
post-conflict statebuilding but are re-articulated and re-configured. Evidence 
from several post-conflict countries reveals that informal network practices in 
fact intensify with international intervention and statebuilding (Narten, 2009; 
Sending, 2011). The empirical evidence in this thesis suggests that the post-
2001 Afghan state is constituted as the state by its appreciation of the above 
identified network practices. However, what one needs to acknowledge is that 
these practices are closely combined and interlinked with political networks. 
 
Examining the everyday practices of political networks in determining political 
outcome is different to the dominant approach in network and organisational 
studies that analyse either the types of networks (Sinno 2008), the internal 
composition of the network (Knoke 1990; Burt 1992), or the strategies 
employed to manage the network (Kickert, et.al. 1997; O’Toole 1997; Agranoff 
& McGuire 2003). Although these aspects of political networks are important, 
they inform us little about the political outcomes in statebuilding. In the context 
of intervention and international statebuilding, a focus on network practices 
sheds light on how political networks compete to perform as the state. It helps 
better understand not only how competing networks constitute the post-
conflict state and produce political stability (or instability) but also how they 
“enact” the state. According to Reeves, enactment is the process in which 
state officials, those who claim to possess legitimate authority, enact 
themselves to represent the state (Reeves 2007). For instance, how does an 
army commander, a tribal elder, a village National Solidarity Program 
member, and a regional strongman whose loyalty is to his/her political 
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network, come to make a meaningful claim to an authority that is external to 
him. Through this act of “impersonation,” network members on a daily basis 
produce an effect of the state as a singular and vertical entity. The state effect 
concept is further discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis. The key 
features of these practices are discussed below.   
 
Patron-Client Practices 
 
With the sudden increase in international fund in statebuilding and the 
constitution of the post-conflict state by political networks who gain access to 
these funds, patron-client ties linking the leaders and sub-leaders of various 
political-economic and identity networks, proliferate. Political networks come 
to enact and impersonate the state from top government officials to district 
police commanders, to community leaders, and to local teachers through 
informal bargains of patron-client relations. A patron-client practice is an 
exchange relationship of some private and personal nature where players 
have reciprocal needs and expectations, but unequal power and status 
(Johnson & Dandeker 1990). This relationship is a dyadic one, characterised 
by unequal status, reciprocity and personal contact that is arranged 
hierarchically (Scott, 1972: 92). Such relationships in post-conflict settings link 
political network members in the centre with their local clients (e.g., tribal 
leader or district police chief) to the state.  
 
Patron-client practices are driven by political economy and political culture 
aspects. Goodhand (2004), in his study of war-to-peace economy, shows how 
patronage in post-2001 Afghanistan involves complex socio-cultural and 
political as well as economics of exchange and association. Patron-client 
practices are often reinforced through strategies of interfamilial marriage, 
partnerships, and gifts. Moments of rupture and contestation like the 
presidential elections provide an excellent opportunity for network elites of all 
levels to seek rents and exchange. As Kitchelt and Wilkinson (2007) found, it 
is the contingency of targeted benefits, not the targeting of goods taken by it, 
that constitutes the clientelistic exchange in most electoral politics. In one of 
the early works on patronage, Alex Weingrod (1968: 379) defines electoral 
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patronage as a “way in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special 
favours in exchange for electoral support.” Voters pledge their votes 
instrumentally – that is, to politicians who promise to deliver specific goods or 
who have already delivered a particular mix of goods and services. As 
Shahrani (1998) points out in the context of Afghanistan, patron-client 
practices are often contingent upon the shifting boundaries of the community 
within the changing context of various political network struggles within or 
between contending groups. This is what he calls the “political ecology of 
particular times, places and spaces” (1998: 220). Thus, patron-client practices 
must be understood within their own political ecology context, which in a post-
conflict situation means understanding the intensification of interaction 
between international statebuilding and local political networks, which then 
generates opportunism and rent-seeking.  
 
Once seizing a key strategic part of the post-conflict state, following 
internationally mediated power-sharing arrangement, each political network 
attempts to consolidate their power by offering state resources to their clients 
in order to maintain and co-opt key embedded local leaders, district 
governors, Mullahs, state officials and businessmen into their bargaining 
network. The ability of political networks to provide privileges, positions and 
bargains determines their authority, power and legitimacy within the re-
assembling state. The ties of loyalty and reciprocity—whether economic, 
political or moral—between the political network and its clients within the 
network and across other political networks are conceived in interpersonal 
dyadic terms and subject to constant negotiation. The availability of numerous 
patrons and the clients’ ability to defect provides the client considerable 
leverage within the political network. As Sinno argued mid-level patrons can 
always challenge their own patron if he/she cannot continue to supply them 
with the resources they need, or if they develop a large clientele, or they 
sufficiently accumulate the resources that their patron once supplied 
(2008:39).  
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Opportunism and Illegality  
 
The sudden increase in international aid money creates opportunities for 
political networks and their clientele.  The availability of several networks and 
the ability of clients to exit in post-conflict statebuilding means maintaining a 
political network can be extremely costly. In most post-conflict counties like 
Afghanistan, where community power structures are driven largely by a 
bargaining system and controlled by political networks, financial acquisition 
and then distribution plays an instrumental role in helping the network to 
sustain itself in competition, otherwise members would be co-opted by the 
rival. Post-conflict countries that exhibit strong patron-client practices often 
move towards creating a deeply “entrenched economy” where small 
intertwined political and economic elites come to govern the economy and the 
politics.22 Empirical studies that analyse the effect of political connections and 
rent-seeking activities on firm performance (Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001) 
suggest that such connections represent an integral firm asset. Burt (1992) 
and Granovetter (1985) found that these connections have a social capital 
component, which affects both firm strategic choices and their performance in 
the market. This could be applied to political networks in statebuilding. Studies 
in other contexts have confirmed that opportunism and criminal economic 
practices are fundamental in maintaining political networks and the state 
functioning (Roitman 2003).  
 
In his study of illicit border crossing in the Chad basin, Roitman (2003:192-
193) found that illegal resource extraction by state officials was seen by many 
(both by the local and state officials) as a “legitimate mode of the exercise of 
power”, fundamental to the survival of the state. Roitman criticised those that 
he argued misleadingly refer to such practices as “informal economy” or 
“shadow economy” (Nordstrom, 2001) or “parallel economy” (Reno, 2001), 
because these activities are fundamentally linked to the state. In post-conflict 
spaces, illegality is neither parallel nor captured to the legal as suggested; it is 
an integrated and inseparable process that shapes the nature of governance 
                                                        
22 For recent studies of economic entrenchment theory see Faccio, 2006 and Fisman 2001.  
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in these spaces. Cheng and Zaum (2011) in their edited volume proposed that 
corruption might actually be necessary to meet the objectives of 
peacebuilding. They argued that in post-conflict settings, where the state is 
captured by rent-seeking factions, corruption does indeed have a corrosive 
effect on political stabilisation.  This challenges the conventional wisdom that 
argues corruption and peacebuilding are fundamental opponents. However, 
as Reeves (2007) asks in relation to the Fergana valley, is this, then, simply a 
story of corruption? Reeves suggests illegality is not simply a deviation or 
corruption of the state; neither is it incidental to its constitution, but it is an 
everyday functioning (2007:134). Political networks and the state as a whole 
thrive on illegality. In places like post-1998 Bosnia (Le Billon 2008) and post-
2001 Afghanistan, resource extraction through illegal means such as violence, 
extortion, and land grab by members of political networks are fundamental to 
their political survival. In Afghanistan, through their political client links within 
the state (e.g., access to information, financial assets, and coercion) and licit 
and illicit business links (e.g. Kabul Bank, drug trade, private security firms), 
and access to development aid and contracts, political networks accumulate 
and distribute wealth to maintain and expand their political networks.  
 
An interesting area, which is often overlooked, is the link between criminal 
networks and politicians. In post-conflict spaces like Afghanistan, these two 
are intertwined and entrenched. Illegality and rent-seeking practices work best 
when using a combination of weak and strong ties. Podolny and Page (1998) 
found that networks enable criminals to build positive relations with the 
political groups they depend on for protection, and build functional, mediated, 
and varied connections with non-criminal actors whose expertise is of value to 
them. For instance, traffickers use strong intimate ties with local residents to 
maintain an inward trust base to build the trafficker’s leadership role while 
limiting the local roles of weakly tied state officials; but, still using contacts to 
those officials to obtain funds and build political support. In international 
relations, Kahler (2009) found that in order to reduce risk and uncertainty, 
traffickers form social connections with government officials. They often enter 
into a mutual exchange process where the illicit entrepreneurs provide 
partners with a range of resources, including money, votes, property, and 
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other enticement. They try to exploit state power and create an alternative 
political space that tolerates, even supports and legitimises their activities.  
 
However, wealth accumulation is not an end for itself for those political 
networks that engage in illegality and opportunism, but a means for political 
ends in purchasing loyalties and expanding political support. The combination 
of patron-client practices and illegality interlock political networks and their 
clientele into long-lasting interactions. Most political networks attempt to 
maintain a close tie with their local communities to ensure they survive during 
moments of crisis. While wealth might help buy loyalties, political networks still 
need communities as an additional bargaining card in political exchange, 
especially in moments of high contestation like the elections.   
 
Instrumentalisation of Identity-Based Divisions at Community Level 
 
Political networks are embedded in communities that they represent (or 
manipulate). Studies of community elite networks and collective actions 
suggest that community elites are strongly affected by their proximity in the 
network of informal social relations (Laumann & Pappi 1976, Laumann, 
Marsden & Galaskiewicz 1977). Network effectiveness at the community level 
means the ability of networks to satisfy the needs and expectations of their 
constituency to gain political legitimacy. Suchman (1995) suggests that 
legitimacy is key for long-term survival of political organisations, their status 
and viability.23 Legitimacy in post-conflict statebuilding is often achieved along 
with a combination of service provision and traditional means such as 
religious, tribal and ethnic support. Coburn (2010) found that most 
communities in Afghanistan considered their members of parliament first and 
                                                        
23 There are two types of legitimacy, internal and external. External legitimacy is bestowed by 
international intervener’s support to political networks. The international invitation of several 
networks to the Bonn Conference in 2001 provided Jihadi political networks with the 
necessary external recognition they needed. External legitimacy is gained on a daily basis in 
the process of statebuilding. Tsai (2001) argued that external links are crucial to the survival 
and expansion of networks. As outlined in Chapter 5, external support and legitimacy was a 
key factor in enabling Karzai and his emerging political network to pursue repression and 
accommodation policies.  
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foremost as an extension of their local patronage system whose primary role 
is to connect them to the patronage aid provision of international statebuilding.  
 
In divided societies, identities provide a powerful mean through which political 
networks and their clients could mobilise communities. In post-conflict spaces 
like Afghanistan where prolonged conflict has produced an environment of 
“complex security dilemmas” (Kaufman 2000:441) along identities, ethnic and 
tribal divisions provide opportunities for political networks to claim 
representation to communities that they are embedded. In such conditions, 
the appeal of identity elites further accentuates identity affiliations as the two 
together provide a rationale for the perpetuation of identity divisions. This 
produces a symbiotic relationship between political networks that wish to 
advance their own bargaining position within the state, and their constituency 
who fear political domination. The empirical chapters support the theory that 
politicisation of identities provide a powerful mask for political networks to 
conceive their illegal and rent-seeking practices, whether it is to elect a new 
parliament speaker, subcontract a project, or distribute land in a district. 
However, this is not to imply that identities are fixed and stable in post-conflict 
countries. Identity is not a quality of a social group, but a relationship between 
social groups (Barth 1969). Mitchell’s (1969) network approach to ethnicity is 
informing. He argued that ethnic identities are both a “situational” and a 
“negotiated” phenomenon (Mitchell 1969: 241). Individuals are self-
categorised or categorised by others depending upon different types of social 
relationships in different situations (1969: 32). As such, identities are multiple 
and overlapping forms, crosscutting families, villages, regions, and etc. In 
post-conflict spaces like Afghanistan, identities provide a powerful terrain on 
which political battles could be contested among political networks. In 
Afghanistan, whilst none of the political networks came to power through 
identity structures, once in power they pursued every effort to maintain a 
certain degree of influence over the ethno-regional and tribal systems 
(Wimmer & Schetter 2003; Roy 1995; Dorronsoro 1995; Simonsen 2004).  
 
To sum up, in post-conflict divided societies, identity-based solidarity provides 
a particularly powerful bond for network construction and political 
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organisation, thus promoting patron–client linkage building. In post-conflict 
statebuilding, patron-client practices, opportunism and illegality, and 
politicisation of identities mutually help political networks to maintain 
themselves in the state, subsequently, ensuring peace and political stability. 
The survival of political networks depends on their ability to effectively perform 
at least two of the above features of network practices. For instance, a 
combination of patron-client practices and illegality interlock political elites and 
their clients into long-lasting mutual interaction during times of stability but 
might not be effective in times of major crisis and internal wars. A mixture of 
patron-client relations and political networks’ strong links with their 
communities at the local level, on the other hand, might be more effective in 
times of crisis or moments of contestation like the 2009 presidential election 
(Chapter 6), however, to some extent less relevant in times of political 
stability. 
 
 
V. Political Networks and the Institutional Context 
 
Political networks operate within a given institutional context. This analysis 
simply draws on the neo-institutional theory to explain that repeated 
interactions between actors over a long period of time produce institutions that 
enable actors to regulate behaviours and practices (Hodgeson 2004; North 
1990; Ostrom 1990). This analysis employs Douglas North’s definition of 
institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. 
They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal constraints  (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)”, or simply, the “rules of the game” (1990:1-2). Networks and 
institutions mutually shape each other (Scott 2008; Owen-Smith & Powell 
2007). While institutions shape the strategies and intentions of political 
networks and help them coordinate complex interaction between them, 
networks generate the categories and hierarchies that help define institutions 
and contribute to their efficiency or make them vulnerable (Owen-Smith & 
Powell 2007: 603). 
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In post-conflict statebuilding, informal institutions take precedence over formal 
institutions in regulating the pattern of political network practices and 
behaviours. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) maintain that informal institutions are 
socially shared and usually unwritten, created, communicated and enforced 
outside officially sanctioned channels. Political networks in post-conflict 
statebuilding have every incentive to preserve the old rules of the game, 
which had helped them survive during the warring years. Informal rules such 
as rent-seeking, corruption and bargaining are enduring and resilient 
institutions which do not disappear with the arrival of international intervention 
and statebuilding. Even new rules are often built onto existing ones (Narten 
2009). This is especially the case in contexts where state institutions are 
failing (Ostrom1990).  
 
 
VI. Political Network Cohesion 
 
A vital aspect of political network effectiveness is network cohesion: what 
holds a political network together. Public management literature provides four 
different explanations to describe what holds a network together. These are: 
trust, common purpose, mutual interdependency, and network leadership. 
This analysis finds network leadership as the most important explanation for 
network cohesion at individual network and the resource dependency at the 
whole network level. 
 
At the individual network level, trust is a defining feature of network cohesion. 
However, trust plays a lesser role at the whole network level. Trust imposes 
obligation, expectations, and commitment to others in the network (Barber 
1983). Axelrod’s (2006) concept of “the shadow of the future” points to a 
broader conception of self-interest in which individuals pay attention to the 
long-term prospect of their reputation. Anthropologists have long argued that 
strong ties based on kinship, families and friendship build trust and facilitate 
high-risk activities. High trust helps build consensus and a sense of 
understanding and partnering (Agranoff & McGuire, 2007:121). Political 
network members in post-conflict statebuilding are also motivated by a 
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common purpose for maintaining and expanding their political network power 
within the state. Tsai and Kilduff (2003) argued that a goal-directed network is 
highly structured around a leader or set of leaders who articulate the goals of 
the network. Although common purpose might be important, it is the least 
contributing factor to network cohesion in statebuilding settings, particularly at 
the whole network level. 
 
At the whole network level, mutual dependency is the most important factor in 
brining the whole network together and to a lesser extent in the individual 
network level. This explanation was advanced by Rhodes and Marsh (1992) 
and Rhodes (1997) who argued that networks are resource-interdependent 
because they cannot attain their goals by themselves, but need the resources 
of other actors to do so. Interdependency is based on the distribution of 
resources over various actors, the goals they pursue and their perceptions of 
their resource dependencies. At the whole network level, in the immediate 
post-conflict situation, competing political networks find it advantageous to 
strategically collaborate with each other in re-assembling and transforming the 
post-conflict state in their favour and once the state is re-assembled to 
continue working together in maintaining the status quo. It is this 
manifestation of the rational behaviours that could ensure political order in 
post-conflict statebuilding.  
 
Leadership in post-conflict settings is the single most important factor in 
keeping the network together, especially at the individual network. This 
analysis draws on recent public management literature that suggests the 
success of political networks depend mainly on the good management of the 
network leader (Agranoff & McGuire 2003; Huxham & Vangen 2005; Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2000). In post-conflict statebuilding, political leaders, as the 
“central node”, must build critical linkages externally whilst simultaneously 
managing the network internally. Internally, a political network leader needs to 
know who has the resources within the network (e.g., money, information, 
expertise, and legitimacy) and how to employ them. The role of a political 
leader at the whole network level is to steer processes for the common good. 
Kickert and Koppenjan (1997) identified five steering processes which he 
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argued a network leader must pursue: 1) activating networks to tackle 
particular problems or issues (activation); 2) establishing ad hoc 
organisational arrangements to support interaction (arranging); 3) bringing 
together solutions, problems and parties (brokerage); 4) promoting favourable 
conditions for joint action (facilitation); and 5) conflict management (mediation 
and arbitration). The most effective role for an individual leader in a situation 
of asymmetry of power and resources is to play the role of a “powerbroker” 
and “facilitator”. For instance in post-2001 Afghanistan, individual networks 
are centred around a charismatic leader who plays the role of both patron and 
powerbroker client enabling the network to span across “structural holes” 
within the state and society, negotiating bargains and exchanges and 
mobilising support at community level. 24  However, a key weakness of 
individual network leaders is that they allow little diversification of authority 
and connection. That is why, the loss of a charismatic leader often results into 
splintering, weakening, and even the collapse of the network. In post-2001 
Afghanistan, the splintering of former Mujahedeen tanzims into several sub-
networks following the death of the leader seems a common feature. Major 
former Mujahedeen tanzims have fractured into several smaller networks 
including Jamiat-i-Islami, Hizb-i-Islami, and Wahdat-i-Islami (see appendix 
table 1). At the whole network level, while a network leader coordinates and 
facilitates actions, rarely, the real authority is granted to him/her across the 
network as a whole. Such a move is neither possible nor feasible. Each 
political network brings and keeps its own authority, thus managing together. 
In this situation network governance is more of a process of “co-managing, 
co-steering, and co-guidance”  (Kooiman 1993:6).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
24 Burt (2005) provides a rich account of social capital in networks. He shows how brokers 
span across structural holes to connect different clusters, help bridge differences and work 
towards cooperation. Network entrepreneurs identify rewarding structural holes in a market or 
organisation, and have an advantage in managing the work of bridging the hole. A structurally 
autonomous group has a strong reputation mechanism aligning people inside the group, and 
a strong vision advantage from brokerage outside the group. They have a creative view of 
valuable projects, who to involve, and who they work together with to make it happen. 
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Figure 3.2:  Political Networks and Post-Conflict Political Stability Framework 
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VII. The Safe State Position(s) Contingency  
 
The contingency that would have a significant influence on political network 
performance is the network’s control of a safe state position(s).25 A safe state 
position(s) refers to the political network’s strategic control of a key position 
within the state (i.e., presidency, vice-presidencies, ministerial positions, 
directorates, governors) from which it could contest against potential rivals 
both materially and symbolically. The safe position is important because it 
provides political networks with the necessary legitimacy to make a claim to 
the state. Once in power, political networks could utilise state resources and 
the legitimacy given to them by the state to expand and consolidate their 
power within the state (Chapter 5).  The state provides them with the 
opportunity to accumulate wealth, gain access to international projects and 
contracts, shape policy, and more importantly offer them with first-hand 
access to information. For instance, once a friend working for President 
Karzai’s office explained how knowing about the government’s policy of 
building new housing nine months prior to releasing the policy to the public 
                                                        
25 The idea of a safe position contingency draws on Sinno’s framing of organisations at war 
where he refers to safe heaven contingency (2008).  
Political Networks Network Practices 
Political Outcomes 
(State Survival) 
Contingency  
Availability of 
Safe State 
Position (S) 
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had enabled a particular construction company which belonged to the first-
vice president to make the preparations to win the contract. Safe positions are 
rarely safe for long because in a situation of “contested field” dictated by the 
asymmetry of power and resources, competing political networks try their best 
to undermine their rival’s safe position. Empirical evidence suggests that in 
post-2001 Afghanistan, with the loss of a safe position political networks often 
take an anti-government position and in some cases join the insurgency, 
contributing towards the re-emergence of conflict.  
 
 
VIII. Political Order and State Survival 
 
The power dynamics of political networks and their practices are likely to 
produce three different potential political outcomes in relation to political order 
and state survival in post-conflict statebuilding, particularly relevant once the 
international military withdraws from the host country. These outcomes are: 1) 
a balanced-network equilibrium; 2) co-optation by the dominant network (the 
emergence of a regime); and 3) relapse into conflict and instability. 
 
The best ideal outcome that would benefit all political networks is 
collaboration and the creation of balanced-network equilibrium, where each 
political network respects the other network’s spheres of influence, resources 
and power. This is aligned with Douglas North’s framing of limited-access 
state where the elites establish a coalition through which they limit access to 
privileges of the empowered political networks, therefore, creating incentives 
for cooperation rather than trying to out-maneuver each other. The logic is 
simple: violence reduces political network’s rents especially with regard to the 
international aid. Of course, there will be tensions and competition over key 
strategic state positions and resources in a situation of asymmetry of power 
but these do not translate into conflict as the evidence from the 2009 
presidential election and the 2010-2011 Special Court crisis uncovers.  This 
fits with the logic of the game theory that cooperation will produce outcomes 
that are more favorable to parties involved than when the parties compete 
(Axelrod 2006). Collaboration is perceived as the management of differences 
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between competing networks (Williams 2002:115) or a continuous 
“negotiating process” (Bardach 1998:232) between them over key policies, 
objectives and strategies within the state. Agranoff and McGuire suggest that 
network collaboration raises the potential for more rational decision-making 
(2007:157). Thus, in this particular scenario, rather than vying for dominance, 
political networks share power to achieve mutually obtainable objectives. A 
balanced-network equilibrium situation provides a greater degree of discretion 
and flexibility among political networks over key decision-making processes 
and goals.   
 
The second ideal outcome is the cooptation of individual networks and their 
clientele by an emerging powerful political network. I content with Sinno 
(2008:55) that co-optation is a strategy employed by a more powerful party to 
offer positive sanctions to key members of other threatening networks in 
return for accepting the norms of interaction desired by the dominant party. In 
post-conflict statebuilding where there is an asymmetry of power and 
resources, the resource-rich individual networks or whole Networks 
repeatedly attempt to co-opt their opponents’ key members. Co-optation is 
often very costly especially within an environment of multiple alternative 
networks. The empirical evidence in this thesis uncovers the astonishing 
amount of bargaining paid to purchase loyalties (Chapter 6 and 7). However, 
as Piattoni (2001) highlighted the best resource buyer in a patron-client 
network is usually a political actor close to government resources, most often 
the incumbent authorities. In Afghanistan it is the Karzai network that has 
been able to consolidate its power through a combination of repression and 
co-optation strategies. In Iraq, it is the incumbent Al-Maleki who has built an 
extensive political network, moving towards dictatorship (Dodge 2012). Once 
the power of one individual network exceeds the power of all political 
networks, the likelihood of the emergence of a regime becomes imminent. 
Cambodia (Cock 2010) and Iraq (Dodge 2012) are such political outcomes. 
Both of these political outcomes tend to produce political stability and 
subsequently state survival, even though in some cases this is achieved with 
a significant reliance on coercion and force.  
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The worst political outcome is the re-lapse to conflict. This happens when 
political network distrust reaches a level that leaves no room for collaboration 
and when there is no dominant network that could co-opt opponents. Post-
1992 Afghanistan and Congo are examples of such situations. The eventual 
outcome of this scenario is state collapse and conflict.  
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Chapter 4: The Process of State Formation and Statehood in    
                   Afghanistan: A Political Network Perspective 
 
Introduction  
 
This historical chapter is an attempt to provide a political network perspective 
to study the process of state formation and the dynamics of statehood in 
Afghanistan since its modern formation in the 18th century. The aim of this 
historical chapter is to illustrate that the current logic of network governance in 
Afghanistan has emerged historically and sociologically over the preceding 
centuries. This chapter retells that history through an explicit network lens in 
order to establish the historical precedent of the findings of the empirical 
chapters. This is consistent with recent studies in peacebuilding that have 
aptly argued that post-conflict states are never fully built by international 
interveners but are subject to an on-going process of formation (Herring & 
Rangwala 2006; Bliesmann de Guevara 2008). This chapter situates the post-
2001 intervention and statebuilding along its continuous struggle for state 
formation which is dominated by a vicious cycle of violence and state 
collapse, characterised by Cramer & Goodhand (2002) as  “try again, fail 
again, and fail better”.26 Analysing these key historical patterns is crucial to 
our understanding of the post-2001 statebuilding. Afghanistan’s historical 
process of state formation is analyses along three main variables: (1) the 
competition and conflict between rival political networks over the control of the 
state; (2) the global-international dimension and the subsequent role of 
colonial conquests and international patronage; and (3) the political network 
practices of personalised loyalties, patron-client practices, and manipulation of 
identities.  
 
This chapter begins with a brief background to the emergence and decline of 
the Durrani Kingdom (1747-1880). It examines the power dynamics of socio-
                                                        
26 Of the nineteen pre-Hamid Karzai rulers of Afghanistan (excluding Mullah Omar), except 
three (Ahmad Shah, the founder of the Durrani Kingdom, his son Timur Shah, and Amir 
Abdur Rahman Khan, 1880-1901), the rest were either violently deposed or assassinated. 
Both Dost Mohammad Khan and Shah Shuja ruled twice. The former was first deposed by 
the British but then reinstalled by them.  
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political organisation of a small group of entrenched tribal lineage that came to 
constitute the Afghan state and competed over its control. This section is 
considerably lengthy because it attempts to show how the founder of the 
Durrani Kingdom (1747-1773) established a “networked kingdom” as a model 
to which his successors built upon and subsequently, expanded. It argues that 
the primary reason for the vicious cycles of political instability and state 
collapse was rooted in the failure of its rulers to effectively balance power 
dynamics among rival political networks within the state against its founding 
logic of a “network state”. State formation and statehood was further 
influenced by successive governments’ discriminatory policies targeting 
specific identity-based divisions, further raising tensions. Section II highlights 
the global-international dimension of state formation in Afghanistan with a 
specific focus on the role of international patronage on political stability. It 
highlights the consequences of the Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-42 & 1878-80) 
on Afghanistan’s state formation. Section III explores the power struggle 
between competing political organisations since the 1970s, first between the 
Soviet-sponsored political factions (the Khalq & Parcham factions), and after 
the collapse of the Soviet-sponsored regime in 1991, between different 
Mujahedeen tanzims over the state. It concludes by suggesting that the post-
2001 period must be understood in the continuities and changes in the power 
dynamics of these former Mujahedeen tanzims and their network practices. 27 
 
 
                                                        
27 A Note on Historical Sources: First, historical data and information on Afghanistan and its 
people, as noted by Gregorian, are at best “fragmentary, scattered, and negligible” (1969:4). 
Most recent historical works, except a few (cf, Noelle 1997; Hopkins 2008), have dealt 
primarily with the elementary task of reconstructing the bare bones of the historical narratives 
on the basis of thin and contradictory data (Noelle 1997:xv). These works are overwhelmingly 
state-centric and Pashtun-centric, excluding the people of the margins (Mousavi 1997; 
Dolatabadi 2001; Hopkins 2008). Second, colonial writers, travellers and intelligence agents 
influenced the bulk of these histories. As Hanifi (2004) shown, colonial Orientalist works still 
dominate the hegemonic construct and help theorise the genesis of the Afghan state and its 
people. One of the most influential sources on the early Durrani kingdom and the people 
living under their rule is that of Mountstuart Elphinstine who visited Shah Shuja’s court in the 
early nineteenth century. Ironically, most of his observation was based on what he had heard 
at the royal court and saw in Peshawar city, the summer capital of the Durrani kingdom. This 
source alone has provided the scholarly template for subsequent colonial scholarship on 
Afghanistan (Hopkins 2008). Historically, this trend has promoted a tribal, stateless and 
Pashtun imagery of Afghanistan (Mousavi 1997; Hopkins 2008). This was aptly exposed by 
Hanifi’s study (2004) of the historical myth and invention of Loyi Jirga (grand council).  
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I. The Emergence and Decline of the Durrani Kingdom (1747-1880) 
 
The geographical territory, today called Afghanistan, was a borderland 
between various empires that ruled from India, Persia and Central Asia. In 
sixteenth century, the region was the battleground between various Turko-
Mongol empires- Safavids in today’s Iran, Mughals in India and Shaybanid 
Uzbeks in Central Asia. The decline of these empires paved the way for the 
emergence of the Pashtun Durrani Kingdom and subsequently, the modern 
Afghanistan.  
 
I.I A Historical Overview (1747-1880) 
 
The Durrani Pashtuns owe their special position to the policies of the Safavid 
Empire and later to Nadir Shah Afshar. In 1589 the Safavid ruler entrusted 
Sado, the leader of the Sadozai subdivision of Abdali tribe (later Durrani), with 
the protection of the Kandahar and Herat highroad. In return for their services, 
they received prominent positions and service grants in the form of lands 
around Kandahar and the cities of Herat (Noelle 1997:233). The Abdali tribe’s 
help for Nadir Afshar in defeating their rival Pashtun Ghilzai tribe put them in a 
privileged position in the Afshar dynasty (1736-1747). With the sudden 
assassination of Nadir Shah Afshar in 1747, the Eastern part of his empire fell 
into the hands of his 26-year-old Abdali general, Ahmad Khan. Allegedly, after 
his return to Kandahar, the Pashtun tribes and other ethnic groups including 
the Hazara, Qizilbash, and the Baluchis organised a Loyi Jirga (ground 
council), choosing Ahmad Khan as their ruler and giving him the title of Shah. 
However, the account of Ahmad Khan’s peaceful and consensual accession 
to the throne has been questioned.28 The kingdom and the Abdali tribes were 
                                                        
28 The dominant view asserts that the Pashtun tribes organised a traditional Loyi Jirga to elect 
the future ruler of the kingdom. Hanifi (2004) and other prominent historians (Mousavi 1997) 
reject this account. They claim that none of the Persian sources at the time confirm this 
account. Pre-colonial sources including the 1773 official court history of Ahmad Khan Abdali, 
Tarikh-e-Ahmad Shahi, by Mahmud Al-Hussaini (re-printed, Moscow, 1974) contains no 
reference to a coronation, election, consensus, Afghanistan, Pashtuns, or Loyi Jirga (Hanifi 
2004; Mousavi 1997). In fact, the Al-Hussaini reveals that Ahmad Khan’s accession was 
surrounded by much violence and armed conflict between his supporters and opponents. 
Hanifi (2004) in his detailed study of the myth of Loyi Jirga compellingly shows that this 
account is inspired by various whimsical, oriental and colonial representations of local people. 
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named Durrani, supposedly after the title he adopted – Durr-i-Durran (‘pearl of 
pearls’) (Vogelsang 2008:233).  
 
Ahmad Shah was fortunate when he captured a caravan transporting Nadir 
Shah’s taxes from India to Persia. The fund enabled him to build an expansive 
patronage network across tribes and various ethnic communities for his 
conquest, particularly for his military expeditions in India (Gregorian 1969). He 
conquered most of the territories of present Afghanistan. By 1762, the young 
kingdom had reached its height when it expanded to Kashmir, Punjab, Sind 
and Baluchistan. Timur Shah (1773-93), Ahmad Shah’s son and successor, 
ruled for the next twenty years without major upheavals. However, he failed to 
pass power peacefully to his 24 sons, which subsequently brought two 
decades of power struggle amongst rival royal family lineage, mainly between 
the Sadozai and Mohammadzai sub-tribal divisions. 29 The outcome was the 
disintegration of the Durrani Kingdom into several principalities and significant 
loss of territories in India. 
 
The Sadozai lineage rule was effectively ended in 1826 when Dost 
Mohammad Khan (1826-38 and then 1842-63), the youngest of the 
Mohammadzai, seized power in Kabul. Dost Mohammad Khan’s reigns 
coincide with the British invasion of Afghanistan, known as the first Anglo-
Afghan war (1939-42). Lack of revenue became a major obstacle for Dost 
Mohammad Khan and his successors, making the Durrani Kingdom more and 
more dependent on foreign aid and subsidies. During Dost Mohammad’s 
second reign (1942-63), foreign aid from Qajar Iran and British India enabled 
Dost Mohammad at times to subdue the people and extract taxes from them, 
but his control remained precarious (Noelle 1997). The British provided 
weapons in appreciation of his neutrality during the Indian revolt of 1857-59. 
Dost Mohammad Khan’s death brought the country back to five years of civil 
                                                                                                                                                              
Such representation of the Orient is based on the European understanding of the state, a 
modern phenomenon, introduced through colonialism (Shahrani 1990; Baiza 2013). 
Interestingly, in later Afghan historical writings, the coronation of Ahmad Shah has been 
portrayed as an exclusive Pashtun process, excluding the role of other ethnic groups.   
29  Shah Mahmud of Barekzai’s tribe came to power between 1800-1803/ 1809-18. The 
Sadozai heir, Shah Shuja managed to hold onto power from 1803-1809 but then was 
overthrown and was eventually forced into exile in India.  
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war as his sons (27 in total from 16 wives) fought one another over accession. 
Eventually, Sher Ali Khan (1863-1866 & 1868-1879) seized power. He 
pursued an ambitious modernisation program attempting to build a 
professional army and administration. He also followed a multi-ethnic 
accommodations approach to government in an attempt to broaden his power 
base and create national cohesion (Saikal 2006:33-35). Vartan Gregorian 
(1969:93) has termed Sher Ali’s initiative as the “beginning of a new 
Afghanistan”. However, reforms were once again hampered by rivalries 
among different political factions within the royal family who mobilised tribal 
communities against the king (Saikal 2006; Gregorian 1969). Sher Ali was 
overthrown by the British in the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880) 
bringing Afghanistan further under colonial control.  
 
I.II The Constitution of the Durrani Kingdom (1747-1880) 
 
Gregorian (1969:48) suggests that the constitution of the Durrani Kingdom 
during this period resembled closely a confederation of tribes and khanates 
than a centralised monarchy. The kingdom was a collective power-sharing 
enterprise, a “network kingdom”.  
 
Noelle (1997) provides an interesting account of the tribal constitution of the 
Durrani Kingdom in the 19th century. She argues that the Pashtun rulers 
created an entrenched leadership clique who came to constitute the core of 
the Durrani Kingdom. The Sadozai and Mohammadzai subdivision within the 
Durrani and Hotak and Tokhi tribal subdivision among the Ghilzai emerged as 
the “entrenched leading lineage” to rule the kingdom collectively (Noelle 
1997). She divided the Pashtun tribal structure into the following three 
categories: 1) border tribes who display the dispersion of power typical of 
segmentary lineage organisation (e.g., tribes in the Khyber pass area and 
some Ghilzai in Ghazni); 2) tribal aristocracy superimposed on a local 
population of heterogeneous population (e.g., Yusufzai and Tarklanri in Swat, 
Bajaur and Dir areas); and 3) entrenched leadership, which had crystalised 
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under Safavid/Mughal patronage (Noelle 2007:122-223). 30  Noelle (1997) 
suggests that it was only the latter that constituted the core of the kingdom. 
She compares their role and their service to that of the medieval European 
institution of the feudum.  
 
Ahmad Shah and his successors could only maintain their claims to 
supremacy over the population by making tribal chiefs, especially the ones 
from the entrenched leading lineage, privileged partners of his expansionist 
policies. As Ghubar (1981), the Afghan historian aptly summarised, the tribal 
chiefs were Sharik-o-Dawla (partners to the state). Ahmad Shah had to 
consult with a council of nine tribal chiefs called sardars (“Amir-i-Lashkar”, the 
head of army) (Gregorian 1969: 48). These tribal chiefs were like “little kings” 
as described by Ghubar, who were permanent tribal commanders with their 
own tribal and ethnic army units, collecting revenues from the provinces under 
their control and receiving a substantial part of it as jazia (patronage), while 
sending only the assigned amount to the king (1981:574). The sardars 
essentially acted as political entrepreneurs (see section leadership) who were 
able to manipulate identity-based divisions as a convenient basis for building 
political alliances and, at times of war, challenging rivals. This way, different 
sections of the “entrenched lineage” came to constitute different parts of the 
Durrani Kingdom. This was essentially a “network kingdom” where 
competition and conflict over its control by rival tribal leaders shaped the very 
nature of politics and statehood during this period.  
 
I. III. The Sources of Political Instability in the Durrani Kingdom 
 
The Durrani Kingdom was marred by vicious cycles of political instability and 
violence. Explanations are abound about the sources of political instability 
ranging from those who blame the country’s resilient socio-cultural diversity of 
“micro-societies” (Saikal 2006), to Afghanistan’s difficult topography in making 
it difficult for rulers to subjugate its population (most colonial writings), to 
                                                        
30 The internal organisation of these tribes was shaped as the result of interplay between 
kinship structure, ecological conditions and the power of the adjoining sedentary states 
affecting tribal organisations (Tapper 1983; Barfield 1990). 
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Afghanistan’s strategic position in world power competition (Kakar 2006; 
Ghubar 1981), to rivalries within the ruling dynasties (Saikal 2006), and to 
those who blame successive government’s discriminatory policies (Mousavi 
1997; Shahrani 1990). Although most of these explanations are valid, they do 
not hold because most countries around the world have experienced similar 
situations, yet the state has survived.  
 
The most compelling explanation is provided by historical anthropologists 
(Noelle 1997; McChesney 1991; Barfield 1990) and some political scientists 
(Rubin 1995; Hopkins 2008) who identify the main source of political instability 
in the tribal dynamics of social organisations of Pashtun rulers. Drawing on 
the theory of segmentary lineage organisation proposed by Evans-Pritchard, 
Sahlins and Gellner, they assert that the internal Pashtun tribal organisational 
dynamics interlocked the ruling groups down in a vicious cycle of political 
instability and violence. They point out that the dynamics of Pashtun tribal 
lineage is “segmentary”, which means that cooperation or hostility between 
groups is determined by the scope of the problem at hand (Barfield 2012: 78). 
Tapper found the Pashtun tribal structure as the most “pervasive and explicit 
segmentary lineage ideology on the classic pattern, perpetuated not only in 
written genealogies but also in the territorial framework of tribal distribution” 
(1983:43).31 The segmentary dynamics in Afghanistan have followed a pattern 
of cousin rivalry (tarburwali), or jealousy among brothers and half-brothers 
(Barfield 2012; Rubin 1995; Saikal 2006). This reflects the famous Pashtun 
saying that “Me against my brother; my brothers and me against our cousins; 
my brothers, cousins, and me against the world” (Barfield 2012:78). In such 
dynamics, once a charismatic leader dies or loses influence, the divisive 
character of the segmentary tribal system impedes the smooth transition of 
power. The ruler cannot have the power to command because he is ‘first 
among equals’ (Barfield 2012:79). Every political pretender has to build and 
maintain his personal and individual clientele and his own political network. 
                                                        
31 In Afghanistan, there are two main Pashtun tribal confederacies, the Durrani and Ghilzai 
who trace their origin to Qays, allegedly the common ancestors of all Pashtuns (Caroe 1958). 
Pashtun groups are composed of lineage. Most rulers of modern Afghanistan belonged to 
Durrani tribes and to Sadozai (1747-1826) and Mohammadzai (1826-1973) lineages. The 
Pashtuns in Afghanistan adhere to Pashtunwali as their code of conduct. 
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Tapper argued that the relationship between tribe and the state are not 
necessarily conflictive as they mutually work together in maintaining a single 
system (1983: 5-6). State control is clearly an important determinant of a tribal 
political organisation (Tapper 1983). Glatzer (1983) proposed that the degree 
of hierarchisation within a tribe is directly linked to the intensity of its contact 
with the state. Barfield (2012) observed an inherent tension between the 
egalitarian Pashtun tribal system and the centrally and hierarchically 
organised Turko-Mongol government system which the Durrani rulers adopted 
from the Safavid and the Mughals. 32  While the actual units of social 
organisation among the Turko-Mongols were based on loyalty to successful 
warrior chieftains, among the tribal Pashtuns it was based on their specific 
genealogical descent. Barfield infers that the egalitarian Pashtun tribal 
organisation is prone to rejecting the centralisation of power because of the 
instrument of segmentary division.  
 
The theory of segmentary lineage organisation is a compelling analysis. 
However, as pointed out by Shahrani (1990) one must not externalize the 
problem of state-building. The above analysis should not simply equate the 
social organisation of the tribal Pashtun society with social and political 
fragmentation and opposition to any kind of centralised rule, independent of 
the policies and practices of the government (Shahrani 1990:42). This study 
contends with Dorronsoro (2012) that the initial strategies and policies 
employed by the Afghan rulers were instrumental in the survival and political 
relevance of the tribes. In fact the emergence of the “entrenched lineage” was 
the result of these policies in the first place (Noelle 1997). When fully 
entrenched, sardars and tribal khans were able to successfully manipulate 
tribes at moments of rupture for bargains. Tribal networks served as a 
blueprint for rulers and political entrepreneurs to expand and consolidate their 
power through network practice of patronage and manipulation of identities. 
This is discussed below.  
                                                        
32 Barfield (2012) identified two different cultural traditions in Afghanistan: (1) the hierarchical 
Turko-Mongol tribal structure which had dominated the political landscape since the first 
millennium in Central Asian, Iran, Turkey and India; (2) and the egalitarian Pashtun tribal 
structure. 
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I.V Government’s Policies and Practices 
 
The strength of the Durrani ruler and tribal chiefs to maintain an expansive 
web of personal loyalties was a function of his abilities to remunerate the 
services rendered (Noelle 1997; Gregorian 1969).  
 
Noelle (1997: 220-222) identified four different types of patronage allowances 
during the reign of Dost Mohammad Khan, which were practiced until the mid-
20th century. These were: tankhayi wilayat (provincial allowance), given to 
sardars; 2) jagir (service grant), assigned to the khans, 3) the village 
headsmen received an allowance called malikana; and 4) an allotment of 
grants and cash known as wazifa was generally set aside for the support of 
the religious establishment. The provincial allowance formed the largest 
amount followed by jagir. For instance, in Jalalabad 37% of revenue was 
given out in the form of tankhayi wilayat. This did not include the amount of 
land that was given as patronage to tribal chiefs. Noelle also provides another 
interesting observation regarding the sardar’s patronage position. The sardars 
were bound to the king by some sort of contract. The appointment of 
provinces took place in a bidding process in which the contenders often 
accused the current officeholders of embezzlement and promised to submit 
greater net revenue in order to gain the appointment (Noelle 1997:254-256). 
For instance, Haji Hassan Kakar, the chief of Kakar Pashtuns and governor of 
Bamiyan, was awarded a two-year contract to collect the revenue of the 
Behsud area, the trade route between Kabul and lesser Turkistan. According 
to Masson (1974II: 305-316), after the payment of his government dues, he 
was estimated to have a yearly income of 150,000 rupees for himself.  
 
Until the early 19th century, the regular military campaigns into the rich Indian 
provinces for plunder provided the Sadozai kings with the necessary wealth 
for redistribution (Dupree 1973; Gregorian 1969; Saikal 2006). However, with 
the loss of the Indian territories, the Durrani kings had to rely on internal 
revenue for distribution to maintain the royalty of tribal sardars and khans; this 
meant levying heavy taxes on non-Pashtun communities as well as grabbing 
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their lands for redistribution to buy loyalty. During Dost Mohammad Khan’s 
second reign, maintaining the army had become so difficult that the army had 
to do without regular salaries during difficult times and on many occasion 
maintained themselves through looting and plundering (Noelle 1997). In 1863, 
during the siege of Herat, Dost Mohammad Khan rewarded his army by 
allowing 4,000 soldiers, chosen deliberately for the purpose of looting, to carry 
out the plundering of the city (Noelle 1997: 265). 
 
The politicisation of identity-based divisions was another active government 
policy and practice. Although, Ahmad Shah’s and even his successor, Timur 
Shah’s rule, were more inclusive in following the Turko-Persian pattern of 
governance, they cultivated the seeds of discriminatory policies and the 
supremacy of the Pashtuns.33 The country become known as Afghanistan in 
the late nineteen century based on the ethnonyms of “Afghans” and 
“Afghanistan” used to denote a particular ethnic group, the Pashtuns.34 
 
Their successors followed a policy of rule and divide and manipulated 
Afghanistan’s religious, tribal, and ethno-linguistic differences to expand their 
rule (Emadi 2010: 5). Shahrani suggests that the Durrani Empire further 
strengthened their tribal and ethno-linguistic entities by using them as units of 
administration, principally for the recruitment of Lashkar (popular army) for its 
war of expansion (Shahrani 1990:44). These discriminatory policies, 
manifested through patronage and privileges, gradually led to tribal and ethnic 
                                                        
33 Historically, empire-building in this region was traditionally an inclusive project as the cases 
of Turkic Ghaznavids, the Ottomans and Mughals has shown. The exclusion of non-ruling 
ethnic-groups from power is a modern European phenomenon related to European 
perception of tribal and ethnic nationalism. I am indebted to Dr. Yahia Baiza for his 
comments. 
34 Until the late 19th century, the territory of today’s Afghanistan used to be called “Khurasan”. 
In the two main texts from this period there is no mention of Afghanistan (Griffiths 1967:17-
32). Elphinstone who visited the country in 1809 noted that the people did not call their own 
land “Afghanistan” but were aware that others did. Elphinstone himself described the 
“Afghauns” as the Pashtun ethnic group, which he divided into east and west. He referred to 
other parts of today’s Afghanistan as dependencies of the “kingdom of Caboul”.  The 
Pashtuns, in particular, held the colonial imagination at the expense of other ethnic groups. 
This was in line with the colonial strategy in selectively using race to maintain nation-states 
under their territory (Marx 1998). Imposing a model of Afghanness ultimately privileges 
Pashtun property interest. Even today, most images coming out of Afghanistan portray the 
whole country from the point of the Taliban and insurgency, whereby the image of 
Afghanistan, as a multi-ethnic country is lost.  
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stratification and conflicts (Shahrani 1990; Noelle 1997; Saikal 2006). While 
the Pashtuns were exempt from paying any taxes, as they regarded 
themselves rulers not as citizens or subjects, other ethnic groups had to pay 
heavy taxes. 35  The Durrani and some Ghilzai leading hereditary tribes 
regularly received crown lands (khalisa) as military pay for past services. As a 
result, Kandahar city and its surroundings became completely ‘Durranized’ 
during Ahmad Shah’s rule, forcing the local indigenous populations’ of 
Farsiwans, Hazaras, Kakars, and Baluchis to move (Vogelsang 2008: 233; 
Noelle 1997: 161).36  
 
I.IV The Durrani Leadership  
 
The Durrani kings were first and foremost tribal leaders, primus inter pares, 
one among equals (Dupree 1973). Effective leadership meant the ability to 
balance tribal and lineage family interests within a complex web of loose 
allegiances and loyalties. Rulers had to constantly build and expand their 
networks, rather than possess power. Power did not reside in any one person 
or structure but in fluidly structured networks of influence. As soon as doubts 
concerning the ruler’s political power or even physical health arose, 
allegiances tended to shift in favour of another contender for power who 
showed greater promise of securing adequate advantages for his followers 
(Gregorian 1969; Barfield 2012). Successful successions meant raising the 
broadest coalitions of tribes and ethnic communities. For instance, Dost 
Mohammad Khan’s seizure of power in 1826 was mainly due to his ability to 
build an expansive coalition from the Pashtun tribes, the Kohistan Tajiks and 
the Shi’a Qizilbash (Noelle 1997). Elphinstine made an interesting observation 
in the early nineteenth century that power struggles between various Sadozai 
princes were relatively small, never exceeding 10,000 men on either side 
(1972II: 103-5). Most of these battles were decided by shifting allegiances 
rather than bloodshed. Another interesting observation from an organisational 
                                                        
35 The Ghilzai of Kabul at the time were paying 1/10 of their harvest as tax, whereas the 
Tajiks of Kabul had to pay 1/3 of their harvest (Starchy, “Revenue and Trade”, fs, 21, 134). In 
Jalalabad, the Khugiani paid revenue on the basis of Jam-i-qalandar khan and most Ghilzai 
villages submitted no revenue whatsoever (in Noelle 221).  
36 According to Raverty, the Durrani Pashtuns moved to the Kandahar region during the reign 
of the Turko-Mongol Timurid ruler Shah Rukh (1404-1447) (1888: 53).  
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network perspective is that only those rivals, who had a territorial base, were 
able to effectively challenge the centre.37  
 
The sardars (tribal chiefs) were acting as “powerbrokers” mediating between 
the king and tribes. For the king, the Sardars had to collect tax, provide 
soldiers in times of war, and to maintain order in their regions. For his 
followers, he had to liaison external political relations and adjudicates 
disputes. This is referred to as the ability to ‘tie the knot of the tribe’ (Galtzer 
1983:134). Azoy (1982) points out that in a tribal society, leaders must prove 
that they possesses two important qualities: 1) Haisiyat (character) and itibar 
(credit). The first is established by the behavioural display of “piety, 
generosity, and wisdom”. The second is achieved by his ability to get things 
done for the community and to create a followership for himself (Azoy: 1982: 
35-36). A tribal chief (Sardar or khan) must provide its followers, if not with 
booty, at least with lavish entertainment and hospitality; otherwise they may 
abandon him and support the rival, even the chief of another tribe (Tapper 
1983: 55).  
 
To sum up this section, the Durrani rulers of Afghanistan founded a “network 
kingdom” surrounded by a small clique of leading lineage families. In 
moments of rupture and crisis, they manipulated clientelistic and identity 
features of the Afghan society in order to sustain and expand their power 
within the state. Tribal chiefs were skillful in mobilising rebellion as a political 
tool to remind the ruler that he was one among other equal players in the 
game, and therefore needed to continuously put his claim to test. Thus, the 
power of rulers depended very much on maintaining the support of tribal 
chiefs and maintaining balanced-network equilibrium amongst them.38  The 
stability of the first two Sadozai kings (Ahmad Shah and his successor, Timur 
                                                        
37 For instance, Shah Shuja, who had a rightful claim to the throne, made several attempts to 
gain power but failed (Darlymple 2013). Similarly, in the quest for power during the civil war of 
1818-1826, Pur dil Khan and his brothers were able to threaten the Kabul rulers because they 
had control of Qandahar and Peshawar as safe heaven where they could mobilise the tribes.  
38  Elphinstone observed in early nineteenth century that “the king is in great measure 
dependent on the good will of the Dooranee chiefs, and is obliged to conciliate that order by 
bestowing on it a large portion of power and honour, though in reality he views it with 
jealousy, and is continually employed in indirect attempts to undermine it” (1972II: 104). 
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Shah), and the first Mohammadzai king, Dost Mohammad Khan, rested 
greatly on their ability to maintain the balance among competing networks. 
Rulers like Shah Shuja, Zaman Shah and Ali Sher, who either tried to 
centralise power by undermining tribal chiefs or failed to maintain a balanced-
equilibrium among them, paved the way to their own downfall. The rulers 
themselves exacerbated identities and political-economic tensions with their 
policies of social and political fragmentation and discrimination. Interestingly, 
similar power dynamics are at play in the post-2001 international statebuilding 
period, (Chapter 7) where parallel features of statehood and governance are 
visible.  
 
II. International Patronage and State Formation (1839-1974) 
 
With the first Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan’s historical state formation 
became enmeshed with international intervention and international patronage. 
International patronage was gradually consolidated as a political mean for 
state formation in Afghanistan, paving the way for Afghan leaders to rely on 
international aid for survival. 
 
II.I Anglo-Afghan Wars and Their Consequences 
 
The Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-42 and 1878-80) introduced a global-
international dimension to state-building in Afghanistan. It brought the country 
into closer interaction with the European colonial powers, particularly with 
Great Britain and Russia. Most historians consider the geopolitical 
calculations within the context of the “Great Game” as the principal reason for 
the first British intervention. However, Hanifi (2011) has compellingly argued 
that economic considerations took priority for the East India Company.39 The 
outcome of the first Anglo-Afghan war (1839-42) was an embarrassing defeat 
                                                        
39 Hanifi (2011) provides the following explanation for his reasoning. First, British India did not 
yet border Afghanistan. The Sikh kingdom was a buffer between the two sides. Second, 
concern about whose goods would dominate this trade network was more significant than the 
hypothetical Russian military threat to India. Third, and most telling, the British were initially 
motivated by a much more ambitious plan for economic development that would link the 
overland trade networks coming out of central Asia with a new maritime route utilising ports to 
be constructed along the Indus River. 
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for the British. The outcome of the second Anglo-Afghan war was the signing 
of the Treaty of Gandamak, which gave Great Britain full control of 
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs. A few years later, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 
agreed to the British and Russian demarcation of the territory of Afghanistan, 
creating a buffer state between them. The outcome of the Anglo Afghan wars 
had direct and indirect long-term consequences on future political instability 
and violence in Afghanistan. It made Afghan rulers dependent on foreign 
subsidies and weapons, which they used to suppress their people. It paved 
the way for building local-imperial power alliances (Emadi 2010). In addition, it 
weakened and de-linked Afghanistan’s trade networks, connecting the Indian 
Sub-continent and Central Asia and weakening the Afghan economy (Hanifi 
2011). The British occupation gave impetus to Afghan nationalism and 
xenophobia. Even today, these sentiments feed Afghan national feelings 
against the on-going post-2001 NATO-led intervention. Finally, it brought 
ethnic boundaries more strongly into profile (Noelle 1997). During Amir Abdur 
Rahman Khan’s reign, in one of the worst genocidal attack, the Shia Qizilbash 
and Hazara pro-British stand and the Baluchis, Brahius and Turkic groups 
neutrality provided the Amir with an excellent pretext to mobilise the Sunni 
population against the Shi’s in order to fully subjugate them. 40  This is 
discussed further in the next section.  
 
II.II. The Centralisation of Power by Abdur Rahman Khan and the British Aid 
(1880-1900) 
 
The reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (1980-1901) witnessed a significant 
transformation in state-society relationship. He pursued a coercion-intensive 
path to state formation, which earned him the title of “Iron Amir” (Rubin 
1995:48). What made centralisation possible, something that his 
predecessors had failed, was international aid money from the British in the 
form of grants and subsidies. In 1882 the British granted the Amir a yearly 
subsidy of 1.2 million Indian rupees, which was increased to 1.8 after the 
                                                        
40 During the second Anglo-Afghan war the Hazara and Qizilbash had actively supported the British 
intervention (Saikal 2006). When the resistance took place, other mentioned ethnic groups maintained 
their neutrality.  
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formal demarcation of the Durand Line in 1893 (Saikal 2006:30; Rubin 1995: 
49). Form this money Abdur Rahman Khan built a discipline and capable 
army, which enabled him to increase direct tax revenues on merchants, 
landlords and farmers (Rubin, 1995:49). He was against large-scale industries 
such as transportation and communication as he feared this might expose the 
country to imperial invasion (Hanifi 2011). Only industries like arms, which 
were politically needed for his centralization, were pursued (Saikal 20006:36).  
 
The means employed to achieve centralisation was brutal, absolute and 
genocidal (Saikal 2006; Emadi 2010; Mousavi 1997).41 Louise Dupree (1969) 
dubbed it, “internal imperialism”. The Amir used every means to eliminate his 
rivals; including force, bloody reprisals, divide and rule, matrimonial alliances, 
bribes and intrigues (Gregorian 1969). The brutality of Amir’s centralisation is 
best demonstrated with his suppression of the Ghilzai, Nuristan and Hazara 
communities. Like his grandfather, he assumed the title of “Amir-al-Muminin”, 
“Commander of the Faithful”. In crushing the Nuristanis and Hazaras, he 
employed Islam as a powerful institution to mobilise the tribes (Gregorian 
1969). When suppressing the Hazara revolt he appealed to the Sunni tribal 
Pashtuns, Kohistanis and even the Uzbek with the offer of land, property and 
slaves (Mousavi 1997).42 According to some estimates, over half of to the 
Hazara population was either killed or enslaved and most of their lands were 
redistributed to Pashtun tribes (Dolatabadi 2001). 43  The state gained the 
largest share from the selling of Hazara slaves, which became a significant 
source of their revenue (Emadi 2010; Mousavi 1997). Abdur Rahman Khan’s 
centralisation policy had a major consequence on the long-term political 
instability in Afghanistan. His oppressive policies traumatized state-society 
                                                        
41 A British citizen at the court of Amir wrote,” the Amir sent for me to the palace, and was 
eating ice cream in an upper veranda. For hundred mutinous soldiers from Herat were 
marched in. The Amir ordered to ‘poke their eyes out’ and they did it there and then. I couldn’t 
finish my ice-cream, but the Amir gulped his.” (Lt. General Sir George MacMunn, Afghanistan 
from Darius to Amanullah (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd, 1929). 245. In Emadi 2010: 16). 
42 This was not the first “religious war” documented in modern Afghan history. In 1803 a Shia-
Sunni conflict broke out in Kabul with the Shia-Qizilbash and Hazaras who had supported the 
Mohammadzai Sardar Shah Mahmud in one side, and the Sunni population of the city who 
had sided with the Sadozai Sardar, Shah Shuja, on the other. The attack took 400 lives on 
both sides. See Siraj-ul-Tawarikh by Fayz Mohammad Kateb for a full account of this incident.   
43 An indication: “Out of the 200,000 families of Behsud only 64,000 families in total and only 
60 families of the Sultan Mohammad clan survived the war” (Siraj-ul-Tawarikh, 1858: 1031).  
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relations, which arguably to this day haunts Afghanistan. As one famous 
Afghan analyst put it “he set into motion the seeds of ethnic conflict which 
exploded ninety years after his death”.44 
 
II.III Ideological Difference: Modernising the Afghan State (1901-1929) 
 
The reign of Habibullah Khan (1901-1919) and Amanullah Khan (1919-1229) 
reconciled with the broader nationalist and pan-Islamist movements in the 
Muslim world in Persia, Ottoman Turkey, Egypt and the Indian subcontinent. 
These political divisions would eventually dominate politics and political 
ideology in the latter half of the twentieth century. In contrast to his father, 
Habibullah Khan introduced pragmatic reforms and opened the country to 
new ideas. According to Gregorian (1969), three different ideological networks 
emerged and competed within the government, all of them anti-British and 
pro-Turkish in their sympathy: 1) The conservative-clericals who sought the 
re-emergence of Islam; 2) the moderates who wanted a Turkish style 
modernisation with caution; 3) the modernist-nationalist who wanted a rapid 
modernization. Habibullah’s assassination was the result of his failure to 
accommodate the demand of these opposing factions (Gregorian 1969).  
 
By the late 1910s, the modernist-nationalist had emerged as the dominant 
network centred around Ghulam Mohammad Tarzi, a prominent scholar who 
had studied in Damascus and Istanbul. Once in power in 1919, Amanullah 
Khan, a member of the modernist-nationalist group, pursued a radical 
modernisation and an independence programme (Poullada 1973). First, he 
declared Afghanistan independent and waged jihad against the British. 
Exhausted from the recent World War One, the British acceded to his 
demand. Then he pursued a radical modernisation programme which failed.45 
                                                        
44 Author’s discussion with Ashraf Ghani in 2011.  
45 These social, political, military, and cultural reforms were comprehensive. The first Afghan 
constitution was promulgated in 1923; according to which even the king’s actions were, in 
principle, subordinate to the law (Poullada 1973:94). Measures were taken to centralise and 
improve the effectiveness of administration. A new tax law was introduced and the legal 
system unified. Universal conscription was imposed. Social reforms included the introduction 
of universal citizenship, expansion of the education system including women; the mosque 
schools reforms and the banning of polygamy and child marriage. He established the first 
girls’ high school in 1921 and even sent girls to study in Turkey and Switzerland, which 
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According to Poullada (1973) two reforms in particular, taxation and 
conscription, aimed at reducing the power of tribal chiefs triggered mass revolt 
against his rule. The reform was designed to limit the allowances paid to 
Mohammadzai elites and religious leaders, reducing their tax collection and 
conscription capacities. The tribal chiefs and religious leaders organised a 
combined revolt giving the revolt Islamic sanctions. The seizure of Kabul by 
Habibullah Kalakani, a Tajik-rebel from Kohistan, North of Kabul, was 
significant because for the first time in Afghanistan’s modern history, a non-
Pashtun had become ruler.46 The ability of Habibullah Kalakani to rule for 
almost a year with the Pashtun tribes failing to unite around a leader is seen 
as a confirmation of the segmentary political dynamics of Pashtun tribal 
societies (Poullada 1973). The tribe eventually united around Nadir Khan, a 
former Mohammadzai Sardar, who had arrived from exile in France. 
Habibullah Kalakani’s defeat brought a new dynasty, the Musahibans, which 
lasted until 1973, the longest period of political stability in Afghan history.  
 
II. IV The Rise of a “Rentier State” and Pashtun Nationalism (1929-1973) 
 
The Musahibans adopted the old policies of buying loyalties through 
patronage and bargain in an attempt to create an extensive political network, 
this time, exclusively around Pashtun nationalism (Saikal 2006; Gregorian 
1969). Having come to power with the help of tribal chiefs and the religious 
establishments, Nadir Khan gave them high-profile position in the government 
(Dupree 1969:276). 47 He appointed his brothers and family members in key 
government positions (Saikal 2006:104-5). His successor, Zahir Shah (1933-
1973), pursued similar policies and turned to international systems for 
resources that could enable him to gradually enlarge a state-dominated 
economic development and political control without confronting tribal chiefs 
(Rubin 1995:59).  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
shocked the Afghans (Poullada 1973:70-73).  
46 Habibullah is often referred to in historical books as a Bache Saghoa (the son of a water-
bearer) downgrading his social status.  
47 For instance, Mojaddadi’s brother who had declared jihad against Amanullah was 
appointed the minister for justice (Dupree 1969: 276). 
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The Musahibans continued with the reforms, albeit with pragmatism, caution 
and adherence to Pashtun nationalism (Gregorian 1969). Modernisation was 
aimed explicitly to empower the Pashtun constituency (Saikal 2006; Emadi 
2010). Influenced by Nazi Germany and their German advisers, the 1930s 
and 40s saw the emergence of Pashtun nationalism. The state development 
projects were exclusively targeted in the Pashtun regions in order to create 
Pashtun development symbols of progress to be emulated by non-Pashtun 
communities (Emadi 2010). Efforts were also made to hegemonise the state, 
society and culture through Pashtun nationalism. Attempts were made, albeit 
unsuccessful, to Pashtunise the pre-dominantly Persian-speaking civil 
servants (Rubin 1995:66). Pashto was declared the official language in 1936. 
The Pashtu Tulana (Pashto Association) was established in 1937 to conduct 
research on the Pashto language, culture, traditions, history and way of life. 
The names of historical cities, towns, and streets were changed.  
 
The internationalisation of state-building through “rentier state” provided 
another important source of political stability in Afghanistan (Rubin 1995; 
Saikal 2006; Gregorian 1969). Prime Minister Daod skillfully manipulated Cold 
War rivalries between the opposing superpowers, which led to an 
“accelerated course of modernisation” but at the cost of transforming the 
country into a “rentier state” (Saikal 2006:117). The country received grants, 
military supplies and loans from the Soviet Union and the US. From 1956 to 
1973, foreign grants and loans accounted for 80 per cent of Afghan 
investment and development expenditure (Rubin 1995:65). 48 However, the 
Afghan state had no control over its aid money, fluctuating all the time (Rubin 
1995). It also meant that the foreign patrons could build and expand mutual 
networks of connections with different networked elites and their 
organisations, reinforcing the rentier network state (Emadi 2010) (see next 
                                                        
48 Between 1950-1959 US assistance totaled 148.3 million while Soviet assistance came to 
246.2 million (Arnold 1985:39). Most of the Soviet aid was long-term loans whereas the US 
aid was in the form of outright grants. The US built the Kandahar-Kabul highway while the 
Soviets built the Kandahar-Herat highway and Salang Tunnel, which connected the South 
and North of Hindu Kush. Aid money enabled the regime to expand government expenditure 
to build schools, universities, hospitals and etc. According to Rubin (1995:65), from 1958-68 
and again in the 1970s the state financed over 40 percent of its expenditure from revenues 
accruing directly from abroad. 
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section). For instance, while West Germany sponsored the Police Academy, 
Turkey and the Soviet Union sponsored the Military academy, enabling them 
to penetrate different segments of the Afghan armed forces (Saikal 2006:123). 
Moreover, an increasing number of students were given scholarships to study 
in the Soviet Union, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, the US, and Europe. By 1979, some 
6,000 civilian specialists and 4,000 military officers were trained in the Soviet 
Union. It was these trained officers that organised the coup against the king, 
toppling the 250 years of Durrani rule.  
 
In summary, a key feature of statehood in this period (1880-1974) was 
international patronage. This played a key role in Amir Abdur Rahman Khan’s 
ability to centralise power as well as ensuring a long-term political stability for 
Musahibans rulers. Amanullah’s failed modernisation attempt was partly the 
result of British termination of subsidies. However, what really cost him his 
throne was his policy of curbing the power and finances of powerful tribal 
chiefs. In contrast, the Musahiban rule was sustained because they co-opted 
key tribal leaders and rival family members within the government, pleased 
their constituencies by exclusively targeting economic development projects 
to Pashtun tribes, promoting Pashtun nationalism to consolidate their tribal 
legitimacy, and obtaining international patronage from foreign sources without 
undermining tribes.  
 
 
III. The Power Dynamics of Political Organisations  
 
The two hundred thirty years of the Durrani rule ended on 17 July 1973 when 
Daod Khan, the former Prime Minister and a cousin of the king, in partnership 
with the communist Parcham faction of People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) staged a bloodless coup and overthrew the monarchy.49 
The coup brought an end to the historically powerful class of Durrani 
monarchs, landed gentry (e.g. tribal chief and khans) and mullahs 
                                                        
49 The Soviet involvement in the coup is difficult to prove, but most analysts (Kakar 1997; 
Saikal 2006 and Arnold 1985) contend that the Soviets had at least prior knowledge of the 
coup.  
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(Dorronsoro 2012: 40). It also saw a significant shift in the concentration of 
power from Durrani to Ghilzai Pashtuns. Although this power transformation 
had taken place before the leftist coup due to the expanding nature of the 
Afghan state and economy, Daod Khan’s death sealed their faith (Rubin 
1995:91-92). The state authority was thus no longer threatened by powerful 
tribal chiefs- the traditional model of uprising against the ruler in which chiefs 
manipulated identities (Dorronsoro 2012: 40). Instead the threat would 
originate from political organisations and the internal factional infighting within 
them. The power dynamics among political organisations that shaped politics 
for the next three decades is discussed below.  
 
III.I The PDPA Rule & Factionalism  
 
In 1965 the leftist groups officially founded the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA). Only after eighteen months of its establishment, the 
PDPA split into two hostile Khalq (people) and Parcham (banner) factions led 
by Nur Mohammad Nur and Babrak Karmal respectively. Both factions were 
of the belief that the revolution should be carried out from above through the 
agency of a strong state (Arnold 1985). Given that PDPA lacked the capacity 
to carry out a grassroots’ revolution, the army provided the quickest way to 
organise a revolution (Arnold 1985). Their infiltration of the army and 
bureaucracy provided them with the necessary institutional base to carry out 
two successful coups (Guisstozzi 2000; Emadi 1991:5-12). The first coup was 
in partnership between Daod Khan and Parcham in 1973 which did not last 
long. Feeling threatened by Parcham’s expansion within the army and the 
bureaucracy, Daod removed them from the cabinet posts and declared that 
he was opposed to any party that served the interest of foreigners (Guisstozzi 
2000; Arnold 1985). In 1977 he arranged a Loyi Jirga that elected him for a 
six-year term. The new constitution prescribed a strong presidency and a one-
party system that paved the way for his political party, the National 
Revolutionary Party (Hizb-e-Inqilab-e-Mille), to gain full power (Arnold 1985). 
The establishment of NRP as the only legal party forced both Parcham and 
Khalq factions of the PDPA to re-unite in 1977 (Arnold 1985). A year later, the 
PDPA organised a successful coup, killing Daod and his entire family. The 
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demise of Daod was ultimately rooted in his attempt to eliminate rivals without 
first consolidating his power sufficiently. 
 
Once in power, Khalq and Parcham factions began a fragile partnership. 
Initially, the strength of each faction was carefully balanced within the cabinet, 
central committee and the politburo (Rubin 1995:127). The Khalqis held the 
nominally top positions of Prime Minister (Noor Mohammad Taraki), and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Hafizaullah Amin). Although, the Parchamis had 
occupied top positions in the Ministry of Defense and Interior, the Khalqis, 
under the influential network of Amin had more middle-ranking officers in the 
armed forces (Arnold 1985:72). The social composition of the middle and 
lower ranking officers were mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns from rural Afghanistan, 
which gave Khalq a recruiting advantage over Parcham (Rubin 1995:105). 
 
The PDPA came to constitute the state apparatus and bureaucracy. Once 
occupying strategic positions within the state, each faction then tried to fill the 
ministries with their members. By 1979 a third of the party membership 
worked within the state, reaching 82,000 by 1987 (Guisstozzi 2000:16). 
Militarisation of the party was also an unavoidable consequence. As early as 
1983, more than 50% of party members were in the armed forces (Arnold 
1994:51). Data gathered by Rubin (1995: 91-92) on the tribal and ethnic 
composition of elites during different periods of Khalq and Parcham rule also 
reveals a significant shift in the concentration of power from Durrani to Ghilzai 
tribal Pashtuns. While the Parchamis were predominantly urban (mainly 
Kabul) and Persian-speaking (both Pashtun and non-Pashtuns) elites, the 
Khalqis were largely rural, Ghilzai and Paktia Pashtuns. 
 
The party ultimately suffered from its own lack of internal cohesion and 
factional infighting, which contributed ultimately to the Soviet intervention 
(Arnold 1985; Rubin 1995; Giustozzi 2000). The differences between them 
were political and strategic rather than ideological. After July 1978, the 
Khalqis started pursuing a policy of Khalqisation, removing their opponents 
from power, especially from the army (Giustozzi 2000; Arnold 1985). The 
removal of key Parchami generals and officers significantly weakened the 
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army. According to Bradsher, of 62 army generals from the old regime, 60 
were killed, removed or forced to retire (1999). Once the Parchamis had 
weakened, internal division within the Khalq faction emerged between Nur 
Mohammad Taraki’s (the general secretary of the party) and Hafizaullah 
Amin’s (Prime Minister) political networks. In a failed attempt by Taraki to 
assassinate Amin, Amin staged a successful coup and killed Taraki, removing 
his supporters.50  During the Khalqi rule, particularly under Amin, violence 
emerged as the determining factor in state-society relations (Kakar 1997). The 
state provided the political framework for factional infighting, where each 
faction was using state coercion and violent capacities to eliminate their rivals. 
The demise of the Khalq was further attributed by their radical, social, and 
economic reforms to transform the countryside which was badly formulated 
and implemented, alienating the Afghan countryside and fuelling insurgency 
(Rubin 1995).51 
 
III.II. The Soviet Intervention and Statebuilding (1979-1989) 
 
The rapid disintegration of the new client-regime was a serious blow to the 
Soviets. Using provisions of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1978 as their 
justification, the Soviet intervened on 27 December 1979 removing Amin and 
instead, installing Babrak Karmal as the new President. The intervention 
marked the beginning of a decade-long occupation. The Soviets pursued a 
policy of accommodation and compromise both in relation to the Khalqis and 
the rural countryside, at the same time accelerating efforts to rebuild the state 
institutions (Giustozzi 2000). Most of Amin’s social and economic policies 
were repudiated. At the party level, some of the Khalq members were co-
opted in the central committee but Parcham retained two-thirds of key 
government positions (Rubin 1995:127). Despite this, the Khalq-Parcham 
factional divide continued and even intensified. Each network-faction was 
working hard to undermine the other in the eyes of their Soviet political 
advisers and using their Soviets patrons to manipulate the other (Rubin 1995). 
                                                        
50 For the detailed account of the coup see Arnold (1985) and Kakar (1997).  
51 These included land reform, equality for women, the abolition of marriage payments, and 
the cancellation of many types of rural debts (Giustozzi, 2000).  
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On many occasions, the Khalqis in the army behaved passively, sabotaging 
the initiatives of the centre and sometimes even cooperating or deserting with 
the rebels (Giustozzi 2000:82). A KGB officer visiting Afghanistan in the early 
1980s reported that it was almost impossible to create a single effective army 
unit because of factional infighting (Giustozzi 2000:83). 
 
The need for a charismatic leader who could pursue serious reforms before 
the Soviet planned exit brought Najibullah, the head of the country’s secret 
police, to power in 1986. However, Najibullah’s policies to bring change in the 
organisation of the state, the army, and the economy, accentuated the ethnic 
realignment (Rubin 1995:150-153). 52  Within Parcham, this divide was 
between those non-Pashtun Parchamis allied to Karmal and Pashtun 
Parchamis allied to Najibullah. This was a shift from organisational lines along 
political party affiliation to network lines along ethnic and tribal 
interconnections crossing party organisational boundaries. In an environment 
of generated uncertainty and survival with the announced Soviet withdrawal, 
national and regional officials sought to build links with various political 
networks and social groups outside the state (Rubin 1995: 148). Army 
officers, provincial and district governors and field commanders were carving 
autonomous principalities, striking alliances of convenience with disregard for 
ideological differences. The political process disintegrated into direct 
bargaining by primary groups. This was best manifested in the 1990 Khalqi 
Defense Minister Shahnawaz Tania, who organised a coup with support from 
Mujahedeen Hizb-i-Islami tanzim and Pakistan’s ISI (Giustozzi 2000). 
Najibullah ordered the arrest of 127 Khalqi military officers (Rubin 1995:151). 
Twenty-seven of those fled to Pakistan where they appeared at a press 
conference with Hikmatyar, the leader of Hizb-i-Islami Mujahedeen tanzim. 
According to Rubin, the failure of the coup and its inability to mobilise sections 
of the military in the hands of Khalqis, indicated the loss of organisational 
coherence amongst the Khalqis (1995:152).  
                                                        
52 Najibullah appealed to the Khalqis on the basis of Pashtun solidarity while balancing their 
power in the army with non-Pashtun militias outside the regular chain of command (Rubin 
150). As noted by Rubin, Hizb continued to play the Pashtun fear that the northerners would 
capture power and that both Pashtuns within the government and the opposition should unite 
to take power before it was too late (1995:271).   
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The Najibullah government found itself in a permanent state of siege, with the 
countryside almost completely beyond their control. In order to ease this, the 
regime gradually came to rely more and more on qawm-based militias for its 
survival (Giustozzi 2000). 53  The militias were responsible for closing the 
Mujahedeen’s infiltration routes, maintaining security in their region, and 
limiting the movement of resistance groups. Najibullah justified his policy by 
arguing that one-third of Ahmad Shah’s forces were tribal forces (Giustozzi 
2000:201). The relationship between these militias and the regime was based 
on patronage and bargain. 54   They evolved into powerful strongmen for 
regional and ethnic demands in post-1992 Afghanistan. For instance, Juma 
Khan led the Andarabi militias, Sayyed Mansur Naderi led the Ismailia Hazara 
militias, and Abdul Rashid Dostum controlled the Jawzjan Uzbek militias. The 
support from these militias was a significant reason for the Najibullah 
government’s survival three years after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  
 
The primary reason for the collapse of the PDPA and the state was internal 
divisions within the parties. Each faction competed over Soviet intervention 
policies, programmes and resources in order to expand their power and 
interest within the state. The state provided the political framework for 
factional infighting. The Najibullah regime survived nearly three years after the 
Soviet withdrawal due to his ability to balance the disparate factions as well as 
building an extensive patronage-based qawm-militia support system that 
constituted his power base. Its sudden collapse was not due to the strength of 
the resistance Mujahedeen tanzims but because of the sudden cut in the 
Soviet fund after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Sinno 2008). The collapse 
of the Najibullah regime resulted into the fragmentation of the Afghan state 
and society (Rubin 1995). It brought about ten years of civil war between 
                                                        
53 Most Afghans belong to a more extended kinship-based solidarity group known as qawm. 
Ordinary Afghans use the concept of qawm as a mark of distinction vis-à-vis outsiders; it 
designates solidarity groups of varying sizes (Bacon 1958). It is commonly used to refer to 
any segment of society bound by close ties. It can signify different meanings in different 
contexts, depending on the social/spatial distance between the informant and the person 
questioning (Bacon 1958). 
54 In 1988 of 55,000 troops in Herat, 30,000 were militias. The 17th infantry Division, counted 
3,400 regular troops and 14,000 militiamen (Giustozzi 2000: 213-224).  
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competing tanzims (political-military Mujahedeen networks) over the control of 
the state and the emergence of the extremist Taliban. A new dynamics of 
power politics emerged and consolidated whereby political networks run by 
Jihadi commanders, warlords and mullahs came to dominate Afghan politics.   
 
III.III The Mujahedeen Tanzims, the Fragmentation of the State and the Civil 
War (1992-2001) 
 
In the early 1970s, the Muslim Youth Organisation (Sazman-i-Jawanan-e 
Musulman) was formed with strong roots in the Sharia Faculty of Kabul 
University. After a failed coup attempt against Daod Khan in 1973, the 
Islamists escaped to Pakistan. By the mid-1980s seven major Sunni-tanzims 
in Pakistan and eight Shi’a-tanzims in Iran were functional, financed by the 
US, Pakistan, Iran and other countries in the war against the Soviets (see 
appendix for a list of key Mujahedeen tanzims). Islam, the only umbrella that 
could unite all communities in Afghanistan, provided the Mujahedeen with a 
powerful symbolic tool against the PDPA and the Soviet invasion (Roy 1990). 
The causes of insurgency varied from one part of the country to another 
(Shahrani & Canfield 1984). Political and economic motives shaped tanzim 
differences more than ideological and theological reasons (Roy 1990). In an 
environment of political uncertainty and increase in funds, some insurgency 
networks were driven purely for personal gains and exchange. For instance, 
in 1987 about one hundred so-called Mujahedeen insurgency commanders 
signed contracts with the regime to fight in the Ghudni Qawmi (ethnic militia) 
and Militia Sahard for the regime (Giustozzi 2000:205). 
 
Except for the Hizb, the Mujahedeen tanzims were de-centralised political-
military network forms of organisations (political networks) because of their 
open-hierarchical structures and their operational mode. They were 
fragmented along ethno-linguistic, tribal, sectarian and personality-lines 
(Dorronsoro 2012). The Mujahedeen insurgency was essentially a “network 
insurgency” (Mendel 2010:734). Arquilla and Ronfeldt used the term 
“Netwars” to describe networks in conflict, because of their network 
organisational structure and their network operation mode and communication 
 111 
lines (1996:33). At the ground level, given the Soviet and communist regime’s 
harsh and brutal retribution, local insurgency activities were carried out 
through trustworthy and reliable personal associates. Their command, 
coordination, and communication could only be implemented through informal 
social structure of personal network ties. Therefore, tanzims had to build an 
extensive web of connections with tribal chiefs, village mullahs, commanders 
and community leaders to coordinate actions and achieve military objectives 
(Roy 1990). Sinno (2008) concluded that tanzims’ network structure and 
network mode of operation was a principal factor in making them a formidable 
resistance force against the Soviet intervention and was ultimately 
responsible for their success. 
 
According to Roy, Mujahedeen tanzims suffered from a growing discrepancy 
between a would-be-state from below (the field commanders) and a would-be-
state from above (the Pakistan and Iran political leadership and 
bureaucracies) (1990: 92-94).55  The civil war that followed the communist 
regime (1992-2001) was thus the result of tensions and infighting between a 
fledgling state rising from below and an imported state, both manned by 
young intellectuals (Roy 1990: 95). The local commanders saw themselves as 
somehow independent agency bound more to the population of the district in 
which they fought than to the leadership in Peshawar (Roy 1990). Once in 
Kabul, the power dynamics among tanzims interlocked them in a power 
struggle over the control of the state. None of the tanzims could maintain 
military hegemony and none was willing to compromise with its rival. The 
result was three years of intense civil war in Kabul between rival tanzims over 
the control of the city (Dorronsoro 1995). Several attempts were made to 
reach a political settlement (the Rawalpindi accord of 1989, the Peshawar 
Accord of 1992 and the Mecca Accord of 1993) among the warring 
Mujahedeen groups. However, the diversity, fragility and loose nature of 
tanzims made any chance of political settlement unlikely. None of the tanzims 
had a national profile or attempted to appeal to the entire Afghan population. 
                                                        
55 These tanzims performed administrative tasks for millions of Afghan refugees using the 
prerogatives of the former central state (Roy 1990). For example, there were committees 
dealing with health, culture, and education. In some instances, they were collecting taxes 
using their own judicial power and issuing passports.  
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They were divided along ethno-linguistic, sectarian, religious and tribal lines. 
Their distrust and personal rivalries meant that each saw all politics as war. It 
was in this context that the 2001 Bonn Conference, aimed at achieving a 
compromise among warring political networks, took place (discussed in the 
next chapter). 
 
The inter-Mujahedeen wars over the control of the state brought Afghanistan 
10 years of civil war and led to the emergence of the Taliban as the 
hegemonic group from 1996 to 2001. All parties in the war committed 
atrocities and human rights violations. The civil war had several major 
consequences on governance and statehood in Afghanistan, which 
significantly influenced the post-2001 international statebuilding. Firstly, the 
war further fragmented the Afghan state where each tanzim commander and 
warlord was controlling different strategic regions of the country (Rubin 1995). 
For instance, in the immediate collapse of the Najibullah regime, in Balkh 
province, Wahdat, Junbish and Jamiat tanzims commanders fought one 
another for the control of the provincial state. A “bargaining settlement” was 
eventually reached in which state administration and its resources were 
divided among the rival tanzim commanders based on their military strengths. 
By 1994, General Dostum emerged as the undisputed strongmen of the 
North. His strategic control of the Northern provinces bordering Central Asia 
and its airports, roads, and fuel depots financed his army and provided 
salaries and career prospects to many different groups including the former 
communist generals and officials (Rubin 1995:275). The same scenario was 
in place in different parts of the country with Ismail Khan, a Jamiat-i-Islami 
commander, controlling the West, Wahdat-i-Islami controlling the Central 
regions, and Hizbi-Islami dominating part of the South and South East.  
 
Secondly, the war further served to solidify the link between political networks 
and specific ethnic and tribal communities, instrumentalising and bringing 
Afghanistan’s historical hostilities along identity-based divisions into the 
forefront of Afghan politics (Roy 1995; Simonsen 2004; Wimmer & Schetter 
2003; Maley 1998; Dorronsoro 1995). Political tanzims utilised ethnic markers 
for instrumental ends (Wimmer & Schetter 2003). The intense war and its 
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violent consequences– the Etihad-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami’s massacre of 
Hazaras in Afshar neighbourhood in Kabul in 1994, the Junbish massacre of 
the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997 and the Taliban massacres of Hazaras 
in 1998 in the same city– created conditions proximate to an “ethnic security 
dilemma” (Kaufmann 2000: 441). In such conditions, the appeal of tanzims 
further increased conflict and accentuated ethnic affiliations as the two 
together provided a rationale for the perpetuation of ethnic divisions. 
Therefore, this produced a symbiotic relationship between tanzims, who 
wished to advance their own positions and their constituency who feared 
political domination. Moreover, the civil war further strengthened the 
emergence of a complex set of power relations based on patronage networks 
both within and between tanzims clientele and powerbrokers in Pakistan, Iran 
and beyond (Maley 2002).56 Given that Mujahedeen leaders were clients of 
rival international and regional patrons of resistance, the civil war intensified 
the regional aspects of the Afghan war. The regional dimension of the current 
insurgency conflict in Afghanistan related to this regional power rivalries and 
competition. It is widely alleged that Pakistan is actively sponsoring the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a historical account of the process of state formation 
and the nature of statehood in modern Afghanistan (18th-20th century). It 
illustrated that the current logic of network governance and statehood is 
rooted in Afghanistan’s historical and sociological development over the last 
two centuries. It argued that the Pashtun rulers of Afghanistan founded a 
“network state” which was substantiated by power dynamics among 
competing tribal lineage networks, producing brutal cycles of violence and 
state collapse. Political disorder always rested on a combination of 
personalised patron-client practices and instrumentalisation of identity-based 
divisions. For the Durrani rulers, the stability of their rule depended very much 
                                                        
56 For instance, Gulboddin Hikmatyar was supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence 
(ISI), Abdur-Rab Rasul Sayyaf by Saudi Arabia, Ali Mazari by Iran and General Dostum by 
Uzbekistan and Turkey.  
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on maintaining the support of tribal chiefs and maintaining a balanced-network 
equilibrium among them. The state always provided the political framework for 
network competition, where each political network or factions within them 
used state coercive and violent capacities to eliminate their rivals.  
 
From the mid-19th century, international patronage proved akin to drug 
addiction for Afghan rulers. The Mohammadzai lineage ruled from 1826 to 
1973 through a mix of patron-client network relations provided mainly by 
foreign aid. Foreign aid was vital to Abdur Rahman Khan’s centralisation of 
power. His repression policies brutalised Afghan society beyond repair, which 
still haunts local communities. Amanullah’s attempt at centralising the state 
without foreign aid failed against the re-emerging tribal networks. The 
Musahibans (1929-1973) did not attack tribes but tried to encapsulate and 
divide them, using resources from the international system that enabled them 
to last the longest. With the emergence of political organisations (e.g. the 
PDPA & Jihadi tanzims), the rentier state brought about rentier revolutionaries 
and rentier Jihadis. Like all previous governments, the PDPA regime 
collapsed not because of the strength of the resistance groups but because of 
its own internal division and segmentation. The power dynamics of 
Mujahedeen tanzims interlock them in a vicious power contest over the 
control of the state, which led to a decade of civil war (1992-2001) 
empowering commanders, warlords and mullahs. The civil war subsequently 
consolidated the link between Mujahedeen tanzims and ethnic and tribal 
communities, further instrumentalising identity-based divisions within the 
Afghan state and society.  
 
Most of the historical features of statehood and the power dynamics of 
political networks over the control of the state are still visible in post-2001 
Afghanistan. As such, the post-2001 international statebuilding must be 
understood in terms of continuities and changes in the power dynamics of 
former Mujahedeen tanzims since the 1980s. The following three empirical 
chapters explore the power dynamics among competing networks (both 
former tanzim networks and new emerging ones) in constituting the post-2001 
state (Chapter 5) and thus shaping the processes and outcomes of 
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statebuilding in Afghanistan. Chapter 5 shows how rival political networks 
consolidated their power using the state coercive powers and financial 
resources and funds. Chapter 6 and 7 shows that the post-2001 period has 
further provided a platform for political network pact-making and renegotiation. 
This is best manifested in moments of contestation and crisis like the 2009 
presidential election (Chapter 6) and the 2010 to 2011 Special Court crisis 
(Chapter 7). Patronage practices, horse-trading, opportunism and illegality 
seem to be far more important factors in the emergence of political stability 
and political order than election, democracy, justice sector reform, the 
strength of the national security forces and civil society development. In the 
following empirical chapters, the thesis addresses these practices and 
interventions.  
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Chapter 5: The Post-2001 State, The Re-Assembling and Transformation  
 
 
The more we can get people who have occupied positions of force 
and strength in the past but who now say ‘we’re committed to a 
political process’ and the more we can close off the options for 
people who resort to violence, the better the future of Afghanistan 
will be. (Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary in Lucy Morgan 
Edwards “the Afghan Solution”, 2011: 148) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Four weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, the Operation 
Enduring Freedom began to topple the Taliban from power. The operation 
was carried out by the CIA and a small deployment of US military Special 
Forces, and subsequently implemented by the Northern Alliance (NA) on the 
ground- a loose coalition of several anti-Taliban Mujahedeen tanzims who 
had fought one another during the civil war of 1992-1996 but then formed a 
coalition against the Taliban.57 In less than two months the entire country had 
been liberated from the Taliban. The country was firmly in the hands of 
Mujahedeen tanzim leaders and their militias by the time the Bonn 
Conference took place in early December in order to agree to transfer power 
to the Afghan Interim Authority. In the sudden vacuum created, Mujahedeen 
tanzims who had the necessary coercive organisational structures came to 
constitute the post-2001 state administration and bureaucracy. At the same 
time, in the periphery, the main tanzim commanders established councils and 
shared power as part of a local political settlement (discussed in section II & 
III).  
 
The decision to employ a “light footprint” approach to statebuilding at Bonn 
meant relying on tanzims and their military organisational capacities to 
provide security and administration staff. The International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), a contingent of a small military force, was only 
deployed to Kabul city leaving the periphery to its fate. Busy with the ‘war 
                                                        
57 In Lucy Morgan Edwards (2011) “The Afghan Solutions: The Inside Story of Abdul Haq, the 
CIA, and How Western Hubris Lost Afghanistan.”   
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against terror’ campaign, international military forces, in particular the 
Americans pursued a strategy of purchasing peace and security from 
indigenous anti-Taliban forces. Subsequently, the same Mujahedeen political 
networks that were once defeated by the Taliban emerged as the winners 
and played an instrumental role in the composition and transformation of the 
peripheral state. In fact, the post-2001 state re-building was closely 
associated with tanzim re-assembling, albeit with their restructuring 
(discussed below). International statebuilding provided opportunities for re-
building and expanding new links among and across tanzims under a novel 
logic of collaborating with one another to re-assemble the state. The 
internationally sponsored statebuilding that followed began within an 
extensive build-in element of conflict, deeply rooted in the last two decades of 
war and violence, characterised by Suhrke et. al. (2004), as ‘conflictual 
peacebuilding’. The early post-2001 period resembled the situation in post-
1992 Soviet-sponsored regime, a “fragmented” state where competing 
tanzims controlled different regions of Afghanistan whilst keeping their own 
army, police, and revenue-extracting structures in place (Rubin 1995).  
 
This chapter attempts to show how the Afghan state came to be re-
assembled following the international intervention, and subsequently 
transformed as the result of their power dynamics. The first section considers 
the consequences of the 2001 Bonn political settlement, its exacerbation of 
political network fragmentation and inter-network conflict. The following 
sections show how the historically grounded “network state” was re-build 
around key political networks and centres of powers in the centre (e.g., 
Karzai) and in the periphery (e.g. Atta Mohammad Noor & Gul Agha Shirzai) 
through bargains and exchanges. It is argued that as the post-2001 
international statebuilding re-build the Afghan state, it concomitantly build 
political networks and patronage relations. International statebuilding and 
political networks thus consolidated a non-state form of authority based on a 
long-standing patron-client system promulgating by identity-based divisions, 
opportunism and illegality.  
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I. The 2001 Bonn Political Settlement and Its Consequences 
 
Political settlements are aimed to provide a framework for ending hostilities 
among opposing political organisations and a guide to post-conflict 
containment of failed states and their disorderly elites. With these aims in 
mind, on 5 December 2001, the international community gathered the four 
main anti-Taliban political networks in Bonn, Germany, to agree on provincial 
arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent 
government institutions. The first group was the Northern Alliance (NA, 
Etihad-e-Shamal) Jihadis, a loose coalition of several Mujahedeen tanzims 
who had fought one another during the civil war but then established a 
coalition against the Taliban. Among them, the most dominant political 
network was the Jamiat-i-Islami tanzim which in turn was dominated by its 
military wing (the Shura-i-Nizar) Panjshir valley commanders. Secondly, the 
Rome group was selected to balance and represent Western interests and 
was associated with the ousted King, Zahir Shah. Thirdly, the Peshawar 
group was linked to Pir Gilani, the leader of Mahaz-i-Millie tanzim. The final 
group-known as the Cyprus group- was associated with Humayoun Jareer in 
Iran. The NA was included as the winners against the Taliban, while the two 
smaller groups were arguably selected to please Afghanistan’s neighbours, in 
particular Pakistan and Iran.  
 
The Bonn Agreement, named after the Bonn Conference, outlined the legal 
framework for the building of a unitary state in Afghanistan, which became an 
internationally supported four-year liberal-peace regime political process. It 
included the holding of an Emergency Loyi Jirga (Grand Council) in June 
2002 to elect an interim President to lead a transitional government, which in 
turn would ratify a new Constitution in 2003. This would then be followed by a 
presidential election in October 2004, which elected Hamid Karzai as 
President, and legislative elections a year later. However, the Bonn 
Conference was driven by the opposing network forces of massive external 
pressure to produce a stable and preferably liberal-democratic regime in the 
aftermath of September 11 attacks and an internal political environment 
which was particularly ill-disposed to compromise.   There was a shift in the 
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compositions and positions of the ruling political networks and their elites as 
the Taliban were driven out and some prominent former tanzim leaders and 
commanders (e.g. Ali Mazari, Abdul Haq & Ahmad Shah Massoud) were 
killed to be replaced by new ones. Also, a new political network emerged 
around the Western-educated technocrats with closer links to international 
statebuilding.  However this change was not significant in terms of the 
composition of the tanzim elite and the nature of their power.  Maley 
(2002:197) characterises the Bonn Conference as an exercise in “elite 
restructuring” that came about when the carrots and sticks of international 
donors produced a reshuffling of national network elites, rather than the 
elimination of political networks or a fundamental change in the nature of their 
power. This reshuffle of the pack, which characterised the Bonn settlement, 
returned to power the same tanzim political networks which were responsible 
for the civil war and some of its worst brutalities, instead of auguring the 
transitional justice for which many Afghans had hoped.  Bonn had three main 
principal consequences for post-2001 statebuilding and state formation in 
Afghanistan.   
 
Firstly, the power-sharing process was hasty and shaped by urgent Western 
security concerns. Negotiations on the structure of the new government were 
strongly influenced by the changing military situation on the ground (Jalali 
2003:175). It has been argued that Bonn was a “home-grown” settlement, 
which benefited from a clear transitional framework and granted substantial 
ownership of the transitional process to Afghans (Papagianni 2005). 
However, international donors mediated the process to achieve a deal which 
satisfied their counter-terrorism agenda and allowed them to fill the military 
vacuum that was created in Afghanistan with a new and friendly regime. The 
decision on who could attend, which political network elites should be 
excluded and how they should be accommodated was made in the first place 
by the interveners. The senior advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Moradian remarked that “The Bonn Agreement did not reflect the Afghan 
people, but reflected the American policy and interests…. both Khalilzad [the 
US envoy] and the Northern Alliance hijacked the conference as both parties 
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decided on the outcome.”58 Much like previous Afghan political settlements 
which following the Soviet-backed regime in 1992, international coercion 
shaped the process and led to a formal agreement, which was all set to be 
undermined by the fully and partially excluded political networks and interest 
groups. In this sense, the Bonn Agreement can best be seen as a “security 
and patronage pact”, or as labelled by Goodhand a “grand bargain” for an 
“externally driven division of the spoils among a hand-picked group of 
stakeholders who were on the right side of the War on Terror” (2010:582).  
 
Secondly, the Bonn Conference was not inclusive enough of competing 
political networks and the micro-societies they claimed to represent. It 
excluded the Taliban and the Hizb-i-Islami tanzim who were reluctant to line 
up behind Karzai. The representatives of various political networks disagreed 
on the rules of the game and the worth of the proposed political institutions. 
President Rabbani saw the conference as an attempt to replace him whilst he 
continued to preside over the government which occupied the UN seat. 
President Rabbani refused to attend. There was tension between him and his 
powerful Shura-i-Nizar of the Jamiat-i-Islami (the military wing of the tanzim) 
who were present at the conference (e.g. Yunos Qanuni & Abdullah 
Abdullah). Karim Khalili, the Hizb-i-Wahdat tanzim leader, Haji Abdul Qadir, 
an influential leader of Pashtuns in South East, and Abdul Sattar Sirat, Rome 
delegate leader complained about the lack of representation of their particular 
interests and international intervention. Rashid Dostum, the leader of 
Junbish-i-Islami tanzim (predominantly Uzbek ethnic group) officially 
questioned the inclusiveness of the conference as only a handful of Uzbek 
delegates were in attendance out of thirty-two. According to Ghulam 
Muhammad Aylaqi, the Former vice-chairman to Karzai’s Interim 
Administration and the former deputy minister to Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce, “several participants did not sign the agreement. Sirat, Khalili and 
Haji Qadir had walked out. Enayatullah Wasefi, Sayyaf’s representative, 
Abdullah Wardak and I did not sign it”.59  
 
                                                        
58 Interview 129, 12 June 2009, See Appendix: List of Interviews and Meetings  
59 Interview 130, 17 June 2009 
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Thirdly and most importantly, the conference created real winners and losers. 
The political network representation did not necessarily reflect the political 
power of the political networks, but the internationally funded military 
successes of the Northern Alliance (NA). Bonn thus set the stage for further 
distrust, exclusion and alienation of certain political network elites. De jure, 
the four main Afghan political groups agreed to a “broad-based, multi-ethnic, 
politically balanced, freely chosen Afghan administration representatives of 
their aspirations” (United Nations 2001). De facto, power was largely 
dominated by the NA and within the NA, the military wing of Jamiat tanzim, 
predominantly ethnic-Tajiks of the Panjshir valley (see table 5.1). The NA took 
17 of the 30 government positions, which included the Security ministries and 
Foreign, Planning and Commerce. Only the Presidency and the Ministry of 
Finance were beyond their reach.  Qasim Fahim also became a vice-
chairman to Karzai.  This was proximate to a “winner-takes-all” scenario in 
which the NA who had liberated Kabul and were in possession of two thirds of 
the country, were awarded the lion’s share of posts. Ethnically, Tajiks were 
over-represented, whereas Pashtuns, Hazaras and Uzbeks suffered under-
representation. Karzai was surrounded in his own cabinet by powerful NA 
political elites, who made sure that his authority remained weak and 
circumscribed. In the country, as the next section shows, Karzai’s authority 
was limited to Kabul city as regional leaders and warlords took control of the 
provinces where they had their own militias, sources of income and 
autonomous administrations. This exacerbated the fragmentation of central 
authority in Afghanistan rather than promoting its consolidation, fuelling a 
legitimacy problem from the start. It was these short-term security initiatives 
which now continue to hinder state-building efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
 
Table 5.1:  Power-sharing at Ministerial level among the 4 invited groups at the 2001 
Bonn Conference60 
 
 
 
 
 
II. The Constitution and Transformation of the Post-2001 State in the 
Centre 
 
The outcome of the Bonn Conference set the stage for further inter-network 
conflict based on patron-client practices and identity politics.  Ali Ahmad 
Jalali, an Afghan academic and the former Interior Minister, (2003: 176) 
argued, “monopolization of power [by the NA factions] precluded the 
                                                        
60  There were 26 ministries and 4 vice-chairman positions, totaling 30. The light grey 
represents the NA ministers and the dark grey represents the Rome ministers.  
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emergence of an ethnically balanced post-Taliban government.” With the 
sudden evacuation of Kabul city by the Taliban, the ethnic-Tajik Panjshiris in 
Jamiat-i-Islami of Shura-i-Nizar council of the NA who had seized control of 
the city immediately dominated the main bureaucracy (Jalali 2003: 175). Data 
collected by the Office of Administrative Affairs (2006) confirms that 
monopolisation, not just at ministerial level, but at all levels of the Afghan 
government – bureaucracy, army and police – was consolidated under 
Bonn.61 It evidences that network practices of patronage and identity divisions 
came to shape daily politics in post-2001 international statebuilding (see 
below). Given that, during the civil wars (1992-2001) political networks came 
to be structured along ethno-regional identities, the following data proves, at 
least numerically, the Constitution of the post-2001 state administration and 
bureaucracy along political-economic and identity networks.  
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that even in 2006, after the formal elimination of 
most NA political network elites from the top government position, ethnic-
Tajiks comprised 53% of the government bureaucracy at grade 3 and above, 
compared to Pashtuns at 34% and Hazaras and Uzbeks respectively at 4% 
each. This is a significant over-representation of Tajiks and a serious under-
representation of Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups when compared to the 
estimated overall ethnic composition of Afghanistan, with Tajiks constituting 
(between 20-25%), Pashtuns (35-40%), Hazaras (15-20%) and Uzbeks (8-
10%) of the population.62 The ethnic composition of the four main ministries of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior and Finance also confirm this point about 
the over-representation of certain Tajik elites in the early Bonn period, where 
the Panjshiris in Shura-i-Nizar controlled the first three ministries from 2001-
2004 (Figure 5.2).   
 
                                                        
61 The Office of Administrative Affairs collected the data in 2006. Afghan bureaucracy is 
categorised into six main grades, one being the highest position and five the lowest position. 
The margin of error is estimated at 10%.  
62  ‘Ethnic Minority at Risk data (2004-6)’, available at: 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp accessed 27 December 2010. However, It is worth 
noting that Afghanistan has never had a complete census, and statistics, especially those 
relating to population, are wildly discrepant depending on sources. 
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The “security gap” that resulted from the International Security Assistance 
Force’s (ISAF) light-footprint approach to intervention, meant that provision of 
security relied heavily on indigenous anti-Taliban forces (numbering about 
100,000) under the command of various powerful commanders (Goodson 
2003: 15).  From 2001 to the removal of Qasim Fahim and Yunos Qanuni in 
2004 from the Ministry of Defence and Interior respectively, Afghanistan’s 
National Army and Police were dominated by one individual political network 
and one sub-network, the Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley (see Figure 5.3). 
Under the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program, a 
key international statebuilding benchmark, the Jamiat tanzim was able to re-
integrate their militias in the army and his commanders in the Ministry of 
Defense and Interior staffing structure (Giustozzi 2008). While most non-
Jamiat factions were de-militarised and put in non-military integration 
programs, Jamiat faction had the highest re-integration in the Afghan National 
Police (Giustozzi 2008; Bhatia & Sedra 2008).  
 
This is reflective of Afghanistan’s historical state constitution and bureaucracy 
staffing shown in Chapter 4, grounded on political patronage and identity 
divisions, which have used solidarity-based affiliations as a basis of state 
distribution of resources – whether economic, educational or political. 
Subsequently, this shaped popular perceptions that in the new era, Afghan 
politics were once again to be operated along network practices and that 
democratic representation and a fair balance of political networks were only 
found in the rhetoric of international statebuilding.  
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Figure 5.1: Ethnic Composition of Government Bureaucracy at Grade 3-1 (%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Ethnic Composition of 4 Top Ministries at Grade 3-1 (%) 
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Figure 5.3: Afghanistan National Army by Ethnic Group 
  
 
 
The post-2001 state was thus re-assembled as a result of political 
competition, compromise and accommodation between rival political 
networks. Once again the foundation of the Afghan state bureaucracy 
became thoroughly political, as the officials’ allegiance were not to the state 
but to the political networks that had helped them secure the position in the 
first place. This way, using their positions and the dependencies created 
within the state, they were able to further expand their interests, thereby each 
political networks and sub-networks pulling the direction of international 
statebuilding and state formation in their favour. Although, it was beyond the 
scope of this thesis to carry out a detailed fieldwork to observe how the power 
dynamics of political networks affected the day-to-day functioning of the 
bureaucracy, numerous informants highlighted how constant competition over 
the state resources (e.g., positions, employment, strategies, projects and 
contracts) at all levels of the state is negatively affecting policy-making, 
programmes and objectives. For instance, the former Director of Policy 
Research at the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock detailed how positions 
such as his were subject to fierce competition among rival networks in 2010.63 
The interview with the senior advisor of the Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
                                                        
63 In that particular incident, it emerged that while the minister had his own man for the job, 
Karzai’s chief of staff, Karim Khurram, had called the directorate demanding to appoint his 
candidate, an Afghan expatriate living in France, whilst the director trying to get the job for a 
friend of his. Interview 24, 24 September 2011.   
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is revealing about how these negatively affect the daily functioning of the 
government.  
 
During my job at the ministry [last three years] there has been two 
ministerial reshuffle which had resulted to an immediate restructuring 
of all top positions. When the previous minister left he took with him 
the entire senior officials and when the new one came he brought 
most of his colleagues from the Ministry of Finance. This meant a 
significant loss of knowhow. With every minister we had to write a new 
trade policy.64  
 
 
It is these political power dynamics that international actors often overlook 
when re-building the post-conflict state. As the next section will highlights how 
Karzai and his network clientele consolidated a new network, which came to 
dominate state power in post-2001 Afghanistan.   
 
 
II.I The Consolidation of Power by the Karzai Network  
 
The power-sharing agreement at Bonn set into motion fierce competition 
between different political networks within the state. The newly formed 
Western technocrats circled around President Karzai, whose power was 
limited to Kabul, pursued a combination of repression and accommodation 
policies to consolidate their power across the country.65 What follows below is 
not a detailed fieldwork analysis of Karzai’s consolidation of power. It draws 
mainly on secondary sources which has addressed this aspect extensively.  
 
Karzai Network’s Repression Strategy 
 
With the ostensible legitimacy accrued by Karzai in his indirect election as the 
head of Transitional Administration in the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) of 
2002, Karzai and his clients skilfully used their positions in the internationally 
aided state, and their access to state resources, to coercively remove the 
                                                        
64 Interview 15, 17 August 2011.  
65 Elsewhere, repression and accommodation are denoted as control and co-optation.  See 
Byman (2002) for a survey of this literature. Middlebrook & Sedra also use the term 
“accommodation policy” (2005:8). 
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leaders of individual networks while co-opting their middle-ranking network 
nodes to his whole network. At the end of 2002 Karzai began to work towards 
the exclusion of the main Mujahedeen network elites from the cabinet as well 
as playing one powerful commander against another in the periphery. 
International perception of the state as a unified and consolidated body 
largely gave both material resources and legitimacy to the Karzai network as 
the state, and therefore to Karzai’s actions as the figurehead of that state. It is 
fair to characterise the period between 2002 to 2004 as a network 
contestation over the control of the state between a largely Western educated 
Pashtun technocratic network led by Karzai and his close allies Ali Jalali, 
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi (at the time) who stood on 
one side, and the overwhelmingly Northern Alliance Mujahedeen networks, 
who had come to dominate the immediate post-2001 state, on the other. The 
difference here was clearly the international support, which shifted decisively 
to Karzai and his predominantly Pashtun allies and thus fomented the 
network conflict that came to dominate the post-2001 international 
statebuilding.  
 
A careful analysis of changes in the cabinet between the Post-Bonn and the 
post-2004 Presidential election cabinet supports this point (table 5.1). By the 
end of 2004 there was only one main NA political figure left in the cabinet, 
Abdullah who was replaced in 2006 by Dadfar Spanta, a Pashtun technocrat 
from Herat. The NA network elites were effectively replaced with 
predominantly Southern Pashtuns and Western-educated technocrats in 
Defence (Rahim Wardak), Finance (Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi), Interior (Ali Ahmad 
Jalali), Reconstruction (Hedayat Arsala), Economy (Amin Farhang) and 
Rehabilitation and Rural Development (Hanif Atmar).  
 
Karzai’s repression policy is best visible in the periphery. His policy came in 
the form of playing one commander against another. This was a high-risk 
strategy which led directly to significant outbreaks of political violence in the 
periphery. In Herat, the President provoked and helped Amanullah Khan, a 
powerful Pashtun commander in Shindand district, and other commanders 
like the commander of 17th division, Zahir Nayebzada to challenge Ismail 
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Khan as these fought throughout 2003 (Dietl 2004). As part of the 
Disarmament, demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme, these 
conflicts gave the opportunity to President Karzai to issue a decree that 
officials could no longer hold both military and civil posts, therefore, removing 
Ismail Khan from his role as the military commander of the Western 
Afghanistan.  In March 2004 violence erupted between forces loyal to the 
regional warlord Ismail Khan and Afghan army’s 17th division units under 
General Zahir Nayebzada, a Pashtun, after a failed assassination attempt on 
Ismail Khan. In the battle Ismail Khan’s son and the Minister of Civil Aviation 
and Tourism, Mirwais Sadiq, was killed. In August 2004, in a final battle 
between Ismail Khan and the pro-Karzai commanders, the government sent 
more than 1,000 members of the US-trained national army and 300 German-
trained police to Herat, subsequently forcing Ismail Khan to accept a 
government position in Kabul (Dietl 2004). This effectively distanced Ismail 
Khan’s direct link with his constituency in Herat and in the West.  
 
In Balkh, the three main commanders, General Dostum, Atta Mohammad 
Noor and Mohammad Mohaqqeq battled over the control of the strategic city 
of Mazar-e-Sharif, the result of which was the gradual removal of General 
Dostum from his power base and its ethnic Uzbek constituents (Section IV.I). 
In an attempt to weaken Noor, Karzai issued a decree appointing Dostum 
who was the Deputy Defence Minister as his special adviser on security and 
military affairs. The main motive was to give power to Dostum to dismantle 
the powerful Army Corps No. 7 commanded by his rival Jamiat-i-Islami 
commander, Noor (Giustozzi 2004). In the last battle between them in May 
2003, General Dostum initiated the attack with the promise of support from 
the central government (Giustozzi 2004). Once it was clear that Noor would 
emerge as the winner, Karzai switched his support to Noor, imposed a 
ceasefire and demanded the cantonment of heavy weapons. Whilst Noor 
gradually emerged as the strongman of Northern region (section IV.I), 
Dostum had to take a symbolic position in Kabul. Dostum’s relations with 
Karzai deteriorated and in 2009 he was effectively exiled in Turkey after the 
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Akbar Bai incident.66 In Kandahar, governor Gul Agha Shirzai, also had to 
take a position as the Minister for Urban Development in 2003 before being 
exiled to Nangarhar province as the governor. Karzai’s strategy whilst 
weakening some political network leaders and commanders in the centre and 
periphery, it empowered others.  
 
Karzai Network’s Accommodation Policy 
 
Rothschild (1970) argued that in the political settlement model, repression as 
a policy of domination over the periphery often fails in environments where 
societal forces are powerful and resilient. Therefore, Karzai’s repression 
policy was supplemented by accommodation in the form of the co-optation of 
key political network leaders and peripheral commanders. During this period, 
his whole network’s consolidation of power was propagated in the form of a 
patron-client system, linking powerbrokers and sub-leaders of various political 
networks within the state as shown in the next section. As the historical 
chapter uncovered, although, clientelism has been a historical feature of 
Afghan politics, its present nature and the level of its analysis is closely 
combined and interlinked with ethno-regional networks rather than an 
exclusive tribal one dominated by an entrenched lineage family. Historically, 
the authority, power and legitimacy of rulers were determined through a 
complex system of patronage and instrumentalisation of identities.  
 
The post-2001 period has not been exempt from this. Several studies found 
and confirmed by ethnographic fieldwork in this study that under conditions of 
increased external resourcing of the state and inter-political network 
competition for the state, the clientelistic features and identity divisions have 
in fact intensified in the post-2001 period (Bhatia & Sedra 2007; Wimmer & 
Schetter 2003; Giustozzi 2005). While there was a shift of power between 
2002 to 2004 from Mujahedeen political network leaders (e.g., General 
                                                        
66 The incident began late on 2 February 2008 when Dostum and his militias staged a raid on 
the home of a political rival, Akbar Bay, in Kabul. Akbar Bay was beaten up and his family 
members were assaulted. Akbar Bay is a former Dostum ally who broke away in 2007 setting 
up his own party, the Turkic Council of Afghanistan. Dostum’s house was surrounded by 
police force for a few days. Reportedly after the Turkish embassy’s intervention he was 
allowed to leave the country.     
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Dostum, Marshal Fahim, and etc.) and commanders (e.g., Mohammad 
Mohaqqeq, Ismail Khan, and etc.) to predominantly Pashtun and technocratic 
networks, this was reversed following the 2004 and 2005 presidential and 
parliamentary elections respectively when it became clear that certain former 
Mujahedeen political networks enjoyed a high degree of power base, 
necessary for winning elections, generated from their close connection with 
their ethno-regional constituencies (e.g., Mohammad Mohaqqeq, General 
Dostum, and the Arsala family in Nangarhar). It became clear that power 
could best be guaranteed if patron-client relationships go hand in hand with 
strong constituency linkages produced through manipulation of identity-based 
divisions (Chapter 6 and 7). 
 
Evidently, Karzai’s whole network allies gradually used their position in the 
state and state’s resources in war-making so as to strengthen their own 
positions. As the political network, which acted as gatekeeper to the external 
resources supporting international statebuilding, the Karzai network was able 
to deploy these resources against other elite networks in their conflict over 
the state. Francesco Vendrell, the Special Representative of the European 
Union reminded how significant a change this has been for Karzai, “the 
authority of the central government of Karzai, which was reduced to Kabul at 
the beginning, has extended virtually everywhere, even if his commends are 
not always followed” (in Middlebrook & Sedra 2005:7). Since 2005, Karzai 
has relied on two types of political networks and its powerbrokers to expand 
his power: 1) individual network powerbrokers; and 2) middle-ranking 
provincial and district officials who had come to power through political 
networks, but within a new political environment their position had become 
more dependent on the centre, this being Karzai and his political network. 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide detailed evidence on the day-to-day functioning and 
network practices of political networks. Below is just an attempt to highlight 
how the consolidation of power by the Karzai network took place.  
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Political Network Powerbrokers  
 
Since 2005, Karzai has relied on powerful political networks and their leaders 
who act as powerbrokers. These included Ahmad Zia Massoud, the brother of 
the famous anti-Taliban commander Ahmad Shah Massoud for the ethnic-
Tajik clientele, Karim Khalili, Mohammad Mohaqqeq and Sadeq Modabber 
among the ethnic-Hazara and the former Hizb-i-Wahdat tanzim members, Din 
Mohammad and Gul Agha Shirzai for the Eastern Nangarhar Pashtun 
connections, his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai for Kandahar and Akhundzada 
for Helmand links. General Dostum, the ethnic-Uzbek leader of the Junbish 
political network also provided some links until his relations deteriorated with 
Karzai in 2008 after the Akbar Bay incident. Others political network leaders 
such as Abdur Rab Sayyaf, the former leader of Etihad-i-Islami and an 
influential Member of Parliament, Sebqatullah Mojaddadi, the former 
Mujahedeen Interim President of Afghanistan in 1992 and the leader of the 
Upper House, and Pir Gilani, the leader of the Mahaz-e-Millie tanzim, were 
utilised by Karzai for their networking abilities and their connections among 
the religious groups. Some of these connections are a direct result of his 
repression and accommodation policies. Karzai might have had no choice but 
to accommodate them initially, as the next two chapters suggest, but this 
gradually became an active Karzai policy of interlocking them into the 
bargaining system and employing them in moments of contestation and crisis 
against his enemies. This is not to suggest these ethno-regional 
powerbrokers have lost their agency but that from 2005 onwards Karzai had 
the upper hand.   
 
Fieldwork data suggests that reciprocal and resource interdependency 
relations are the primary reason for these relations. Possessing the financial 
and coercive resources of the state in hand, Karzai co-opted them by offering 
ministerial positions, licenses, government contracts and development funds 
as political resources for these clients, who could then distribute it to their 
individual network clients. The Killid Group (2012) research found how this 
reciprocal relationship is performed in respect to the appointment of 
governors in Afghanistan; the study found that individual network leaders are 
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given the authority to appoint their clientele as governors and other key 
positions (Figure 5.4). This is not very different from the initial Durrani 
governance system where tribal chiefs were given spheres of influence in the 
form of territorial regions to control for resource extraction and distribution as 
long as they remained loyal to the ruler. These individual network leaders 
acted like a mediator or powerbroker within the whole network providing 
material and symbolic resources, and in times of contestation like the 
presidential election, with popular votes (Chapter 6). In light of this, Karzai’s 
was maintaining a complex and costly whole network based on a system of 
trading favours and exchanging resources. This is not to suggest that 
individual networks exhibited a clearly defined demarcation. As Chapters 6 
and 7 suggest, they often overlapped as events unfolded, crises erupted, and 
bargains were offered and constantly contested and competed within the 
whole network.  
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Figure 5.4: The Political Networks and their clientele  
 
 
 
 
 
State Patron-Client Networks 
 
The best-resourced buyer in a client-patron network is usually a political actor 
who possesses government resources, most often the incumbent authorities 
(Piattoni 2001). A second type of network through which Karzai has extended 
his whole network is the state network of provincial and district governors and 
officials.  This network is not mutually exclusive of the former network but 
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overlaps with it at certain moments. The new Afghan Constitution gave the 
president excessive powers, which he made extremely effective use of it to 
expand his power. For instance, he has the authority to appoint one-third of 
the Meshrano Jirga (Upper House) representatives (Article 84 of the 
Constitution); but as the District council elections never happened in 2004, 
the president assumed the responsibility of appointing the other one-third. 
Presidential decree has been another important tool (article 76). He is 
responsible for the appointment of all provincial and district governors, which 
he exercises through presidential decree (Article 64:13). Through the same 
article he has been appointing and dismissing judges in the judiciary which is 
supposed to be independent. In fact for a year Karzai ruled by decree 
between 2003 to December 2004 when he sworn in as the president. To this 
date he has issued over 45 decrees, the last one being the election decree in 
2013. As a result, Karzai’s whole network has benefited immensely from the 
weaknesses of the formal system as they continuously award their allies and 
friends with state positions at all governance levels. As one senior 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) officer 
summarised,   
 
These leaders have a stake in maintaining the status quo. It is more like a 
club, a corrupt political-business club that everyone eventually benefits 
from. While Karzai sells the state to the highest bidder, the client gets 
contracts, funds, state positions and etc. Everyone is a winner.67  
 
 
The post-2001 state has become the major source of protection, security and 
employment for most network elites. This is most evident in Karzai’s 
relationship with the Afghan Parliament. As Chapter 7 reveals, Karzai’s 
network has maintained an expensive patronage system in the parliament 
where payments are made to MPs in order to pass a parliamentary bill or to 
appoint a new minister. The next two quotes from two influential MPs 
summarise the nature of patronage practices in Parliament, which is reflective 
of the overall nature of statehood and governance that is being propagated by 
this system of payments and promises. Further evidence is shown in Chapter 
6 and 7, shedding light on political network practices.  
                                                        
67 Interview 1, 12 April 2011. 
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Most of them [MPs] supported the government. The opposition is 
weak and powerless. When opposition members like myself are 
threatened what can we do? Mawlawi Takhel [MP] rigged 50,000 
votes before the election for Karzai [referring to the 2004 
presidential election] and he later confessed saying I did it because 
I got money and lands from the government and also because 
Karzai is the only one who can provide me with security. Another 
MP [who] was supporting Karzai when asked why? He replied 
because I have been accused of killing 41 people so if I do not 
support him what guarantee is there that they would not kill me. He 
is in power.68 
 
Even international holidays and trips are decided on the basis of 
which group you belong to. If you are not part of that group you can 
never go. Karzai has got 70-80 MPs on his side. They have their 
own special meetings. Even the ministers sit with them often bribing 
them as they are offered trips abroad, gifts, and positions for their 
relatives.69   
 
 
In the tribal South, Karzai-network’s coercive practices were pursued through 
playing one tribe against another. In the uncertainty generated by a regime-
state where the rule of law is absent in most areas, the fear of punishment is 
quite high. Tribal leaders are consistently reminded that if they do not support 
the government and the Karzai network within the state they will be excluded 
from the local government: meaning jobs, aid money and privileges. Coghlan 
(2009) provides an insightful account of the rivalry between the different tribes 
(Noorzai, Alikozais, Alizai, and Ishaqzai) in Helmand province and portrays 
how both the Karzai network and the Taliban have used these rivalries to 
strengthen their power in the respected province. The network state 
patronage is pursued through the practice of reward/punishment by including 
those tribal elites who support the regime in the local government whilst 
excluding those tribal elites who do not co-opt in the system. Such a 
patronage system can explain, to some extent, the reason for the Taliban’s 
success in the South. Both the Taliban and the excluded elites or tribes see 
that it is to their advantage to operate together, the former providing 
protection and the latter supplying recruitment.  
 
                                                        
68 Interview 131, 13 September 2009.  
69 Interview 116, 12 September 2009.  
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While the consolidation of a network state was taking place around Karzai 
and individual network leaders at the centre, the peripheral state was also 
being re-assembled around key strongmen. The following section shows the 
impact of Karzai’s repression and accommodation policies on the peripheral 
state. It examines the consolidation of power by two of the most powerful 
regional strongmen in the periphery, Atta Mohammad Noor in Balkh and Gul 
Agha Shirzai in Nangarhar provinces.  
 
III. The State Constitution and Transformation in the Periphery  
 
The re-assembling of the peripheral state in Balkh and Nangarhar provinces 
provide an excellent window to observe the centre-periphery relations as well 
as highlighting the processes and outcomes of state re-building in post-2001 
international intervention. Balkh and Nangarhar are strategic regional 
commercial hubs with vibrant transit routes. Both provinces have a population 
of over a million with mixed ethnic and tribal demography. Balkh is populated 
mainly with pockets of Uzbek, Hazara, Tajik, Turkmen and Pashtun ethnic 
groups whereas Nangarhar is predominantly inhabited by three main Pashtun 
tribes of Khugiani, Shinwari and Mohmand and a small ethnic-Pashei 
community. In the post-2001 international space, Atta Mohammad Noor and 
Gul Aga Shirzai have established themselves as the undisputed regional 
strongmen of the Northern and Eastern regions, controlling a vast network of 
political and commercial networks stretching across several provinces. De 
jure, they have sworn allegiance to the central authority; however, the facto, 
they are relatively free of central control.  
 
III. I Atta Mohammad Noor and his Consolidation of Power  
 
In the immediate liberation of Balkh province from the Taliban, a provincial 
military council was formed, which divided state administration and provincial 
revenues proportionally amongst the three main commanders- Atta 
Mohammed Noor, an ethnic-Tajik Jamiat tanzim commander, General Rashid 
Dostum, the Uzbek leader of Junbish tanzim, and Mohammad Mohaqqeq, the 
ethnic-Hazara commander of Wahdat tanzim- reflecting their control over the 
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stockpiles of military supplies, munitions, fuel, and food (Fishstein & Wilder 
2012).70 Having seized a large part of the city following the sudden retreat of 
the Taliban, Atta Mohammad Noor, took the position of 7th Corps commander, 
the most powerful military position in Northern Afghanistan. His Jamiat 
colleague, Haji Rahguzar, became the Governor of Balkh. According to the 
UN report, the Hairatan border custom, the primary source of revenue in 
Balkh, was shared amongst the competing commanders with Noor receiving 
50%, General Dostum 37% and Mohaqqeq 12% (Rubin and Malikyar 2003).  
 
In the fierce battles that took place between Noor, Dostum and Mohaqqeq in 
2002 and 2003, Noor emerged as the undisputed strongman of Balkh 
province. Noor’s success was mainly the result of his network links with his 
powerful Jamiat colleagues in Kabul. Moreover, he had played an 
instrumental role in the Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban, 
successfully portraying himself as a reliable military commander to the 
international intervention. Given that Noor’s Jamiat colleagues in Kabul had 
occupied powerful positions within the security ministries, his commanding 
position as the 7th Corps Division was secure. During the internal war with 
Dostum and Mohaqqeq he received political and military support and 
protection from the Ministry of Defense and Interior (Giustozzi 2004). In the 
last battle that took place in the fall of 2003 between them over the control of 
the peripheral state, reportedly, Karzai had provoked General Dostum into 
attacking Noor according to Junbish Deputy Chairman, Fayzullah Zaki. 71 
However, once it became clear that Dostum could not win, Karzai switched 
his support to Noor, imposed a ceasefire and demanded a full disarmament 
                                                        
70  In the 1990s, the following Jihadi tanzims were active in Balkh: the Jamiat-i-Islami, 
Wahdat-i-Islami, and Junbish-i-Islami to a lesser extent the Hizb-i-Islami and Harakat-i-Islami. 
Junbish emerged in 1992 as a coalition of former communist politicians, army officers and 
Uzbek militias headed by the ethnic-Uzbek militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, as a 
response to the Jihadi tanzims’ exclusion of Junbish from the 1992 political settlement. In 
Balkh, the three principal tanzim factions, Junbish, Wahdat and Jamiat, came to be 
associated with Uzbek-ethnic leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, Hazara-ethnic commander 
Mohammad Mohaqqeq, and Tajik-ethnic commander Mohammad Atta Noor. By 1994, 
General Dostum emerged as the undisputed strongman of the North. His strategic control of 
the Northern provinces bordering Central Asia and its airports, roads, and fuel depots 
financed his army and provided salaries and career prospects to many different groups 
including the former communist generals and officials (Rubin 1995:275). The region was 
relatively stable compared to the rest of the country before the Taliban occupied it in 1998. 
71 Interview 122, 14 September 2009. Giustozzi (2004) finds the same result. 
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of the warring groups. This then provided Noor with the pretext to remove his 
rivals’ client commanders. According to US Embassy cables, Noor was 
reportedly involved in having planned and financed the assassination of 22 
political opponents in Balkh between the years 2003 to 2005.72  
 
Since then, unable to exert much influence, Karzai has allowed Noor to run 
Balkh like a personal fiefdom. Several attempts by him to weaken Noor have 
failed. The dispute that took place between governor Noor and Interior 
Minister a close ally of Karzai, Haneef Atmar, in 2009 is telling. In a politically 
motivated maneuver, the Minister officially dismissed three senior police 
chiefs in Balkh (Traffic Police Chief, Criminal Investigation Chief, and the 
Highway Police Chief) from their job. All three were believed to be Noor’s 
clientele. In a show of loyalty governor Noor told the policemen not to leave 
their job. A month-long stand off between them ended with governor Noor 
emerging victorious in keeping his three clientele in their job, sending a clear 
message to Karzai that he is in charge.  
 
Patron-Client Practices 
 
Noor’s consolidation of power proliferated in the form of a patron-client 
system. Taking full advantage of his “hybrid authority”, formal state position 
and informal network power, he appointed his clientele as state officials, 
provincial council members, district police chiefs, army commanders and so 
forth, while reshuffling and dismissing officials associated with his opponents 
(Mukhopadhyay 2009). With offers of state positions, access to legal and 
illegal commercial networks and other bargains, Noor co-opted his 
opponent’s embedded commanders, mullahs, state officials and businessmen 
into his bargaining network (Hakimi 2012). This is best seen in the 
strategically influential provincial council and district governments in Balkh 
and even in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) in Kabul. Interviews with several 
provincial council members in 2011 uncovered that at least fifteen of the 
nineteen members in Balkh were Noor’s networked clientele. Noor’s 
                                                        
72 US Cables, 22 March 2006 
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exceptional influence was ostensible when members acceded to his wishes 
as to who the Chairman and his deputy should be. The deputy provincial 
council Chairman, Ghulam Abbas Akhlaqi, summarised this by stating, “Noor 
warned us that nobody should campaign in the internal provincial council 
election. He proposed Dr. Mohammad Afzal Hadid as the Chairman, I as the 
Deputy Chairman, and Mahbooba Sadat as Secretary.”73  
 
Noor monopolised his state control over the use of violence and state 
capacities in the security sector (Mukhopadhyay 2009). Bhatia and Sedra 
(2008:229) found that in the immediate post-2001 period, to many soldiers, a 
commander’s strength was expressed less in terms of offensive capability 
against an opposing unit, rather than his ability to acquire supporting 
contracts, maintain armed units and to integrate them into official and quasi-
official security structures. The Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) program provided an excellent opportunity for Noor to 
re-integrate his militias in the army and his network client commanders in the 
Ministry of Defense and Interior staffing structure within the province. His 
position as the governor and his earlier position as the 7th Corps Commander 
of Northern Afghanistan granted him the legitimacy to enact as the state, 
disguising his patron-client practices.  
 
The following quotes reflect the undisputed power of Noor in Balkh province, 
the former by a provincial council member and the latter by the Head of 
Social Science department who was the head of the Union of Balkh Civil 
Society Organisation. It also illustrates how Atta’s combination of formal state 
authority and informal network power has given an image of an effective and 
efficient governance system to many Afghans when comparing it with the 
widespread corruption and mismanagement in the rest of the country.  
 
 We have an inclusive governance system in Balkh. For instance, to 
spend the municipality’s budget, the Provincial Council, in 
consultation with municipality and the Governor’s office, take 
decisions collectively on what our priorities are and how to spend 
the money. We then encourage the local businessmen to participate 
                                                        
73 Interview 99, 21 April 2012. 
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in the bidding process. If a line minister does not follow our decision, 
we would first give him a warning, then put additional pressure on 
him through the media and if this persists we would then inform the 
governor.74  
 
In our last weekly meeting with the governor, we stressed the 
problem of female-student dormitory at the university. Governor 
Noor simply looked at Mr. Wahdat and said you pay 1,000 dollar, 
Mostufiyat (Ministry of Finance directorate) would pay 3,000 dollars, 
and so on. In that meeting he instantaneously collected 21,000 US 
dollars. He assigned the vice-Chancellor to write the proposal and 
promised to provide the additional cost from his own pocket. You 
see, this is a quick and efficient way to resolve problems. In 
Afghanistan, only those governors who do not follow formal rules 
and procedures are successful.75 
 
 
Illegality and Opportunism  
 
Maintaining such an expansive patronage network is expensive. Interviews 
with several provincial council members revealed that Noor has been 
providing regular financial rent to the council. As one female PC member 
explained:  
 
The current monthly salary of a provincial council member is around 
500 USD per month. I have two bodyguards and one driver, which cost 
me around 800 dollars per month. I have to pay for fuel and guests. 
Once there was a conflict in my district. I had to accommodate twenty 
families who came to stay with me. How else could I cover my 
expenses?76  
 
 
Interviews with several civil society activists and businessmen in Hairatan 
custom city revealed that resource extraction through rent-seeking has 
become a principle feature of governance in Balkh.77 Mukhopadhyay (2009) 
also found that Noor has established a monopoly over licit and illicit trades, 
government contracts, and development aids. The involvement of 
commanders in business is not new. In the early 1990s, with external support 
rapidly fading, Jihadi commanders increasingly overcame the problem of 
                                                        
74 Interview 107, 21 April 2012. 
75 Interview 102, 18 April 2012. 
76 Interview 100, 24 April 2012. 
77 Interview 103, 104, 101, 15-19 April 2012. 
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funding their armies in the war economy (Goodhand 2004; Giustozzi 2005). In 
the absence of the central authority, local traders found protection in 
strongmen who would provide protection in exchange for fees or partnership 
in the business. In the built-in war economy of post-2001 international 
intervention, local commanders have re-connected with their old business 
partners to fund their militias (Goodhand 2004). 
 
Interviews with businesses and MPs in Balkh have suggested that Noor, 
directly and indirectly, has shares in many of Balkh’s lucrative construction 
and fuel trades. In the two-day observation that the author carried out 
specifically in the border town of Hairatan, most businessmen highlighted 
governor Noor’s monopoly in the main key industries through his family 
members, particularly his son. 78 The below statement by a Transparency 
International officer working on Noor’s connections was widely confirmed by 
businessmen in Hairatan.  
 
To run your business you must have the blessing of the governor and 
pay his protection money. The risk is high. He has removed his key 
opponents like Ghazanfar Group out of the energy market. The 
reason that Ghazanfar and Hotek [the head of Azizi Bank] could not 
compete was because the governor was able to use the Hairatan 
storage facilities and his own security companies in reducing cost to 
win contracts. Most of the provincial government contracts are given 
to companies related to Noor like the AFTECH group which is run by 
his son. His son’s partnership in Kabul Oil Group has won them 
massive  international contracts worth millions to import petrol for the 
NATO forces.79  
 
 
As this statement underlines Noor’s business activities in Balkh connect him 
to broader political-economic networks in the rest of the country. For instance, 
in the fuel trade (import, storage and transport), Noor is reportedly one of the 
four main shareholders in the Kabul Oil Group, which has enjoyed a 
monopoly over the trade since 2009 (Rubin & Norland 2011).80 Kabul Oil 
Group’s other shareholders were Kamal Nabizada, Ibrahim Ghazanfar, and 
                                                        
78 Hairatan observation and interviews (95), 2-3 March 2012 18.  
79 Interview 103 & 104, 17 April 2012.  
80 The profit made by just one group, Ghazanfar Oil and Gas Group, which had shares in the 
Kabul Oil Group reveal the lucrativeness of some of these markets. Ghazanfar Oil and Gas 
groups reported in their website a net earning of over 475 million dollars in 2008 alone. 
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Sher Khan Farnood. The latter was Kabul Bank’s former Chairman and main 
shareholder who had taken 504 million dollars in irregular and irresponsible 
loans from the Bank as his personal fund (Bijlert 2011a). The Kabul Bank 
case exposed the extent to which illegality has become a part of everyday life 
in Afghanistan. The Bank’s corrupt practices involved several minsters, senior 
officials, more than 100 MPs, and etc. (Bijlert 2011a). Interestingly, most of 
these profitable contracts are linked to the current ongoing NATO-led 
coalition operation, which indirectly feuds illegality and illicit economic 
activities in Afghanistan.81 
 
In this expansive system of opportunism, Noor has encouraged his rivals by 
offering them access to business opportunities in fuel and the property 
market. Interviews with several provincial council members and civil society 
activists exposed this aspect, which was detailed by the former head of civil 
society organisations in Balkh, “he has coopted and encouraged most of his 
opponents to get involved in the North’s lucrative business. For instance, 
Abbas Ibrahimzada is now a business partner in petrol trade with the 
governor as well as having several Shahrak [property development projects] 
in Elmarab area. Ahmad Ramazan who accused Noor of assassinating his 
brother in 2005 has become his business partner, especially in the property 
sector.”82  The property market and land grab are other profitable sources of 
income for Noor.83 Land grab provides an excellent sector to observe Noor’s 
network co-optation in business (both licit and illicit). The author documented 
more than thirty land-grabbed sites associated with commanders-turned-
politicians in Mazar-i-Sharif including Abbas Ibrahimzada, Alam Khan, 
Ibrahim Ghazanfar, Haji Abdu, Juma Khan Hamdard, Khalid bin Walid, Ashraf 
Ramadan, and etc. As once civil society activist aptly described: 
                                                        
81 See Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan 
(2010), Report was prepared by the Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security 
and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
82 Interview 102, 18 April 2012.  
83 They purchase the lease of agricultural lands for fifty years at a minimum fee with certain 
privileges from the government then distribute it to people as settlement properties. 
Interestingly, the land settlement cases must be approved first at the provincial level, then by 
the relevant authorities in the centre including Ministry of Urban development and Agriculture 
and finally by the cabinet. This suggests that somehow a great number of government 
officials are involved in the process, which reveals the extent of corruption and patronage 
politics in Afghanistan.  
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Land grab provides a fast and efficient way to accumulate wealth 
and launder money. It is the most effective way for commanders-
turned-politicians to legalise [Safed kardane pul] their corrupt money 
which they find through these trades.”84 
 
 
The price of non-obedience is high. For instance, businessmen like Ibrahim 
Ghazanfar who joined Karzai’s camp in the 2009 presidential election not only 
lost his seat in the Parliament but also had to sell his shares in the Kabul Oil 
Group to Sher Khan Farnood.85 
 
Instrumentalisation of Identities 
 
Identities are not the primary source of political practice in Afghanistan; 
however, given the ethnic and tribal demographic arrangements of the 
country, identities provide powerful terrain on which political battles could be 
contested among the political networks (Forsberg 2010; Simonsen 2004; 
Giustozzi 2005; Dorronsoro 1995). Former Jihadi tanzim leaders and 
commanders like Atta Mohammad Noor and Gul Aga Shirzai did not come to 
power through identity structures; however, once in power they pursued every 
effort to maintain a certain degree of influence over the ethno-regional and 
tribal systems. In the post-2001 period, peripheral commanders have 
attempted to regain a degree of legitimacy by re-positioning themselves along 
identity lines. Even the Junbish tanzim, which enjoyed some degree of 
support among the non-Uzbeks, has become further ethnicised (Giustozzi 
2005). 
 
Discussions with ordinary people in 2012 in Balkh revealed that many local 
people perceived Noor’s hegemonic rule as ethnic-Tajik domination at the 
                                                        
84 Interview with civil society organisations, Interviews 103, 104, 116, 108, 15-19 April 2012. 
85  Ghazanfar, a former Member of Parliament, endorsed Karzai in the 2009 presidential 
election and became his Northern election campaign manager. According to a US cable 
report dating 12 July 2009, Atta confirmed that he had recently received two letters signed by 
Karzai asking the Balkh Customs Department to exempt Ghazanfar's company from paying 
duty on the import of first 50,000 metric tons (MT) of fuel and then later, on another 30,000 
MTs. Atta said the letters were cleverly worded to make the exemptions seem legitimate. The 
exemptions totalled USD 12.8 million in customs revenues. Atta suspected that some of that 
money would make its way back to Karzai himself in the form of campaign contributions from 
Ghazanfar.  
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expense of other ethnic groups. Excluded powerbrokers have interpreted 
their marginalisation along the historical grievances against their ethnic 
groups. These grievances are reflected widely by non-Tajiks who feel 
disadvantaged in a system where access to the state and the employment 
market is constrained for them. As one former director of a civil society 
organisation and a provincial council representative in Balkh put it 
respectively: 
 
“There are 55 to 59 provincial directorates in Balkh that are supposed 
to be independent. However, one ethnic group has increasingly 
dominated these positions. The Hazaras have been given two or three 
of these positions, despite the fact they constitute between 35 to 40% 
of the Balkh population. Power is in the hand of one person and his 
Tajik commanders.”86 
 
“We comprise at least 30% of Balkh’s population but we do not even 
have 3% presence within the state infrastructure. Of the nearly 60 line 
ministries we have only 2 or 3 directorates. The same is the case in 
the Afghan police and army infrastructure”87  
 
 
Noor’s support for his former Jamiat colleague, Abdullah Abdullah, in the 
2009 presidential election was seen by many Afghans as an ethnic-Tajik 
coalition to defy the expanding Pashtun Karzai hegemony. Arguably, Noor 
made a tactical calculation to align himself with Abdullah who received most 
of the Tajik votes (Chapter 6). Considering the nature of the ethno-regional 
vote in the 2004 election, this is indeed compelling. Reportedly, Noor 
financed most of Abdullah’s campaign.88 Whatever his motives for his support 
to the Abdullah campaign, discursively, Noor provided an ethnic subtext to 
ordinary voters. Noor portrayed Karzai and his team as a destructive and 
divisive Pashtun force trying to destabilise the Northern region and even 
attempting to assassinate him, the last Tajik commander who had stood 
against the expanding Pashtun domination. The following subtext issued by 
Noor during the election mirrors his strategic appeal to his ethnic-Tajik 
constituency.  
                                                        
86 Interview 105, 19 April 2012. 
87 Interview 107, 21 April 2012. 
88 According to the US embassy cables, Noor had told embassy representatives that he is 
financing most of Abdullah’s campaign.  
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“Today we do not fear the Zoorgu (despotic) government anymore. The 
mask has been removed and our people can see the true face of the 
corrupt deceiver and dictator, who pursues divisive ethnic and tribal 
policies and plans.”89 
 
 
IV.II Gul Agha Shirzai and his Consolidation of Power 
 
Gul Agha Shirzai established himself as the strongman of Kandahar province 
in the immediate post-2001 Afghanistan with financial and military assistance 
from the US (Giustozzi & Noor Ullah 2007).90 Seeing Shirzai’s consolidation 
of power in his hometown as a direct threat to himself, as part of his 
repression policy, Karzai purged Shirzai from Kandahar in August 2003 by 
appointing him Minister for Urban Development. In 2005, Karzai appointed 
Shirzai as the governor of Nangarhar province. 
 
Patron-Client Practices 
 
As an outsider in Nangarhar, Shirzai had to build a new political network. The 
state’s coercive and revenue-extractive resources as well as Nangarhar’s 
legal and illegal commercial networks were already controlled by local 
political network powerbrokers, particularly by the Arsala family and Hazrat Ali 
networks (Mukhopadhyay 2009; Giustozzi 2007). The Arsala family, the head 
of the powerful Jabbarkhel subdivision of the Ahmadzai tribe, has been the 
dominant force in Nangarhar since the early 1990s.91  Both Abdul Haq and 
Haji Abdul Qadir, Arsala family members, were prominent Mujahedeen 
commanders among the Pashtuns who were killed in 2001 and 2002 
                                                        
89 A critical speech that Noor gave just after the election, on the Martyrdom day. September 
2009. 
90 Gul Agha Shirzai was the governor of Kandahar after the collapse of the Najibullah regime 
in 1992. In 2001, the Taliban handed over the city of Kandahar to Mullah Naqibullah and 
Hamid Karzai. The latter became the governor but very soon Gul Agha reached the outskirts 
of the city and challenged both Mullah Naqibullah and Hamid Karzai. After long negotiations, 
during which Gul Agha threatened an all out war, he was finally once again appointed 
governor, Mullah Naqibullah backed down fearing US intervention on his enemy’s side 
(Giustozzi & Noor Ullah, 2007:172).  
91 The Arsala family is a prominent Ahmadzai from the Eastern Ghilzai Pashtun. Historically 
they have been Khans (similar to lords) of the Ahmadzai tribe. The great great-father of the 
Arsala family was known as the Redbeard who had earned himself the Governorship of 
Jalalabad for his slaughter of the British troops in the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1842.  
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respectively. Haji Qadir was Nangarhar’s governor between 1992-1994 and 
2001-2002. After his assassination, his brother Haji Din Mohammad became 
the governor until 2005. Hazrat Ali, the ethnic-Pashei minority commander 
who led the Northern Alliance (NA) forces in Nangarhar and the former Chief 
of Police of Nangarhar, was another key local leader. Although he was 
removed in 2004 and found protection in the new Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) 
as an MP, he maintained strong connection in Nangarhar through his network 
clientele. It was in this unfavourable context that Shirzai was appointed as the 
governor of Nangarhar.  
 
However, with backing from the US and the Karzai network, Shirzai 
immediately asserted his supremacy, challenging the main local 
powerbrokers and their networks. Taking full advantage of his formal state 
position, he made wide-ranging administrative changes to strengthen his 
power. Using his power to dismiss and reshuffle district governors and police 
chiefs he had sent a clear message to local powerbrokers and state officials 
that he was in charge and that he now has the authority to decide on the 
future of their political careers (Hakimi 2012). In fact, the constant reshuffling 
of state officials at district level has been a key part of his strategy in 
maintaining a degree of control over his network clientele. For instance, in 
2012, in one of the widest elite restructuring, he reshuffled eight of the twenty-
one district governors without waiting for the Independent Directorate of Local 
Governance’s (IDLG) approval.92 The US cable further asserts that most of 
these officials are prominent tribal figures who have proven to be corrupt and 
ineffective. 
 
Despite his ability to establish an expansive and costly patron-client system, 
Shirzai’s power is far from absolute. As two prominent MP from Nangarhar 
described to the author, the former run for the presidency in the 2009 
election.  
 
                                                        
92 Us Cable, 7 March 2009. This is despite the fact that IDLG have the legal authority to 
appoint and dismiss district and provincial governors.  
 148 
There is no government in Nangarhar. People are bargaining to 
make money out of government ministry positions, contracts, 
corruption, development funds and etc. The governor works for 
himself to fill his own pocket while his opponent control different 
part of the government. These people do not want peace and 
stability because they benefit from insecurity. The government in 
Nangarhar is nothing more than a Destgahe Muamela (Bargaining 
Machine).93 
 
You cannot have a high position job without protection from one of 
the warlords in Nangarhar. A friend of mine who was the 
commissioner of the Torkham border custom had to resign after 
three months in the job because different warlords wanted 
protection money from him. He was threatened by many different 
groups and interests that he had to resign from his job.94 
 
 
The local powerbrokers have maintained a degree of political, commercial 
and military power. By 2006, even though the Arsala family’s power had 
weakened in Nangarhar; however, they succeeded to position themselves as 
stern players at the national level.95 As Chapter 7 shows, Haji Zahir emerged 
as Karzai’s archenemy after the 2009 presidential election. He became the 
leader of the Support for Rule of Law coalition in the 2010-2011 parliamentary 
crises, which successfully challenged Karzai’s authority over the Special 
Court (Chapter 7). Interviews with several provincial council members 
revealed that the Arsala family, the Haji Zahir faction in particular, have 
maintained powerful positions in Nangarhar through the formal institution of 
the provincial council.96 A few days before the author’s visit to Jalalabad in 
June 2012, a skirmish had taken place between Haji Jamal Qadir and 
Shirzai’s allied businessman Haji Farough. As the Afghan Millet regional party 
leader explained to the author, “Jamal, the grandson of Haji Qadir had 
attacked Farough, a local businessman over money. Apparently, Farough 
had not paid enough money for the contract he had won. He is a dangerous 
warlord who takes money from people, grab lands, and kidnap businessmen. 
The Arsala family remains powerful.” The fact that Haji Jamal had carried out 
                                                        
93 Interview 84,13 April 2012.  
94 Interview 74, 21 February 2012 
95 In 2006 Haji Zahir was exiled to the Northern Takhar province as the head of Border Police. 
96 This is based on the author’s discussion with the National Democratic Institute Programme 
manager in Nangarhar who has been working with political parties in the provincial council 
over the years and several other provincial council members (Interviews 75, 90, 91).  
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such an attack on Haji Farough’s house illustrates the extent of power they 
enjoy in Nangarhar. A month later, following Shirzai’s insistence, the Attorney 
General’s Office and the Ministry of Interior arrested Haji Jamal in Kabul. 
However, he was released a few days later and was warmly welcomed by his 
supporters in the city (Foschini 2011). Interestingly, as one local Shinwari MP 
detailed, 
 
On that same day that Haji Jamal was taken prisoner, thirteen cases were 
registered against him for kidnapping, extortion, land grab and etc in the 
Attorney General Office. A few days later he was released. A deal must 
have been struck between Haji Zahir [Haji Jamal’s father] and Karzai. 
When he returned to Jalalabad people greeted him. This is not because 
they like him but because they fear him.97  
 
 
Several studies have highlighted the increasing involvement of Gul Agha 
Shirzai and his network in illegality in order to maintain its patronage system 
(Mukhopadhyay 2009; Hakimi 2012). These studies have found that Shirzai 
owns construction, logistics and private security firms in Nangarhar 
(Mukhopadhyay 2009; Hakimi 2012). The US House of Representatives’ 
2010 Report, one of the most comprehensive investigative studies into the 
contracting of US funds, found that Shirzai was directly and indirectly partner 
with several logistics and security companies in Nangarhar which provided 
services to the Host Nation Trucking (HNT) contract. The HNT was one of the 
most lucrative contracts in Afghanistan, worth 2.16 billion USD dollars, split 
among eight Afghan, American and Middle Eastern companies to provide 
logistics (e.g., food, supplies, fuel, and ammunitions) for the NATO forces in 
the Eastern region.98 The report concluded that most of the money had gone 
to the pocket of warlords including Gul Agha Shirzai and criminal networks. 
Jawad (2011) found that most of the NATO contracts in Nangarhar are won 
either by Shirzai’s own companies or his close partners, Haji Farough, Gul 
Murad and Najib Zarab.  
 
                                                        
97 Interview 81, 12 April 2012.  
98 See Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan 
(2010), Report was prepared by the Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security 
and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
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The sudden increase in development aid by the US military through the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) meant new roads, schools, clinics and 
housing estates. Shirzai, subcontracted most of these projects to companies 
related to him (Mukhopadhyay 2009). The author’s professional work at 
Afghanistan Stabilisation Initiative (ASI), a USAID funded project, revealed 
corruption, failure and mismanagement in most of the projects that Shirzai 
and his clients benefited financially. In addition to these, Shirzai has 
employed a more draconian method of extracting revenues in Nangarhar. 
Since 2005, he has been collecting illegal tolls on freight entering via 
Torkham Gate, under the “Governor’s Reconstruction Fund”. The operation 
nets the governor $1.5 million to $4 million per month (Hodge 2012). He has 
also accumulated additional rents from the provision of municipal services 
and the illegal selling of electricity to residents of Jalalabad (Hakimi 2012). 
Most of this money ends up in foreign banks. In a revealing incident in early 
July 2012, Shirzai was detained for hours when entering Germany carrying 
three briefcases full of undeclared cash (Hodge 2012).  
 
Manipulation of Identities  
 
Shirzai lacks a strong constituency support in Nangarhar and this is one of 
the main reasons for his vulnerability in power. He has to purchase 
constituency loyalty by relying on an extensive and expansive patronage 
system, discussed above, which has gradually worked to further weaken his 
position. While in Balkh, politicisations of identities were centred on ethno-
regional divisions, but in Nangarhar this was tribal in nature. Unlike his local 
rivals, as an outsider, Shirzai could not rely on his own tribal network 
constituency. However, as the leader of the most dominant tribal group in 
Afghanistan with a long history of king-making, Shirzai relied heavily on the 
tribal system to expand his political network (Mukhopadhyay 2009). He 
pursued a strategy of “buying-in” the loyalties of tribal leaders to maintain 
stability and security in Nangarhar. Through patronage and bargains he has 
manipulated tribes, awarding those in his favour and marginalising those 
against him, from state resources to international development aid (Hakimi 
2012). While he enjoys support amongst the Mohmand and Shinwar tribes, 
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he has received the least support amongst the Khugiani and Sherzad tribes 
(Mukhopadhyay 2009). His harsh counter-narcotics campaigns in the latter 
provinces, combined with the exclusion of key Khugiani tribal administrators 
from the provincial state, played a part in losing the support of these tribal 
groups (Mukhopadhyay 2009:17-18).   A large part of the Khugiani tribe, led 
by the Khales family, has felt isolated from the post-2001 Kabul set-up and 
therefore joined the Taliban. These tensions have been greatly exploited by 
local powerbrokers that claim to represent the interests of these tribes. 
 
Another fascinating area to observe the manipulation of identities is land grab 
and land disputes. In an excellent article, Fabrizio Foschini (2012) highlighted 
how local powerbrokers stirred up tribal tensions for their personal gain. The 
disputes over the Qasamabad area in the Behsud district in 2005 and 2007 
are revealing. The dispute was between local residents and the ethnic Pashei 
community. The Pasheis enjoyed support from the security forces, then 
heavily under the control of Hazrat Ali, the former Jamiat member and 
Nangarhar Chief of Police in 2003-04. The locals, on the other hand, had the 
support of the former mayor of Jalalabad and a couple of other Jihadi 
commanders (Foschini 2010). During the Author’s visit to the province in early 
2012, a land dispute between Khugiani and Mohmand tribes led to a 
weeklong tribal conflict. Interviews with provincial council and Wolesi Jirga 
representatives uncovered that both the Haji Zahir network and the Shirzai 
network had exploited the tension to create chaos and further strife between 
the tribes. As one MP from the Ahmadzai tribe described,  
 
“These incidents happen all the time. The Khugiani and Mohmand tribal 
dispute was over a Khugiani purchasing land in the Mohmand district. 
Haji Zahir used this issue to create rife between the two tribes. They 
manipulated the elders. It was an attempt to create chaos and instability 
and a way to find an excuse to threaten the governor Shirzai. The 
underlying incentive for these powerbrokers is economics.”99  
 
 
Such incidents, which are manipulated by the local powerbrokers, have 
generated moments of instability in the periphery. Identity politics has 
                                                        
99 Interview 81, 12 April 2012.  
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mutually reinforced political network elites’ claim to illegality and patronage on 
behalf of their communities.  
 
In this new emerging political order, the international intervention and their 
sponsored statebuilding process had played a fundamental role in intensifying 
the historically grounded clientelistic and identity-based divisions of Afghan 
statehood. By supporting the civil war era Mujahedeen commanders and the 
new Western-educated technocratic elites, the so-called Western liberal 
intervention and statebuilding contributed much to the strengthening of 
political networks, and subsequently re-assembling the historically grounded 
network state. Since 2001, new political networks and centres of power have 
been critically strengthened over this period through the distribution of 
contracts by Washington and its allies among influential powerbrokers. This 
was one of the main conclusions of a House of Representative report which 
questioned the international intervention strategy of relying on warlords and 
their sub-contracting practices in helping warlords win contracts and 
accumulate wealth. 100  The NATO counter-insurgency strategy of “winning 
hearts and minds” played a key role in empowering Atta Mohammad Noor in 
Balkh and Gul Agha Shirzai in Nangarhar province. The American military 
and USAID poured millions of dollars of development aid into Nangarhar 
based on a misguided assumption that more aid would improve security 
(Fishstein & Wilder 2012). Most of that money went in the pockets of key 
political networks and their elites in the periphery.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter showed how the post-2001 state came to be constituted and 
transformed, shedding light on post-2001 international intervention and state 
formation. The consolidation of power by Karzai at the centre and Noor and 
Shirzai in the periphery, reveals that the post-2001 international state is 
constituted as the state around key political networks and centres of power. 
                                                        
100 See Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan 
(2010), Report was prepared by the Majority staff of the Subcommittee on National Security 
and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
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The state has been re-assembled by former Mujahedeen political networks as 
well as new ones with closer links to international statebuilding. Network 
practices of patronage, opportunism, illegality, and instrumentalisation of 
identities has become the rules of the game through which political networks 
and centres of power maintain and expand their power. Political networks and 
their elites have skilfully used their positions in the internationally sponsored 
state and their access to state resources to coercively remove their 
opponents to further consolidate their power across the country. By enabling 
certain networks to control the country’s economy and policy, the post-2001 
international patronage, to a large extent, provided an opportunity for 
patronage politics, illegality and opportunism to prosper. 
 
Karzai and Shirzai have maintained their power through expansive patron-
client and illegal practices. Noor, on the other hand, in addition to these has 
established a strong tie with the population in the North, particularly with his 
ethnic-Tajiks, enjoying greater legitimacy. While Noor’s power seems secure 
in post-2014 international military withdrawal, Shirzai’s power remains 
vulnerable. Noor’s open support for Abdullah in the 2009 presidential election 
and Karzai’s weakness to remove him from his position after the election 
illustrates the strength of Atta’s power and his network connections, 
establishing him as a national player. In a calculated effort, he helped most of 
his networked clientele in the northern region to win seats in the Wolesi Jirga 
in the 2010 parliamentary elections (Chapter 7). These MPs have played a 
critical role in promoting and strengthening Noor’s relations with Kabul’s key 
powerbrokers, state officials, shadow economic networks and international 
donors.101  
 
                                                        
101 These MPs have helped Noor expand his financial and political connections with the key 
political networks in Kabul. After the election, in an interesting account, Noor sent a 
delegation of MPs, provincial council members, elders and others to Kabul to reconcile with 
the key powerbrokers in Kabul. The lobbying seemed to have worked according to Balkh’s 
deputy provincial council who was part of the delegation: “After the election, Atta sent me 
with other influential people in Balkh to visit Marshal Fahim and other ministries to reconcile. 
Fahim told us even though Atta had disrespected me by not welcoming me in Mazar I forgive 
him as he is one of us and that I will never allow another person except Atta and Tajik to 
control the North. A week later a delegation including governor Noor went to meet Marshal 
Fahim and Karzai. Governor Noor was clever to rebuild trust and restore his connection.” 
Interview 99, 21 April 2012. 
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The next two chapters demonstrate how the power dynamics among rival 
political networks was played out during moments of contestation and crisis. 
These case studies reflect two different moments of competition, conflict and 
compromise which provided a further platform for their horse-trading and 
deal-makings. The 2009 presidential election (Chapter 6) explores power 
dynamics at the national level in a moment of high contestation where 
political networks compete to win constituency votes. The 2010-2011 Special 
Court crisis (Chapter 7) shows the political network conflicts and their day-to-
day practices in the Wolesi Jirga, within the confinement of the state. It 
explores the political economy of the Wolesi Jirga, one of the most important 
institutions of liberal peace. Both these cases highlight how liberal peace 
institutions have become compromised by political network for their gains. 
The network practices help uncover the complexity of governance and 
statehood in post-2001 international statebuilding, shedding light on how 
competing political networks maintain themselves within the state and 
beyond, further expanding their power and interests.  
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Chapter 6: The Power Dynamics of Political Networks during the 2009  
                   Presidential Elections 
 
 
Introduction  
 
One of the primary objectives of the international intervention and their 
sponsored peacebuilding is election. Free and fair elections are considered as 
the principal indicator of success for peace operations. The UNDP guidebook 
to Elections and Conflict Prevention noted that, “the ultimate guarantor of 
social peace is robust democratic institutions such as elections. Election that 
give voice to the people are in essence a critical means of social conflict 
management through peaceful deliberations and decision-making processes.” 
(2009: 1). This rationale has served the development of policy priorities in 
post-2001 international intervention in Afghanistan. The 2001 Bonn 
Agreement included the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections as 
one of its main four benchmarks. The Agreement instructed that “free and fair 
elections are to be held no later than two years from the date of the convening 
of the Emergency Loyi Jirga” (Section I: 4). This was mirrored in the 2002 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) which mandated 
“the extension of government authority throughout the country through the 
establishment of democratic, legitimate, accountable institutions, down to the 
local level” (in UNDP 2009: 28). 
 
Towards this objective, the international intervention invested significant 
resources and efforts in Afghanistan to prepare the ground for elections. In 
the 2004 presidential election, the combined budget for both the voter 
registration and elections projects totaled over 203 million USD, excluding the 
provision of security by international military forces.102 In the 2009 presidential 
election this increased to almost 500 million USD, with half of that money 
                                                        
102 Afghan Elections Project, Excel document entitled “Funding status 5 Oct 04.xls," <hWp:// 
www.elec%ons‐ afghanistan.org.af/>. 
20 United Nations Development Programme, 2004 Afghan Elections Project Budget, <hWp:// 
www.elec%ons‐ afghanistan.org.af/>. 
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donated by the US government.103 The international peacebuilding industry 
put together a diverse set of actors and organisations to assist with 
developing the necessary legislative framework, building the institutional and 
operational capacity of the election institutions and promoting the engagement 
of the relevant stakeholder communities to conduct elections in the limited 
available time-frame. International organisations such as the UNDP, National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) were 
assigned to provide technical assistance to draft the electoral law and 
strengthen the capacity of election organisations including the Joint Electoral 
Management Body (JEMB) and the Interim Afghan Electoral Commission 
(IAEC). The UNDP, under ELECT project, was tasked with the administration 
of the election including voter registration. Other implementing organisations 
such as International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), The Asia 
Foundation (TAF), and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) were assigned to 
develop civic engagement programmes to train the key stakeholders in the 
elections. The role of these organisations was significantly evident in the 2009 
presidential election as expectations increased within a deteriorating security 
situation.  
 
Despite the international declaration of success in consolidating the 
democratisation process, both the 2004 and 2009 elections were marred by 
fraud and vote rigging. The Impartial Panel of Election Expert report cited 
more than 300 cases of abuse and intimidation out of a total number of 448 
officially filed complaints in the 2004 elections. In the 2009 elections, the 
Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) disqualified 1.2 million 
ballots, of which, one million belonged to the incumbent President Karzai and 
200,000 to Abdullah Abdullah. The same election also exposed the increasing 
division and rift between international donors when the UN’s Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon dismissed the UNAMA deputy, Ambassador Peter 
Galbraith, who had clashed with the head of UNAMA, Kai Eide, over his 
forceful criticism of Karzai team’s fraud and manipulation, further questioning 
and undermining the authority, the intensions and objectives of international 
                                                        
103 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) (2010:1).  
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peacebuilding in the eyes of many Afghans. For example, one Afghan 
member of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) characterised the last two 
elections as follows, “if the 2004 election was a setback for democratisation in 
Afghanistan, the 2009 election essentially dug its grave.” 104  A 2012 
Democracy International (DI) survey report found that most Afghans have 
more faith in informal institutions that represent their interests than they do in 
the formal institutions associated with the state. As this chapter uncovers, 
elections in post-2001 international intervention and peacebuilding has 
served, if anything, other than those of democratisation. Elections have 
largely aided the interests of political networks to further consolidate a rigid 
political order that serves their interests and that of their members.   
 
The 2009 presidential election serve windows on the process by which 
political cultural and political economic network contestation and cooptation 
proceeded under the veneer of ostensibly liberal-democratic elections. These 
elections have provided new conditions within which political network pacts 
were re-negotiated. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the shifts 
in the power dynamics of political networks since 2004. It highlights a shift in 
balance of power from Western-educated technocrats back to political 
network Jihadis. Section II examines the inter-network conflict based on 
divisions of ethnicity during the 2009 presidential election. It is an attempt to 
show how opposing political networks tried to manipulate Afghanistan’s 
identity groups; in particular those based on ethnicity, in the symbols and 
rhetoric of their campaign strategies to win votes. Section III explores the 
propagation of patron-client bargains and exchanges linking network leaders 
and their clientele within two opposing whole networks, represented by 
Abdullah Abdullah, a former member of Jamiat tanzim, and by the incumbent 
President Karzai, to bring out the vote. It details three main clientelist 
linkages: 1) the individual network powerbrokers; 2) the tribal and community 
elders; and 3) the provincial and district government officials, upon which 
candidates relied on. The section before the conclusion provides a more 
substantive explanation for “corruption” at the 2009 poll, which focuses on the 
                                                        
104 Interview 131, 13 September 2009.  
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success or failures of formal institutions. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
that Karzai’s political network continues to further consolidate its power by 
depending on patron-client practices and the use of identity politics to gain a 
semblance of legitimacy and to seek the consolidation of the Afghan state. 
 
 
I. The 2004 and 2009 Presidential Election and Political Network Re-
structuring  
 
The 2004 presidential election provided an excellent opportunity for newly 
splintered political networks (Chapter 5) and their elites to rearrange their 
structural composition and organisational power. For Karzai and his newly 
expanding network, the election offered an occasion to further strengthen their 
power. For the so-called Jihadi political networks and centres of power, it 
offered an opportunity to reinvent themselves as resilient ethno-regional 
client-networks (Bijlert 2009; Wilder 2005). Although Karzai won the election 
with 55 per cent of the vote, his three main challengers, Qanuni (ethnic-Tajik), 
Mohaqqeq (ethnic-Hazara) and Dostum (ethnic-Uzbek) received a 
considerable share of the vote at 16.3 per cent, 11.7 per cent, and 10 per cent 
respectively. Capitalising on the uncertainty provided by the absence of a 
valid census, they successfully mobilised a high voter turnout to establish the 
size of their power base. However, the strategic rhetoric that was used was an 
ethnic one, claiming to prove the size of their ethnic population relative to 
other groups. They appealed to their ethno-regional constituency by claiming 
to have defended the interests of their ethnic community in standing in the 
election, thereby characterising the general vote as an ethnic/tribal one. This 
reflected in the following quotes by the deputy Chairman of Junbish, Fayzullah 
Zaki, and Mohammad Mohaqqeq, the powerful ethnic-Hazara candidate.  
 
“This was the first time in the history of this country that an opportunity 
had risen which gave ethnic groups like Uzbeks the chance to contest 
in the political process. Throughout history, the Turkic groups were 
deliberately estimated at only 2 or 3 per cent. Despite knowing we 
would not win, General Dostum contested in the election to prove the 
size of our ethnic group. Dostum won ten per cent of the vote, now, 
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nobody can deny that Uzbeks are any less than ten per cent in the 
country.”105 
 
“The main reason that we contested in the election was to prove that we 
[the Hazaras] are one of the largest ethnic groups in the country. In the 
last three decades we participated in Jihad and fought against the 
Taliban and when democracy was introduced we actively took part. In 
this stage, to represent the Hazaras I stood in the election and people 
voted for me. Through democracy, we proved that this country belongs 
to all ethnic groups.”106  
 
 
These ethno-regional political networks were able to send a clear message to 
Karzai that if he is going to maintain and strengthen his power he ought to 
take them seriously. This could explain, to some extent, the reason for 
Karzai’s shift in policy from repressing the Jihadis to accommodating their 
demands and interests within the system. From 2004 onwards the power 
balance between different networks had shifted away from the Western-
educated technocrats and royalists such as Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Ali 
Jalali back to the former jihadi networks. A year later most of the Jihadi 
political network leaders and their clientele, except Rashid Dostum, found 
protection in the newly established parliament where they used it as a 
platform to maintain and consolidate their power (Chapter 7). The period from 
2005 to the 2009 presidential election can largely be explained in terms of 
active state network extension by Karzai on the one hand, and efforts by 
these political networks to transform themselves into successful ethno-
regional clients networks, on the other. Steadily, a new political order 
emerged in which the political networks’ sphere of influence within and 
outside the state became sharper and more transparent. Subsequently, 
Karzai extended its authority by relying on the former Jihadi ethno-regional 
networks, who largely acted as the mediator clients, to maintain a complex 
patronage system connecting commanders, tribal leaders, and local 
powerbrokers, stretching down to the village level (discussed below). These 
patronage connections functioned both ways, from top to bottom and vice 
versa. 
 
                                                        
105 Interview 122, 14 September 2009.   
106 Interview 112, 30 August 2009. 
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It was within this emerging political order that the second presidential election 
took shape on 20 August 2009. Unlike the 2004 election, this election was 
administered and managed by the newly founded Afghanistan Independent 
Election Commission (IEC). The IEC, the ultimate authority on election, was 
formed with the Presidential decree (decree No.23) without a legislative 
approval. Karzai also appointed the IEC leadership. The final result, which 
was announced two months after the election, put Karzai at 47.5 per cent and 
Abdullah at 30.5 per cent (figure 6.1). It forced the need for a run-off as 
neither candidate had reached the threshold margin of 50 per cent. With 
Abdullah deciding not to run, Karzai was declared the winner.  
 
 
Figure 6.1. The 2009 Presidential Election Result 
 
 
 
The next section attempts to show how the two main candidates consciously 
manipulated Afghanistan’s identity markers for their personal and electoral 
gains, but did so alongside nationalist appeals to unity. It demonstrates how 
political network strategies have further exacerbating identity politics in post-
2001 period. 
 
II. Politicisation of Identities and the 2009 Presidential Elections  
 
In this section, I use discourse analysis to show how the two main presidential 
candidates manipulated identity divisions to win the vote. Discourse analysis 
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of the two main presidential candidates’ speeches, posters and 
advertisements during the election show how they used certain signifiers to 
position themselves in the Afghan society and in relation to their rivals.  
Candidates attempted to draw fixed lines of structure and order in terms of 
ethnicity, simplifying the complexity of the Afghan society. The ethnic 
dynamics of the Afghan society, which were always influenced and re-
negotiated as opportunities emerged and tactics changed (Simonsen 2004; 
Galtzer 2002), were skilfully constructed as fixed by candidates. An analysis 
of the main candidates’ speeches shows how both created a narrative of 
ethno-regional injustice by providing a particular and simplified reading of the 
last thirty years of Jihad and civil war, which amongst other things, precluded 
discussion of centuries of conquest, empire and state building. It is in the 
implicit and explicit messages in their rhetoric and representations that one 
can see the ethno-political features of their discourse and, by extension, their 
political strategies. The sub-text reveals the centrality of ethnicity in their 
campaign as a tool to mobilise ethno-regional support.  Karzai’s political 
adviser’s comment illustrates the importance of ethnicity for securing votes,  
 
Ethnicity was a significant factor in the election…. They [the two main 
candidates] did not use it in public discourse. They did it indirectly as a 
hidden mechanism in a way that the electorate could relate to.”107  
 
 
In the 2009 election, the two main candidates’ campaigns were driven by the 
manipulation of identity-based issues rather than policy-centred issues. The 
little policy that was discussed revolved around ethnically-framed issues of 
political inclusion, social and political justice, and national unity. Substantive 
policy discussion was largely superfluous. For example, one of the main 
policy proposals of Abdullah was the transformation of the political system 
from presidential to parliamentary. However, in none of his speeches did he 
elaborate on the differences between the two or why the parliamentary 
system would be better for Afghanistan.  As highlighted below in the rhetoric 
of Karzai and Abdullah, by contrast, each candidate targeted issues that were 
important to particular ethno-regional groups. For instance, issues such as the 
                                                        
107 Interview 123, 2 September 2009. 
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problem of the Taliban threat and security provision, the stay of foreign troops 
and the Durand line between Pakistan and Afghanistan were brought up for 
Pashtuns. To Hazaras, candidates addressed the Kuchi-Hazara land conflict, 
building of the Kabul-Bamiyan roads and the promise to make the two most 
populated Hazara districts of Jaghuri and Behsud into provinces. For Tajiks 
and Uzbeks, the issues of inclusion of Jihadis in the government and social 
and political justice came to the fore. Although, such regional strategies are 
common in any large democracy, in Afghanistan these strategies had a clear 
ethnic basis and conflictual aspect despite the rhetoric of ‘national unity’.   
 
The Karzai Narrative  
 
In Karzai’s discourse a clear temporal division was drawn between the period 
of the civil war, associated with “factional fighting” and “disunity between 
different tanzims”, to the post-2001 period of “authority”, “peace” and 
“development”.  In making this distinction, Karzai established himself as the 
personification of this transition whilst downplaying his own ethnic identity and 
the role of ethno-regionalism in the constitution of elite authority in 
Afghanistan. This was evident from his election banners, which stated, “vote 
for Karzai, vote for stability”, “vote for Karzai, vote for prosperity and a proud 
Afghanistan”, “vote for Karzai, vote for peaceful Afghanistan”. His two primary 
signifiers of this shift are national unity (Wahdat-e-Millie) and progress 
(Peshraft and Inkeshaf).  
 
Karzai’s emphasis on the notion of national unity is both personalised and 
explicitly anti-factional, which is evident from his speeches and posters 
around the multi-ethnic Kabul city: “Karzai is the symbol of national unity”, 
“Afghanistan for all Afghans”, “our way, the peace way”. He drew a line 
between pre-Bonn tyranny and civil war and his post-Bonn network-building of 
inclusion and co-optation of main political networks to the state, which he 
projected as a significant progress towards national unity, contrasting with the 
Jihadi network of Abdullah, which is portrayed as seeking ethno-regional 
factional domination. Karzai positioned himself as a national figure who 
worked towards pacifying tanzim elites in the post-Bonn era by incorporating 
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them into his network-state. Such a discursive approach can be understood 
as the necessary outcome of his patronage politics (elaborated in section III), 
given that he has brokered political deals with most of the ethno-regional and 
local networks. In such a position he had to frame himself as a national figure 
who dissolved factional differences. Karzai’s language employs dichotomies 
of differentiation and linking such as “peace” against “civil war” or ‘stability” 
versus “factional fighting”. Such official representations draw a clear 
distinction between government and opposition groups. They represent the 
government, more specifically his political network, above the conflict rather 
than being an active player in the current conflict.  During the live television 
debate between the three main candidates before the election in August 
Karzai declared:   
 
Seven years ago when I took office, this country was ruined; there was 
no government and no bureaucracy. The tanzims had fought one 
another and had destroyed everything. Look at this country now, it has 
become free and it has progressed. We must keep this. We should 
maintain this progress, the national unity, elimination of war and gun, 
and elimination of tanzim fighting, in order to have peace and unity for all 
Afghans.108 
 
 
Karzai’s narrative draws on little or no evidence to justify the claim to national 
unity. In his account, he takes the alliance with the main ethno-regional 
networks as evidence of democratic coalition building.  “Democracy” and 
“national unity” substitute for any discussion of ethnically based factionalism: 
“vote for Karzai, vote for democracy and government by people.” For Karzai, 
democracy and national unity are the symbols which conceal the bargains 
and exchanges made with the main network leaders, commanders, 
community leaders and state officials. 
 
Progress was another important signifier constructed by both candidates, yet 
in different ways. Karzai’s campaign capitalised on post-conflict reconstruction 
and argued that socio-economic progress has been uniform for all Afghans. 
                                                        
108 Hamid Karzai, TV Debate, Broadcasted live on Radio and TV of Afghanistan (RTA), on 16 
August 2009 (5-7 pm).  
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Such a discursive mode links “peacebuilding” and ‘statebuilding” to the person 
of the President as Karzai remarked in an August speech, 
 
“Our biggest achievement of [the] last seven years, after three decades 
of war, is that today Afghanistan has become home to all Afghans. 
Refugees are returning home from all corners of the world. Today after 
war and bloodshed, Afghanistan has become home for every single 
Afghan. Today we have 75,000 students in universities, of which, 25,000 
are women. We have roads, schools and clinics...We are moving 
towards a government by the people and a government for the people.” 
109 
 
These deployments of “progress” and “national unity” are misleading, 
however, given the continuance of fighting after the Bonn Agreement between 
political networks within the state and those outside the state fighting against 
the government (e.g., the Taliban and Hizbi-i-Islami). Karzai’s rhetoric went 
even further by creating the narrative of a helpless public, as if they have no 
other option but to elect him to power. He skilfully portrayed himself as a 
saviour knowing that those memories of the civil war and inter-network 
fighting are fresh in the minds of most Afghans, making them an emotive 
topic, ripe for exploitation. In this narrative, the civil war is identified as an era 
apart from the present. For Karzai inter-network fighting is a key generic 
signifier constructed as a direct threat to the ‘national unity’. Therefore, the 
line he established between “civil war” and “national disunity”, between 
‘stability” and “instability”, is effective in its rhetorical impact on ordinary 
Afghans. Civil war is associated with the Hobbesian state of nature where the 
state does not exist. Such representation of the regime idealises the existence 
of the state and the national progress as a managed process of statebuilding 
towards a unified and democratic state. The above rhetoric offered by Karzai 
essentially conceals the strategic partnerships he made with the same Jihadis 
that he blames for the 1990s wars. It conceals his deal-making with political 
networks in getting the vote.  
 
 
 
                                                        
109 Karzai, campaign speech in the Kayhan Valley, 6 August 2009 
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Abdullah’s Narrative  
 
Abdullah provided a counter-narrative to Karzai that at once denied the 
President’s claims whilst offering an alternative and no less partial 
construction of contemporary Afghanistan.  Jihad was perhaps the primary 
signifier for Abdullah.  Contrary to Karzai’s “national unity”, Abdullah’s 
counter-narrative was centred on the notion of alienation and injustice. His 
main campaign slogan was “change” and “hope” which he subsequently 
named his whole network coalition after. However, this narrative was given 
plausibility through the symbolic currency of Jihad and martyrdom. Abdullah’s 
campaign speeches typically start with praising the Jihadi martyrs: “Let me 
pray to the soul of all Martyrs, especially chief martyr Ahmad Shah 
Massoud.”110 Campaign posters such as “the martyrs’ blood is the guarantor 
of freedom and sovereignty of the nation” and “by celebrating the splendour of 
Jihad we can rebuild the nation” were widespread across the city. He depicted 
his decision to stand in the election as an inclusive process among the United 
Front (UF) Jihadis, even though with the joining of Qasim Fahim as Karzai’s 
first running mate, the UF had collapsed. Thus, he was indirectly targeting a 
specific ethnic constituency. Although this discourse brings memories of civil 
war, destruction and anarchy for many Afghans, for Abdullah and his 
supporters it appeals to the glorious days of Jihadis when he was a leading 
commander.  In July 2009, in a campaign speech he declared: 
 
“For the past three years we have been consulting with fellow 
Mujahedeens to re-establish the United Front. In the many meetings we 
had, we agreed to choose a Jihadi as a candidate. They put this burden 
on my shoulder.”111  
 
I promise to the Afghan people and to the Jihadi brothers that I will 
implement your wishes by bringing security and an atmosphere of 
brotherhood and social justice. I will guarantee the Mujahedeens the 
rights that have been denied to them.112  
 
 
                                                        
110 Abdullah’s Speech in Mazar-e-Sharif, 13 August 2009 
111 Abdullah’s Speech in Mazar-e-Sharif, 13 August 2009 
112 Abdullah speech, Baghlan Province, 22 July 2009 
 166 
This invocation of jihad signifies a different reading of Afghan history, one with 
different moments of promise and peril.  Firstly, it represents the glorious days 
of Mujahedeen’s battle against the Soviet regime and their eventual victory 
(1979-1992).   Secondly it indirectly suggests the period of Jihadi domination 
during the civil war years (1992-6). In particular it invokes the hegemony of 
one ethno-regional political network, the predominantly ethnic-Tajik Jamiat 
network to which Abdullah belongs.   Thirdly, it also denotes the immediate 
post-2001 international intervention when Jihadis, in particular the NA and the 
Jamiat, had control over the main government ministries including the security 
ministries (2001-2004).  Finally it signifies the aftermath of that period in which 
these Jihadis, including himself, were excluded from power. Therefore, this 
narrative provides a different rendition of history, one grounded in an ethno-
regional struggle against external powers and Pashtun hegemony. As such, 
Abdullah does not appeal to the wider population that are disenchanted with 
the Karzai government, but to a particular minority group in society.  
 
Similar to Karzai, Abdullah deploys the notion of progress in his campaign 
speeches.  However, in contrary to Karzai, he highlights the government’s 
high level of corruption, despotism, and socio-economic exclusion of some 
ethnic groups such as the Tajiks from the political and economic process of 
statebuilding.  In August 2009 in Parwan province he adopted “national unity” 
as a future prospect under his leadership to fulfil the promise of jihad, rather 
than an achievement of the current government.  
 
“I promise you to bring education to young people; to give back your 
rights; to bring development and woman’s rights; give rights to 
Mujahedeens [so] social injustice is established. [I promise] to bring 
national unity so that there is no difference between the North and the 
South, the West and the Centre; that there is no difference between 
Pashtuns, Farsiwans, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkmens.”113  
 
 
In Kabul stadium on 17 August, he again invoked “national unity” over power 
in the hands of one person. In his rhetoric he further linked Karzai’s corruption 
                                                        
113 Abdullah, Parwan Province, 5 August 2009 
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to his relationship with the Western powers and played on Afghan 
disillusionment with foreign intervention. 
 
“We don’t want power to be in the hand of one person, one family, one 
mafia and one drug dealer. We want power to be with you, the people. 
We want national unity and it does not matter which race, ethnicity, and 
religion you belong to. Today, the empire that is built by paper money [a 
reference to the US Dollar] is broken. Everybody is with us, the people 
are with us and so is God.” 114  
 
The sharply confrontational rhetoric and symbolism deployed in the campaign 
may not be unexpected in an election which is by its nature both competitive 
and based around the claims of particular individual to represent and lead the 
nation.  Moreover, that ethno-regionalism remains an important sub-text to the 
symbolic order of Afghan politics and the conduct of the 2009 presidential 
election, should be of no surprise given Afghan history and the existing 
weakness of civic nationalism in the country.  The symbolic importance of 
ethno-regionalism was immediately evident in the candidate’s choice of two 
vice-presidents to balance the country’s ethnic composition, or to appeal to 
different ethnic groups to win more votes. Karzai’s first vice-president was a 
Tajik and his second a Hazara. Being half-Tajik and claiming to represent 
largely Tajik former Jamiat tanzim, Abdullah’s first vice-president was a 
Pashtun and his second was a Hazara. As Abdullah’s second vice-president, 
Dr Ali Cheraq, bluntly put it and exposed Abdullah,   
 
“I was personally chosen to represent the Shia people [Hazaras being 
largely Shia]…some candidates definitely used ethnicity, religion and old 
historical hostilities as a tool and abuse it. For instance, Abdullah in many 
places reminded people that his mother is Tajik and that he is a Jihadi 
and a close friend of Massoud…”115  
 
 
The centrality of ethnicity in the candidates’ campaign was even evident from 
the banalities of the imagery deployed around multi-ethnic Kabul city. Hats 
and turbans were the two main ethnic symbols which were easily exploited. 
For instance, Karzai’s pictures in Dasht-e-Barchi area (predominantly Hazara) 
with a Hazaragi turban, in Khairkhana area (mostly Tajik) were with Karakul, 
                                                        
114 Abdullah, Kabul Stadium, 17 August 2009 
115 Interview 127, 10 September 2009. 
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the hat that he wears most often, and in the Karte Naw area (Predominantly 
Pashtun) were with a Pashtun turban. Similarly, Abdullah wore a Pakol hat to 
appeal to his ethnic-Tajik supporters, a Pashtun Turban to appeal to Pashtuns 
and no hat or Turban to appeal to the wider public. However, despite this 
superficial playing of the national card, the candidates primarily gained 
support from their ethno-regional bases.  
 
Election results at district level (Figure 6.2) illustrates that the narrative reflect 
an ethnic politics understanding of the election results, when compared to the 
ethno-regional geography of the country (See map 2 page 7). Whilst Karzai 
received most of his votes from the Pashtun south, Abdullah won most of his 
votes from the Northern and Western provinces. In the Central Highland 
provinces of Ghazni and Daikundi, the third candidate Bashardost got most of 
the ethnic Hazara vote.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: The Ethno-regional Voting Map at District Level 
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These attempts to play national unity at one moment and ethno-regional cards 
at others may be quite expected. However, ethnic voting does not give us the 
full picture, concealing as much as it is revealing. These figures bring to our 
attention another significant feature of the 2009 presidential election, which 
complimented identity politics as the second key characteristic: the clientelistic 
bargains struck to bring out the vote. In the West, Ismail Khan, the former 
powerful Jamiat governor of Herat province and a regional network leader, 
who enjoyed sizable organisational and mobilisation power delivered votes for 
Karzai in the West (Figure 6.2). Similarly, in the central and northern regions, 
Karim Khalili and Mohammad Mohaqqeq political networks among the ethnic 
Hazaras and General Rashid Dostum network among the Uzbek population 
respectively won votes for Karzai (Figure 6.2). The role of the main political 
networks and their practices of opportunism and patronage in delivering votes 
are discussed in the next section.  
 
 
III. Political Networks, Opportunities and the State 
 
This section investigates three types of clients which the two main presidential 
candidates, Karzai and Abdullah, used to gain votes. These were: 1) 
individual network leaders; 2) sub-network tribal and community elders; and 3) 
the provincial and district government officials. 
 
Ethno-Regional Network Leaders  
 
The 2009 presidential election suggests that patron-client relations, in its 
present form are closely interlinked with ethnicity. Abdullah and Karzai both 
sought the support of key powerful networks. To reiterate, whilst the 
candidates’ pact-making on the surface might simply look as an elite level re-
negotiation, this is not the case. As outlined in Chapter 3, it is the 
organisational capacity (e.g., money, information, expertise, and legitimacy) of 
the network in mobilising support as well as the role of the leader in 
maintaining network cohesion that ensures network effectiveness. It is the 
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network as a whole that allocates authority to the central node to build 
external links whilst simultaneously managing the network internally. The role 
of the leader is essential but this should not mean that we reduce our analysis 
to just political elites. The failure of the leader to perform this function properly 
could lead to cooptation by a rival in a contested field. This was the case with 
Harakat-i-Islami under the leadership of Sayyed Anwari during the election.116 
Moreover, as argued in Chapter 5, whole network leaders usually prefer to 
deal directly with individual network leaders, in order to maintain and control a 
complicated patron-client playfield. Below, I simply refer to these political 
networks by the name of their leaders.  
 
Karzai was successful in coopting key political networks in his election whole 
network. Pacts were negotiated with the following ethno-regional leaders 
because of their constituency power base: Mohammad Mohaqqeq and Karim 
Khalili, for Hazara vote, General Rashid Dostum for Uzbek vote, Marshal 
Fahim and Ismail Khan for Tajik vote, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada in 
Helmand, Jan Mohammad Khan in Uruzgan, Haji Din Mohammed in 
Nangarhar, and his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai for Pashtun vote in Kandahar. 
Other national and regional powerbrokers like Abdur Rab Sayyaf, Sebqatullah 
Mojaddadi, Abdul-hay Ahadi, Gul Aga Shirzai, and Pir Gilani were recruited 
for their active networks rather than their popular support. For instance, 
Sayyaf, Mojaddadi and Pir Gilani were chosen because of their close 
connection with the country’s conservative circles. Karzai successfully 
enlisted Marshal Fahim (an ethnic Tajik), the most senior former Jamiat 
tanzim commanders to run as his first vice-presidential running mate, thereby 
splitting the so-called United Front whole network. The United Front was a 
loose coalition of several jihadi networks who were sidelined as the result of 
Karzai’s repression policy. Karim Khalili (an ethnic Hazara) remained with 
                                                        
116 An interesting case is that of Harakat-e-Islami political network under the leadership of 
Sayyed Anwari, which splintered into two smaller networks just before the election. While the 
leadership went with Abdullah, key members were co-opted by Karzai. As the spokesperson 
of Harakat, Sayyed Hadi Hadi, explained to the author on 9 September 2009, “If Mr. Kazemi 
and his followers like General Zafar and Amini have left us for their personal interests, that is 
their wish. Our leadership cadre that supports Abdullah is strong. Mr. Anwari who is the 
leader of the group did not see any problem for their departures”. Interview 114, 24 August 
2009.  
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Karzai as his second vice-presidential mate again. Karzai convinced several 
prominent Pashtun powerbrokers like Gul Agha Shirzai not to run (explained 
in Chapter 5). Interestingly, the decision to allow General Dostum, the leader 
of Junbish back in the country from exile in Turkey reveal that Karzai knew he 
could not win as he did not have the constituency power base. Dostum was 
forced to leave for Turkey when tensions between him and Karzai became 
unbearable in 2008.  
 
Abdullah on the other hand struggled to recruit influential powerbrokers into 
his whole network. Both Atta Mohammad Noor, the governor of Balkh, and 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, the spiritual leader of Jamiat tanzim, were the most 
high profile recruit for the ethnic-Tajik vote, the latter did not publicly endorse 
him. His Pashtun, Hazara and Uzbek networks were mainly consisted of 
second-ranking political networks such as Sayyed Hussein Anwari network 
and Qorban Ali Irfani network. Abdullah’s running mates were relatively 
unknown figures who were Humayoun Wasefi (an ethnic Pashtun) and Dr. Ali 
Cheragh (an ethnic Hazara) as first and second vice-presidential running 
mates. The Pashtun network clientele that Abdullah had managed to recruit 
around him including Farahi, Ulumi and Gulobzoy, soon felt alienated and 
excluded. As one Abdullah campaign insider commented:  
 
The Pashtuns felt excluded from the campaign decision-making and 
finance. They were sidelined. When Farahi’s brother was kidnapped I was 
told to write an article through Mandegar. They chose the title ‘Az galla 
dur shavi robuda shavi’ [if you leave the heard, you will get kidnapped’. 
These were short-sighted strategies and interests.117  
 
 
These highly contingent strategic alliances were seen as an effective tool to 
win votes. Karzai’s campaign manager in the Karte Naw district of Kabul city 
stated,  
 
As a campaign manager I can tell you that there were a lot of political 
deals at all levels… this was an effective mechanism to gain votes. Deals 
with political parties, tribal elders, ethnic leaders, and provincial and 
                                                        
117 Interview 45, 16 January 2012.  
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district governors could gain votes for candidates and in this way they 
could win.118  
 
 
Wider ethnographic research showed that such instrumentalism were 
widespread as network leaders demonstrated they were willing to sell votes 
rather than make enduring alliances or, much less, consistently support 
ethno-regional patrons. Although it was beyond the scope of this thesis to 
investigate the role of the economic business sector in the election, it was 
evident from interviews that businesses and economic considerations had 
played an important role in the outcome of alliance-building. In fact interviews 
with politician-turned-businessmen after the election suggested that the main 
reason for Karzai-Fahim grouping in the election was more to do with their 
families’ business connections and interests than political calculations. 
Although this was difficult to substantiate, below statements by an MP in 
Faryab province and the National Coalition member reflects the importance of 
these financial connections.  
 
Marshal Fahim’s brother is one of the biggest traders in petroleum and 
gas in Afghanistan. Sayyaf has grabbed so much land in West Kabul that 
he has made millions. One of Karzai’s brothers is a drug warlord while the 
other is a business partner with Marshal Fahim’s brother in oil, gas, 
logistics, and construction sectors. Khalil’s brother has also made millions 
out of land grabs in West Kabul. So should we be surprised that they are 
in the same team in this election. They literally own most of Afghanistan’s 
resources and foreign aid. They might have spend millions in the election 
campaigns, but once elected they would make billions from government 
contracts.119   
 
As far as I know, both Fahim and Karzai’s brothers negotiated before the 
election. They have financial deals that reach over 100 millions dollars so 
it makes sense if they bring them [Karzai and Fahim] together. Their 
brother’s position they occupy in the government brings them wealth and 
power. The continuation of their economic cooperation is essential for 
them to ensure their families are in power.120   
 
Further research on the political economy of political networks and the state is 
needed to fully consider the role of business in the election and the wider 
                                                        
118 Interview 128, 5 August 2009.  
119 Interview 131, 13 September 2009. 
120 Interview 39, 18 December 2011.  
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statebuilding process. These networks are clearly based on the principle of 
reciprocity. While Karzai had promised ministerial positions, licenses, 
government contracts and development funds as political resources for these 
clients, network patrons like Mohammad Mohaqqeq had publicly demanded 
five ministries for its political network. In addition, Mohaqqeq had demanded 
the power to decide whom to appoint as well as establishing Jaghuri and 
Behsud districts into provinces. Similarly, General Dostum was promised two 
ministries. As an independent female MP from Kabul explained this 
relationship, 
 
In the past these figures used to act like khans (chiefs), now they act like 
mediators between the candidate and the people. They and their halaqat 
[networks] are the key players within the system. They have money and 
resources including coercion power so they will win votes for the 
candidates. While the candidate pays the money to the main 
powerbrokers, they then distribute it down the chain to their cronies. He 
can also choose to appoint ministers as Mojaddadi did by supporting 
Karzai. His son is appointed as the governor of Kabul city. The same, 
Mohaqqeq is demanding four ministries and Dostum two.121 
 
 
The demands of Qorban Ali Irfani, the leader of the Wahdat-e-Islami Millet 
political network who allied with Abdullah, are a good illustration of the kinds 
of requests, which were made. He summarised his terms publicly and as 
follows, 
 
“Twenty per cent of the Hazara’s political, economic, social and cultural 
rights within the state, the construction of Central Highlands’ roads from 
Kabul to Herat, resolving justly the conflict between the Kuchi and 
Hazaras, and upgrading two districts [in Central regions] into province.122  
 
 
These patronage and bargain practices were seen as mutually beneficial for 
both clients and patrons. The ethno-regional patronage relations elicited by 
the election have extensive ramifications not just for the nature of governance 
in Afghanistan but the politico-administrative shape of the state itself. This 
raises questions of statebuilding which will be returned to in the conclusion of 
this thesis.  
                                                        
121 Interview 115, 13 September 2009 
122 Observation, Irfani Speech in Kabul, 5 August 2009 
 174 
 
These ethno-regional network pacts were ultimately carried out through local 
clients. District level election results confirm the important role these 
powerbrokers played in shifting votes, particularly in favour of Karzai. 
However, as the same data (figure 6.2) also reveals their power as individual 
network leaders were neither automatic nor consistent. While Dostum was 
quite successful in Jawzjan he was not in Faryab province. Mohaqqeq and 
Khalili did well in Bamiyan and Wardak (Behsud District); however, in 
Daikundi and Ghazni they could not deliver as Bashardost won most of the 
Hazara vote. Similarly, Marshal Fahim could not get the ethnic-Tajik vote out 
in his own hometown, Panjshir, and neighbouring Parwan provinces for 
Karzai. Given these uncertainties it was no wonder that candidates hedged 
their bets by striking bargains far and wide. The decision to allow Dostum to 
return from exile and his ability to deliver votes, at least in certain provinces, 
was crucial for Karzai. As one female MP from Jawzjan province put it, “I can 
say that Dostum’s arrival a day before the election had a major impact on his 
supporters to vote for Karzai. Most Uzbeks were unhappy with Karzai, yet, 
because he [Dostum] announced his support most Uzbeks followed. At least 
this was the case in Jawzjan.”123  Karzai’s senior advisor also confirms this, 
noting that, “Dostum’s call did turn the tide for Mr. Karzai.”124  
 
At local levels, client-networks such as Dostum publicly campaigned for their 
patron-candidates. In their active campaigning they manipulated the 
appropriate cultural symbols as well as articulating and advancing their ethno-
regional groups’ collective aspirations, as they themselves defined them. 
Political leaders travelled widely across their regions to gather support in 
person. The day Dostum landed in his stronghold of Jawzjan province, he 
declared, “If you like me or not, this is your own personal choice. But when 
you come to Junbish, then support its decisions and its Muamela (political 
dealings). Lets stay united and do not let others exploit your sacrifices and 
your bloodsheds. Let us stay with Hamid Karzai; and I, as your leader ask you 
                                                        
123 Interview 111, 8 September 2009.  
124 Interview 132, 10 October 2009. 
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to come together and make sure that Hamid Karzai wins in the first round.125” 
Similarly, Mohaqqeq told his supporters in Daikundi province, “if I knew 
among these 39 candidates a better one I would have identified and told you 
to vote accordingly, my millet (nation). I have two demands from you, first your 
full participation in the election and second to vote for Karzai.126”  
 
Acting as a mediator or a campaign agent of the leading presidential 
candidates, political networks provided their own staff and resources to 
mobilise electorates. They used their own extended organisational patronage 
network at province, district and village level during the campaign. 
Campaigning usually involved assembling large gatherings, often with lunch 
and transport costs provided, private face-to-face meetings, organising rallies, 
distributing campaign materials, offering gifts like headscarf to women or 
money to a local mosque, and plastering posters around. For instance, the 
head of Cultural Affairs of Harakat-e-Islami under the leadership of Sayyed 
Kazemi described its network’s role as follows, 
 
“We use our political network for a candidate by recruiting people and 
trying to mobilise support through establishing campaign headquarters in 
different provinces and districts. Currently, we are using our office as a 
campaign venue for Karzai both in Kabul and in the provinces. We have 
twenty offices in different provinces.”127  
 
 
According to Karzai’s Deputy Campaign Manager, “while the central office 
was providing them with financial needs, it was left to each group to draw their 
own strategy and coordinate their efforts in implementing actions.” 128  The 
motivation for Karzai’s deputy campaign manager in West Kabul illustrates the 
extent of bargaining and exchange down the chain. She explained: “my 
motivation to join was political networking as well as achieving a higher career 
position. I was recruited through Modabber’s party [Karzai’s current head of 
Office of Administrative Affairs and the leader of Ensejam-e-Millie]…. If I was 
                                                        
125 Obtained from local media  
126 Obtained from local media 
127 Interview 126, 6 September 2009.  
128 Interview 123, 2 September 2009. 
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not given money I would not have helped with Karzai’s campaign.”129 After the 
election she complained bitterly that the client-network leader (Modabber) had 
not upheld his promise of either appointing her as the governor of Ghor 
province or giving her a senior position in the Afghan Embassy in Iran, which 
she was promised. Such promises are widespread, as many of the author’s 
friends have fallen in the same trap. This reveals the uncertainty and 
temporary nature of some of these promises. It shows how inconsistent these 
patron-client linkages were at the time of the election.  
 
In addition to their informal patronage network, political networks were also 
able to utilise other forms of resources that they had in their possessions. This 
included using TV and radio stations under their control to mobilise their 
supporters and broadcast a negative image of opposing contenders. Some of 
the most powerful networks have their own TV and radio stations including 
Khalili, Mohaqqeq, Dostum and Sayyaf. As Bashardost, the third-place 
presidential contester assertively commented, “before they had a 
Kalashnikov, and now they have a TV”. He further complained: “One sentence 
in Khalil’s TV killed my campaign in Bamiyan [province] broadcasting that I 
had said in my campaign in the South that I am not one of those that 
participated in the atrocities of Kabul.”130 Abdullah could rely on Noorin and 
Noor TV channels which are closely linked with the former Jamiat tanzim. 
Newspapers like Mandegar and Nokhost supported and advocated Abdullah.  
 
The majority of the electorate’s decision to follow their ethno-regional network 
leaders suggests that they are easily prone to identity manipulation.  
However, this solidarity emerges both from the structure and composition of 
Afghan society and the legacy of decades of violent political conflict. Of 
course, most of the population has no access to public information. According 
to the 2005 Millennium Development Goals report for Afghanistan an 
estimated 90 per cent of women and 63 per cent of men in rural areas of 
Afghanistan, where the large majority live, are illiterate. However, as argued 
by Scott (1969), in a condition where physical security, status, and wealth are 
                                                        
129 Interview 123, 2 September 2009. 
130 Interview 121, 27 August 2009. 
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precarious, subordinates seek to substitute this by attaching themselves to 
ethnic elites, warlords and powerful power brokers who are capable of 
providing protection and even advancement. These patron-client linkages 
provide a “personal security mechanism”. 
 
Local Communities Opportunism and Business 
 
 
Network leaders particularly provided powerful linkages for network 
construction and political organisation; but this does not explain the whole 
picture. There were those local patrons, solidarity group (Qawm) elders and 
village chiefs or even businessmen who used their community support to 
bargain with the main candidates. Ethnographic research at the main 
candidates’ Kabul campaign offices revealed that local leaders were regularly 
approaching different candidates offering their support in exchange for 
resources, development aid and even money, partially side-lining the ethno-
regional individual network ties. Martine Van Bijlert found similar observation 
in her study of the election, as she noted, “communities, parties and solidarity 
groups go through several rounds of internal consultation and negotiation to 
make up their mind – in a process of communal decision making – about 
whom they will align themselves to. Representatives are sent to sound out the 
various candidates in search of the best alliance or the best deal in exchange 
for the votes on offer” (2009: 13).  
 
In the course of the ethnographic fieldwork during the election, local villagers, 
tribal representatives, and various professional associations from the main 
cities like shopkeepers’ association, carpet association, writers and artists 
associations, and youth associations would regularly visit each candidates 
offering blocks of votes and in return, asking for various demands like a new 
stadium, a social club or other types of financial support. For instance in one 
of the meetings a female group claimed: ”we represent Dasht-e-Barchi 
women. We have 300 voting cards…we will continue [to work for] your 
campaign but we need your support [referring to financial support.” 131  In 
                                                        
131 A group of twenty women at Abdullah’s Shar-e-Naw campaign headquarter. 15 August 
2009.  
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another occasion a group of boxers offered support in providing security in the 
Election Day if the candidate financially contributed towards building their 
boxing club. Such assertions were common by various groups. It is difficult to 
confirm whether such payments would have been made, but the fact that 
various groups would even consider seeking bargains openly, indicate the 
degree to which such opportunistic practices were widespread.  
 
Ethnographic fieldwork also uncovered that this is a two-sided bargaining 
process. While local communities were making their assessment of the main 
candidates as suggested, candidates were also making their calculation as to 
how and whom to seek support from. Candidates would first turn to their 
extended kin and family network for support. Once a campaign manager told 
the author that the main reason for his decision to assist the candidate’s 
campaign, despite knowing that he would not win, was because he was a 
relative to whom he could not say no. In another case during the 2010 
parliamentary election, the representatives of a district in Ghazni told the 
author that they decided not to vote for a female candidate who was from their 
districts because she was married to somebody in another district. This sense 
of qawm-based loyalty, obligation and reciprocity is stronger at the local level. 
Beyond this level, candidates sought the support of key political networks that 
had an extensive organisational capacity to win the backing of the key local 
leaders (e.g., tribal leader, mullahs, local businessmen, arbabs, village elders 
and etc) for the candidates. From a political-cultural perspective, two main 
candidates acted more like a traditional Khan who had to provide hospitality 
and show generosity in distributing funds and resources. Entertaining guests, 
providing meals and hosting regular parties were a key component of election 
campaigns.  
 
With sudden increase in international aid and an occasion for deal-making 
with increasing number of patrons (both candidates and network leaders) 
available, opportunistic practices also intensified. The following quotes reveal 
the extent of opportunism generated at election time, which also confirms the 
author’s observations. The former is from Abdullah’s senior campaign officer, 
the second from an influential independent MP and the latter from the director 
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of Killid Radio, one of the most listened radio station in Afghanistan, which 
had significant coverage of election campaigns.  
 
One hand operates over another [Dest balaye dest kar mekona – an 
Afghan proverb].  From the top to the bottom there is opportunity to 
make money. Most of these campaigners were there, not to make 
Abdullah win but to make money.  It’s like a business. Abdullah gets 
money from foreign countries, then he distributes it to his friends and 
cronies and they distribute it to others. Even the poor benefit…Everyday 
1,000 people come here. I think they are all thieves and unemployed 
people who come from all provinces and their aim is to get Abdullah’s 
money. I do not think any of them do any campaigning once they get the 
money.132 
 
For some, the election provided the best opportunity to make money. 
Some rented a small place or a political party used its office as a 
campaign-office claiming to have spent so much money. Their campaign 
was simple: gathering people at an especial venue, in some cases 
paying them to attend or offering them food. Some of my own colleagues 
have received cars, money and gifts for their service.133  
 
Of course there were some opportunist who wanted to make money out 
of these campaigns telling candidates that they have established a 
campaign headquarters in their districts or that they have distributed so 
and so many posters and leaflets, making fake invoices and receipts. 
Our reporters made a number of interesting observations. They were 
seeing the same person at one candidate campaign office one day and 
at another candidate’s office the next day.  These campaigns had a real 
business feeling to it.134 
 
 
It seems that both patrons and clients felt the need to hedge their bets whilst 
no one was willing to assume support based on ethnic or tribal solidarity.  The 
author observed representatives openly exchanging blocks of votes for up to 
2,000 USD.  To complete such a transaction local client-elites would be 
required to bring in a village’s or a community’s election cards. There were 
many cases of individuals from remote villages coming to Kabul headquarters 
providing dubious receipts and demanding reimbursement. One man showed 
a receipt saying “I have been in Kabul for six days. I have established several 
campaigns in different districts of Herat and I have spent 10,000 USD”. These 
observations were widely noted by many Afghan and international news 
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134 Author interview with Najiba Ayubi, Kabul, 14 September 2009.   
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outlets including The Guardian.135 Bijlert (2009) in her study of the election 
has highlighted similar opportunistic practices.  
 
In this system of personal gain, it seems that everyone - from powerbroker to 
community and tribal elders, to village elders and businessmen- were 
attempting to exaggerate the size of their support, as well as the level of 
control they have over it, in order to elevate their own standing and increase 
the size of their payment. In many places campaign managers, power brokers 
and smaller community agents were giving people money to attend rallies to 
show the patron a high level of support, so to get more money and reward for 
their contribution. It has been credibly reported that when Mohaqqeq went to 
Daikundi, the local Tanzim members were paying people up to 3,000 
Afghanis, providing transport and arranging lunch so to increase attendance 
in order to show sizeable support for the leader and to show that they have 
been doing their job accordingly. 136  In keeping with Bijlert’s (2009: 14) 
findings, people were often invited to gatherings and conferences without 
knowing why they were there, simply to inflate the number of participants.  
These ethnographic observations illustrate the opportunism and uncertainty 
which determined voter support for candidates. Even local networks were 
complex and multi-layered, allowing individuals and groups to break from their 
patrons and sell electoral promises on the open market.  
 
 
State Patron-Client Networks 
 
 
The third venue where the presidential candidates contested for clients was 
the state networks of provincial and district governors and officials.  These 
networks are not mutually exclusive of the informal networks discussed above 
but overlap with them at certain moments. As argued in the previous chapter, 
in the post-2001 period, President Karzai has been able to appoint not only 
the provincial and district governors but also district and provincial chiefs 
                                                        
135 The Guardian, New Evidence of Widespread Fraud in Afghanistan election uncovered, 
Saturday 19 September 2009, (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/18/afghanistan-
election-fraud-evidence) 
136 Interview with a number of key informants from Daikundi province in Kabul.   
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through his network of ministers within the government. As shown in Chapter 
5, the Karzai network has benefitted from this opportunity where they have 
continuously awarded their allies and friends in state position at all levels of 
governance. These regime-state networks pay off most at times of high 
contestation, such as the election. A senior official at the Independent 
Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) explained to the author how 
provincial and district governors and police chiefs- many of them members of 
ethno-regional networks– were called to Kabul to reaffirm their allegiance and 
were even instructed on what measures to take.   
 
Before the election there were a lot of meetings where most of the 
provincial and district officials were asked to come to Kabul to discuss the 
election. This was just a pretext. In reality, Asadullah Khalid and Jelani 
Popal, in coordination with Sadeq Modabber, were ensuring that these 
officials are loyal to the President. Those whose loyalty could not be 
guaranteed would be persuaded by offering positions for their relatives or 
tribes and even threatened. I had many officials, whose loyalty was to 
Abdullah, complaining to me that their staff salary has been stopped just 
before the election deliberately or that they have been pressured or even 
threatened.137  
 
 
These three key network nodes, Asadullah Khalid, the Minister for Tribal and 
Border Affairs, Jelani Popal, the Director of IDLG, and Sadeq Modabber, 
Director of Office of Administrative Affairs and Council of Ministers, played a 
significant role in coordinating efforts at state level. Khalid had already 
established a strong network in the South and Southeast based on his tenure 
as governor in Ghazni and Kandahar, which was controversial because he 
ran his own prison and rendition system. He is well known for his intimidation 
in the region (discussed below). The only two governors that openly declared 
their support for Abdullah were General Atta, the governor of Balkh, and Haji 
Bahlol, the governor of Panjshir. Examples and allegations against 
government officials were widespread which suggests the important role of 
coercion-based patronage and subsequent fraud that followed for the re-
election of Karzai in 2009, as the two incidents below reveal.  
 
                                                        
137 Interview 67 (13 March 2012) & Interview 68 (10 March 2012).  
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If he [Karzai] received votes in some districts of Faryab it is because he 
mobilised his cronies, mainly the provincial and district governors and 
police chiefs to coerce people to vote for him. For instance, the governor of 
Qormach district [Faryab province] rigged twenty thousand votes for Karzai 
by forcing people to vote for him. He [Karzai] has got votes from places and 
districts that people could not vote because of insecurity and the Taliban 
threat. He received votes from places that he cannot even visit, places 
where they would shoot his shadow.138  
 
 
A reporter from Arman newspaper showed the author video footages of 
intimidation by a local district police in Wardak province where ballot stuffing 
was widespread in favour of Karzai. When the reporter inquired the district 
police chief, Mr Halim Fadai, he was intimidated for visiting the district without 
the Chief’s permission. However, when he interviewed the local people, they 
informed him that Janan was following instructions from the police chief.139 
Bijlert (2009:16-17) found that local election staffs were often intimidated in 
cooperating with the local officials who rig votes for their patrons. The price of 
non-cooperation was high (e.g., detention, and even death) especially in the 
rural areas where it is more difficult to be anonymous and where district police 
networks, often linked to the local and central administration, tend to be the 
main channel of power and influence. Bijlert (2009:16), in her report, 
describes how people in the South were checked at bus stands and city 
entrances to verify whether they were carrying voter cards so that they could 
vote for Karzai. Those who did not have cards were reportedly fined’ by the 
local militiamen. Before the election, tribal leaders were continuously 
reminded that if they did not vote for the government, they would be excluded 
from the local government: meaning jobs, aid money and privileges. 
According to a senior Kandahar Independent Human Rights Commissioner, 
the two main tribes in Helmand Province, the Noorzai and Achekzai, were 
threatened by Asadullah Khalid that “if they did not vote for Karzai [he] would 
appoint all the chiefs and governor from that other tribe.140” 
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These examples illustrate that the state provided a framework for inter-
network conflict that ultimately ensured Karzai possessed an overwhelming 
advantage in terms of coercive and cooptive resources in the election 
campaign and overall votes. The multi-dimensional account of the role of 
political networks and identity politics sheds new light on both the election and 
post-election bargaining. The patronage system practiced during the election, 
when clients often try to exaggerate the size of their vote bank, suggests a 
more nuanced explanation to the one often provided in the media that Karzai 
and his network were largely responsible for the gravity of fraud and vote-
rigging committed. Peter Galbraith has called this “wholesome fraud”. 141  
Having made unrealistic claims regarding the clusters of votes, Karzai’s 
clients were bound to manipulate the results in order to deliver on their 
promises. This is an additional explanation for the nature of the fraud at all 
levels, especially in the South and South East, to the one offered in which 
Karzai and his team systematically rigging votes at all levels.  Electoral ethno-
politics were neither exclusively “top-down” nor “bottom-up”; neither entirely 
cultural nor exclusively instrumental. They were institutional, instrumental and 
contingent, that is if bargains were made of the networked relations between 
candidate-patrons and client-networks but they were often both immediately 
self-serving and subject to non-compliance. Indeed impossible promises were 
made by both patrons and clients.  In the 2009 presidential election the Karzai 
network seemed to have offered to sell the state several times over with 
promises of posts, contracts and aid which it may never be able to deliver.  
Therefore, Karzai was left in a difficult position where broken promises had to 
be managed. The rejection of 70% of his cabinet nominees in early January 
2010 was reported as a blow to his personal power and authority.  However, a 
careful analysis shows otherwise. On the one hand, he met promises made to 
his clients by appointing their nominees in second-ranking cabinet positions; 
on the other hand, he made no effort in making sure they were approved by 
Parliament.  Many powerful powerbrokers, including once-powerful individuals 
such as Ismail Khan (former Herat Governor and former Minister of Energy) 
were rejected. On the other hand, key client allies, largely southern Pashtuns 
                                                        
141 Peter Galbriath Radio Interview with On Point Radio, 1st October 2001, http, 
p.//www.onpointradio.org/2009/10/peter-galbraith-on-afghan-election-fraud 
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were appointed to key ministries including Defence (Rahim Wardak), Interior 
(Hanif Atmar), Finance (Omar Zakhilwal), Foreign (Zalmay Rasul), Economy 
(Hadi Arghandival), Education (Farooq Wardak).  With Karzai’s main 
supporters in powerful government positions, he has further expanded his 
network through an effective patron-client system. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
The 2009 presidential election represent different aspects of the Afghan 
political life in post-2001 international intervention and statebuilding. During 
the election, the candidates’ claims of national unity and progress were belied 
by implicit and, at times, explicit sub-texts of ethno-regional division and 
contest. In the discursive battle that ensued, competing political networks 
manipulated these divisions, as candidate-patrons had made pacts with 
ethno-regional network-clients to secure block votes. In this sense, ethnic and 
tribal divisions reflected part of the inter-network competition for the state 
whilst obscuring the fluid and non-ethnic aspects of elite networks. Therefore, 
these in themselves do not provide a full account of the power dynamics of 
political network as well as the reasons for corruption in the poll. As was 
shown, opportunistic local elites and groups also took advantage of the 
uncertainty generated by high-levels of inter-network contestation and low 
levels of institutionalisation to strike deals, many of which may never be 
honoured and which may have been fanciful from the outset. Yet the 
combination of ethno-regionalism and opportunism are still not adequate to 
fully explain the conduct of the election and why the results, whilst fraudulent, 
were ultimately accepted.  The internationally sponsored state mattered as it 
provides a framework for inter-network competition and endows the political 
networks, which controls its various parts with symbolic and material 
resources. The political networks, and the regime they together represent, in 
turn constitute the state itself.  
 
The 2009 presidential election exposed the tensions and divergence of 
interests among the international community. The resignation of Peter 
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Galbriath, the deputy to UNAMA chief, Kai Eide, over how to handle fraud 
uncovered the confusing nature of international statebuilding which 
questioning its core objectives of democratisation in Afghanistan. The failure 
of international donors, especially the UN to highlight some of the 
shortcomings such as the closure of ‘ghost stations’, more than 1,500 stations 
mainly in the South and South East, led to ‘manufacturing of votes’ as put by 
Galbriath.142  Afghanistan’s 2009 elections showed that elections ultimately 
serve the interests of political networks, further institutionalising network 
practices of resource bargaining, opportunism, back door deal-making and 
identity politics in post-2001 Afghanistan, rather than it achieving the liberal 
peace goal of democratisation. The election and its widespread fraud 
essentially undermined the integrity of the liberal peace international support 
and bred doubt and scepticism among the Afghan people about the future of 
the country. The next chapter further highlights the power dynamics of political 
networks in post-2001 international statebuilding by studying the political 
economy of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower house).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
142 ibid 
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Chapter 7: The Power Dynamics of Political Networks in the Wolesi  
                   Jirga: A Case Study of the 2010-2011 Special Court Crisis 
 
Introduction  
 
The Constitutional Loya Jirga (ground council) which was convened in mid-
December 2003, agreed on a bicameral parliamentary system with two 
separate chambers: a 249-member elected lower house (Wolesi Jirga, the 
House of People) and an indirectly elected and appointed 102-member upper 
house (Meshrano Jirga, the House of Elders). The Constitution also gave the 
Wolesi Jirga the oversight powers including the right to impeach ministers and 
approve cabinet appointments. The first legislative election in post-2001 
international statebuilding took place on 18 September 2005 to elect the 
representatives of the Wolesi Jirga. Once established, international donors 
provided financial funds and technical support to strengthen the capacity of 
the newly established parliament and parliamentarians. For instance, the 
USAID awarded one of its biggest programmes, the ‘Afghanistan 
Parliamentary Assistant Project’ (APAP) to State University of New York/ 
Centre for International Development to design legislative programs and put in 
place processes and procedures for a representative and functioning 
parliamentary institution. The APAP provided technical assistance in outreach 
efforts, communications and information technology use as well as advising 
MPs on legislative reform and national budget review. The UNDP ‘Support for 
the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature’ (SEAL) project offered 
assistance to develop both the technical and political skills of the members 
and the staff within the Parliament. However, as the political economy of the 
Wolesi Jirga below highlights, the externally supported (or often externally-
imposed) structures have failed to recognise that such grand projects in 
modernisation are always subverted as much as they are implemented (Scott 
1990, 1998). This subversion has taken place right under the nose of 
international statebuilding. 
 
Understanding the political economy of the Wolesi Jirga over the last eight 
years is critical to our analysis of the power dynamics of political networks and 
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the nature of statehood in post-2001 international statebuilding. The Wolesi 
Jirga provides another excellent forum in which to observe network dynamics 
in action. In post-2001 period, it has functioned as an excellent ‘assembling 
point’ for political networks and their clientele outside the state administration, 
through which they attempt to expand their power and interest. It has become 
a strategic ‘network-building arena’ connecting the centre with the periphery- 
linking state officials, network leaders, local powerbrokers, jihadi 
commanders, influential community leaders, and licit and illicit commercial 
networks at local, national and international levels. As the empirical evidence 
below suggests, it provides protection, security and employment for political 
networks and their key members. Since 2005 key political network leaders 
such as Mohammad Mohaqqeq (former Minister of Planning and a former 
northern commander of Hizb-i-Wahdat), Yunos Qanuni (former Minister of 
Interior and former commander of Jamiat-i-Islami), and Haji Zahir Qadir 
(leader of the powerful Jabbarkhel Ghilzai sub-tribe) who were effectively 
purged by Karzai’s repression policies have found protection in the new 
House. Andrew Wilder, in his paper for the Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit (AREU), found that approximately 133 of the 249 members of 
the newly formed house in 2005 had fought in the jihad, and about 113 
belonged to or were affiliated with the former jihadi political networks (2011:6). 
He also found that they were better organised and better resourced than the 
newly formed liberally inclined parties. Of these, roughly 40 commanders 
were associated with armed groups, 24 members belonged to different 
criminal gangs, 17 were associated with drug trafficking, and 19 faced serious 
allegations of war crimes and human rights violations (Wilder 2005:6). 
According to Hussaini and Faizi (2010) report, since 2010, the number of MPs 
with background in Jihad, known as ‘Jihadis’, has further increased in the 
second Wolesi Jirga, which suggests a rise in the Jihadi political networks’ 
influence in the Afghan Wolesi Jirga. 
 
The 2010 parliamentary election result triggered a prolonged crisis in the 
Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) which came to be known as the Special Court 
(SC) crisis. The 2010-2011 SC crisis offers an excellent window to explore the 
political economy of the Wolesi Jirga and subsequently the wider context of 
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the continued power dynamics between rival political networks in post-2001 
Afghanistan and their impacts on statehood. The SC crisis set into motion a 
fierce battle between competing political networks within and beyond the 
Wolesi Jirga. The conflict was between two opposing camps, namely 
President Karzai’s network and the ad hoc Support for Rule of Law (SRL) 
coalition led by Zahir Qadir. The establishment of the SC and its verdict to 
disqualify 62 sitting MPs (one-fourth of the Wolesi Jirga) for fraud was seen by 
many analysts as a direct attempt by Karzai and his network clientele in the 
judiciary and the executive to exert their influence in the legislature. The SRL, 
a coalition of several smaller anti-Karzai political networks, was formed in the 
Wolesi Jirga against these attempts. It succeeded in declaring the court 
illegal, passed a vote of no confidence for the Attorney General and the 
Supreme Court judges and, at one point proposed the impeachment of the 
President. The crisis ended a year later when the two camps reached a 
compromise, in which just 9 of the 62 sitting MPs were replaced.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to use the 2010-2011 Special Court crisis to shed 
further light on the nature of statehood in the post-2001 international 
intervention and statebuilding period. I begin by providing a descriptive 
background to the 2010-2011 Special Court crisis and the events surrounding 
it. The following two sections explore the opportunistic practices of bargaining, 
exchange and the consequent instrumentalisation of identities as the key 
aspects of political network dynamics. In the final section, this chapter 
suggests that the historically grounded “network state” is being consolidated 
with the legitimacy granted by internationally sponsored statebuilding. This 
chapter is based on the author’s four-month ethnographic fieldwork inside the 
Wolesi Jirga between June 2011 and October 2011. The observation was 
complimented with more than forty interviews with key political informants.  
 
 
II. The Special Court Crisis: A Background 
 
 
The final result of the 18th September 2010 parliamentary election was a 
major setback for the Karzai political network. Some of Karzai’s network 
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nodes in the South, where Karzai’s support was considered high, were either 
unable to win votes or were disqualified by the Independent Electoral 
Complaints Commission, including his first cousin Hishmat Karzai in 
Kandahar. In addition, not a single Pashtun candidate from the Ghazni 
province was elected because of the low turnout amongst the Pashtun 
population. 143  Fraud, vote rigging and insecurity further reduced Karzai 
network’s vote bank. The Independent Electoral Complaints Commission 
(IECC), the organisation responsible for election complaints, received more 
than 3,000 complaints with significantly higher levels of ballot stuffing, voter 
fraud, collective voting and intimidation in the Pashtun South (Bijlert 2011b). 
Insecurity and Taliban threats meant that one-forth of polling stations in the 
South and South East, where Karzai’s political network influence is 
considered to be greater, were closed (Bijlert 2011b). The IEC ultimately 
disqualified 1.5 million ballots, an estimated quarter of the total votes and 
disqualified 27 winning candidates for electoral fraud- many of them being 
part of Karzai’s political bases (Bijlert 2011b). 
 
 
Immediately after the announcement of the election results, the Attorney 
General’s Office (AGO) and Supreme Court- (the head of both organisations 
being members of the Karzai network) - demanded a recount and accused the 
Independent Complaints Commissions of being bias. The Director of Asset 
Registration at the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption characterised 
to the author the role of the Attorney General in Karzai’s government as a 
“whip” that the Karzai regime uses “whenever the government wants to punish 
somebody.”144 At the same time, Karzai ordered the IEC to hold a new round 
of elections in Ghazni province to balance the ethnic composition of the 
province. In Ghazni, with overwhelming voter participation, the Hazara-ethnic 
candidates had won the eleven quota seats for the province; further reducing 
Karzai’s influence in the South. Many analysts considered this as an attempt 
by Karzai and his clientele to change the election outcome in their favour. In 
                                                        
143 In 9 of the 19 districts in Ghazni, no votes were cast at all. See 2010 Election: Ghazni’s 
Election Drama - It’s the System (amended) (Afghanistan Analyst Network).  http://aan-
afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1361 
144 Interview 29, 24 August 2011.  
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retaliation, the IEC certified the final election results on the 1st of December 
2010, with the United Nations and other international donors promptly 
accepting them. Interviews with a number of IEC staff in Kabul uncovered that 
the IEC’s decision was motivated by international donor support.145 There 
were also accusations that the IEC head, Fazal Ahmad Manavi had some 
links with the opposition, however, this is difficult to verify. The Attorney 
General’s Office issued an arrest warrant for three IEC staff, one of whom 
was a high-ranking IEC official, accusing them of orchestrating mass fraud 
(Ober 2011). With advice from the Supreme Court, Karzai issued a decree to 
set up the Special Court (SC) to re-investigate IEC’s list of disqualified 
candidates and other fraud cases. Eventually on 26 January 2011, under 
intense pressure from international donors and disgruntled candidates (both 
those who won seats and those protesting), Karzai made a deal with the 
elected members to promptly inaugurate Parliament, if in return, the MPs 
agreed that the SC could implement any criminal cases identified by the 
court.146  
 
Six months later, the crisis resurfaced when the SC issued it’s verdict on 23 
June 2011 to disqualify 62 sitting MPs, one-quarter of the Wolesi Jirga. 
Karzai’s blatant attempt to implement the SC’s verdict was so alarming that 
Mohammed Mohaqqeq, the leader of one of the main political networks, 
described it as “an alarming danger” which went too far in “undermining all the 
Reshta [connections] built over the last ten years.” 147  Two days later, in 
response, the Wolesi Jirga passed a resolution denouncing the creation of the 
SC as illegal. This was followed by a vote of no confidence against the 
Attorney General’s Office and the Chief Supreme Court judges. To coordinate 
efforts, an ad hoc Support for Rule of Law (SRL) coalition was established. At 
one point, MPs even discussed the possibility of impeaching the President. 
After two months of political manoeuvring, discussed below, and failing to 
generate enough support through deal-making and exchange, Karzai and his 
team backed down, thus issuing a decree giving the IEC the final authority to 
                                                        
145 Interview 46, 8 Jan 2012.  
146 The New York Times, “Karzai Agreed to Seat New Parliament”, 22 Jan 2011 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/world/asia/23afghan.html?pagewanted=all) 
147 Speech in the House, Observation on 25 June 2011.  
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resolve the crisis. Ten days later, in a compromise, the IEC announced that 
only 9 of the 62 MPs should be disqualified (Bijlert 2011b). The head of IEC, 
Fazal Ahmad Manavi, in his interview with the BBC Persian confirmed that he 
was under a lot of pressure from circles within the government to take this 
decision: “This decision was taken on the basis of some Faysalahaye Siyasi 
(political agreements).” 148  The nine disqualified MPs were either relatively 
unknown or seemed to have lacked sufficiently strong backing from powerful 
political networks, whereas, the new MPs seemed to have had the necessary 
connections (Bijlert 2011c). At least four of them were former Jihadi 
commanders with links to powerful individual network powerbrokers.149 On 3 
September 2011, with the presence of heavily armed police and army, the 9 
new MPs were sworn in whilst the opposition SRL coalition members were 
imprisoned in their offices, unable to enter the parliament building. The SRL 
coalition leader, Zahir Qadir, characterised it a “coup d’état” against 
parliament.150 The next section seeks to identify some of the main types of 
clients which both the Karzai and SRL networks relied on in building an 
expansive whole network around the crisis.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1: The Timetable of Events 
18 Sept 2010 Parliamentary Election was held.  
24 Nov 2010 IEC announced the results for 34 provinces except Ghazni. 1.5 
million votes were disqualified and 27 candidates were 
disqualified.  
24 Nov 2010 Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and Supreme Court demanded 
recount and issued arrest warrants for three IEC staff. 
1 Dec 2010 In retaliation, IEC certified final election results. 
21 Dec 2010 Karzai issues a decree forcing the creation of a Special Court.  
26 Jan 2011 Karzai agreed to inaugurate the Wolesi Jirga, if in return, MPs 
allow the SC to prosecute those who committed fraud.   
23 June 2011 SC issued its verdict disqualifying 62 sitting MPs. 
                                                        
148 BBC Persian, 14 August 2011, 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/afghanistan/2011/08/110814_k01_manawi_bbc_iv.shtml) 
149 The new MPs were Hamidullah Tokhi, the former Zabul governor and a former Hizb-i-
Islami commander in Gereshk; Moallem Mirwali from Helmand who is close to the Attorney 
General Aloko; Guli Pahlawan former rival of General Dostum in Faryab; and Ahmad Khan, 
the notorious former Junbish tanzim commander and former governor of Samangan.   
150 Interview 125, 10 September 2011.  
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25 June 2011 MPs passed a vote of no confidence against AGO and Supreme 
Court Judges. 
5 July 2011 MPs proposed to impeach the President. 
10 Aug 2011 Karzai backed down and issued a decree forcing the IEC to have 
the final say. 
21 August 2011 IEC announced the list of 9 MPs to be replaced. 
3 September 
2011 
The new 9 MPs were forcibly sworn in. The opposition called it a 
coup.  
 
 
 
III. The Power Dynamics of Competing Political Networks  
 
 
The Karzai Whole Network  
 
 
Having failed to secure a substantial gain in the parliamentary election, the 
Karzai network were quick to activate their key nodes such as ministers, 
governors, and ethno-regional powerbrokers to re-assemble an ad hoc 
political network around the crisis to strengthen their position. Ethnographic 
fieldwork and interviews with dozens of key informants reveal an interesting 
picture about how Karzai’s network operated around a number of influential 
state officials. These were Humayoun Azizi, the minister for Parliamentary 
Affairs, Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, the minister of Finance, Sadeq Modabber, the 
head of the Office of Administrative Affairs (Karzai’s Cabinet Office), 
Rahmatullah Nabil, the then Director of National Directorate of Security, and 
Asadullah Khalid, the minister for Border, Tribal, and Ethnic Affairs. By 
utilising state resources, including its coercive power and financial wealth, the 
Karzai network negotiated deals and exchanges to co-opt MPs. Although 
difficult to substantiate and fully confirm, the picture drawn suggests that 
during the crisis the minister for Parliamentary Affairs functioned as a “liaison 
officer” and made deals inside Parliament. The finance minister sanctioned 
the extra patronage payment to the head of the Office of Administrative 
Affairs, who then distributed the bargained sum to the co-opted network 
leaders; the Attorney General Office and Supreme Court judges acted as the 
“executioners”.  During the parliamentary sessions man MPs were open about 
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highlighting how this procedure was in play, summarised below by statements 
from a Ghazni and a Samangani MP. 
 
Intimidation was evident at all levels. If an MP was not ready to accept 
certain privileges then he or she was threatened by the Special Court and 
the Attorney General Office that they would be among the disqualified 
MPs. On the one hand, Karzai invite us to the Arg [palace] in an attempt 
to bribe us, and when we refuse, his ministers try to intimidate us.151 
 
The Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs has been lobbying hard in 
Parliament in favour of the executive branch. He acts as a facilitator while 
the Attorney General Office played the role of the prosecutor. Some of my 
colleagues who had relatives within the administration were warned if they 
did not support the Karzai team their family members would risk losing 
their position.152 
 
The Minister for Parliamentary Affairs has been providing some MPs with 
bodyguards and houses. Some of this money has been allocated to them 
through the Ministry and the Estekhabarat [National Security Directorate] 
towards their guesthouse expenses, bodyguards, salaries and others. In 
provinces like Kandahar and Helmand, Khalid has been making Muamela 
[deals] with those that he can, whilst threatening others. I still receive calls 
from the Palace by Khurram [Karzai’s Chief of Staff] threatening that they 
would do this and that to my family and I.153  
 
 
The above quotes also highlight the level of intimidation used against some 
MPs. Several informants highlighted the key role played by the then National 
Directorate of Security, Rahmatullah Nabil, and the minister for Border, Tribal 
and Ethnic Affairs, Asadullah Khalid, in employing state coercive powers to 
threaten and intimidate opponents. Some opposition and independent MPs 
publicly claimed during parliamentary hearings that they had been warned 
that if they did not support the SC’s decision, their families, relatives and even 
tribal colleagues would risk losing their state positions. It is widely reported in 
the Afghan media (Hakimi 2011) and confirmed by several seniors in the 
President’s Office that some ethno-regional powerbrokers including Abdur 
Rab Sayyaf and Mohammad Mohaqqeq have been receiving regular extra 
security budget for up to sixty bodyguards per month as well as other 
expensive gifts like armoured cars for their support. As shown in Chapter 6, 
                                                        
151 Speech by a Ghazni province MP in the Wolesi Jirga, Observation on 24 August 2011. 
152 Speech by a Samangan province MP in the Wolesi Jirga, Observation on 24 August 2011. 
153 Interview10, 30 Jun 2011.  
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both Asadullah Khalid and Ahmad Wali Karzai (assassinated in mid-2011) 
have been instrumental in expanding and exerting Karzai’s influence in the 
tribal South through intimidation and deal-making. Their control over key 
businesses, both licit and illicit, meant that they had the final decision as to 
who can gain access to state funds, services and contracts. As one MP from 
Kandahar confined to the author in relation to the level of coercion his 
colleagues have been facing in Kandahar.  
 
In all honesty I am against the SC’s decision. But if some of my friends 
don’t support the government their commercial ertebatat [links] and ability 
to import goods from Pakistan would be significantly constrained. Ahmad 
Wali controls everything: the government, the customs, and the security. If 
others do not support Karzai, they will risk losing their business.154 
 
 
Once again, the roles of ethno-regional network-client leaders were 
instrumental in connecting the top whole network patron with MPs in 
parliament during the crisis. However, this time around Karzai’s clients were 
not as expansive as it were during the 2009 presidential election. With the 
disastrous presidential election outcome for both Dostum and Mohaqqeq in 
failing to deliver for their political networks, it seemed that their position in the 
Wolesi Jirga had relatively weakened. Moreover, in a system where votes are 
anonymous and exchanges high, the temptation is high among the MPs to 
attempt to make direct deals with the patrons rather than go through their 
political network. Karzai’s main source of support was predominantly his 
ethnic-Pashtun MPs. The Hizbi Islami (Hizb) under the leadership of Abdul 
Hadi Arghandival proved to be the most loyal and biggest bloc to support the 
Karzai decision, with over thirty members as part of the Sabah parliamentary 
group in the Wolesi Jirga.155 The strength of the Hizb is within its structural 
cohesion to function as an organised political entity. This became even more 
evident when the author visited Nangarhar province in early 2012. As 
commented by Arghandival’s deputy, the Hizb’s organisational cohesion 
enabled it to send 30 MPs to the Wolesi Jirga from limited regions (mainly 
                                                        
154 Interview 12, 24 July 2011.  
155 The 2010 Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies report identified the Hizb and its Sabah 
parliamentary groups as the most coordinated network in the House.   
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South East and Kabul), as they have been enable to operate in Southern and 
Eastern provinces where regional strongmen exercise excessive coercive 
power. Abdur Rab Sayyaf’s Dawat political network was another influential 
powerbroker that provided the necessary networking skills needed for Karzai 
to build his support in the Wolesi Jirga. In post-2001, Sayyaf has become 
Karzai’s central connecting node in the House. Twice he stood for the position 
of the Speaker of the House to represent the Karzai group; both times he fell 
short by only a few votes. In addition to these ethnic-Pashtun powerbrokers, 
Karzai obtained the support of other ethno-regional powerbrokers in the 
parliament. Both Sadeq Modabber (the head of the Office of Administrative 
Affairs) provided support amongst the Hazara MPs.  
 
In the post-2005 Wolesi Jirga, political network patrons have exercised some 
degree of control and hierarchy over their clients by establishing 
Parliamentary Groups (PG). The provision for the formation of parliamentary 
groups was established in 2005, the first year of the Wolesi Jirga, as a formal 
mechanism to encourage greater efficiency and organisation in plenary 
discussions (ICG 2006). De jure, a PG must have at least 21 members and be 
inclusive of all ethnic, religious and gender groups. The head of the PG has 
the advantage of attending the Wolesi Jirga’s executive meetings to decide 
parliamentary agendas. De Facto, ethnographic fieldwork in some PG 
headquarters uncovered that the PGs are at best a form of patronage network 
centred around key political network leaders such as Abdur Rasul Sayyaf, 
Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Sadeq Modabber, Haji Zahir Qadir, Karim Khalili, and 
Abdul Hadi Arghandival. Each parliamentary group has an office/guesthouse 
close to the Wolesi Jirga where they host visitors, financially sustained and 
politically led by competing leaders. Various factors contribute to a MPs 
decision to join a PG; these being financial gains, political influence, ethnic 
and tribal affiliations, and legal and illegal business interests. A female MP 
asserted,  
 
In the first month of the Wolesi Jirga, Haji Zahir Qadir [the head of Peace 
Caravan PG and the leader of Support for Rule of Law coalition] 
approached me to join his group. He told me that he knew that I live in a 
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rented house. He offered me 2000 US dollars per month if I joined his 
group.156  
 
 
Financial fund is one of the central contributing factors to the survival of a 
political group. Wafaey and Larson (2010:9) found that the main reason for 
the disintegration of Khat-i-Sehum (Third Line) and some other earlier non-
legacy/jihadi PGs was the lack of funds as well as internal divisions along 
identity-based rifts. For powerbrokers, the political and financial return is high 
(discussed in the next section), especially at moments of trading favours like 
electing a new Speaker or voting to approve a minister. Participatory 
observation and interviews with MPs revealed that during the crisis Sabah, 
Etemad and Dawat were the three main PG’s that seemed to have provided 
Karzai with the necessary client-base. The patrons of these groups, Abdul 
Hadi Arghandival (the current Minister for Economy), Sadeq Modabber (the 
head of the Office of Administrative Affairs) and Abdur Rasul Sayyaf, have 
been key allies of Karzai in post-2001 period.  
 
The Support for Rule of Law (SRL) Whole Network  
 
 
Since the contentious 2009 presidential election, the size of the so-called 
opposition or those willing to identify themselves as such has increased in the 
Wolesi Jirga. There were several reasons for this increase. First, with his 
considerable vote (33%) in the 2009 election, Abdullah Abdullah emerged as 
a serious alternative opposition-patron whom some MPs could rely on, thus 
exacerbating the demarcation between government and the opposition. In the 
parliamentary election, those associating themselves with his Hope and 
Change Coalition did relatively well in the election. Regional political 
strongmen like Atta Mohammad Noor in Balkh and Hajji Zahir Qadir in 
Nangarhar succeeded in sending more of their members into the Wolesi Jirga. 
Second, those ethno-regional network-clients who felt betrayed by Karzai’s 
duplicity after the election in not delivering on his promises further identified 
themselves as opposition to the government. Third, there were some 
independent MPs who genuinely felt that Karzai’s increasing level of 
                                                        
156 Interview 25, 8 September 2011. 
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corruption and intimidation must be stopped. Finally, there were some MPs 
who identified themselves with the opposition for various reasons to do with 
their local power dynamics. For instance, one or two MPs in Kandahar like 
Lalay Hamidzai took an anti-Karzai stance mainly because they had been 
effectively excluded from the provincial funds and power. For some Hazara 
MPs, the annual dispute between Hazara-Kuchi (Pashtun-nomad) had 
become a defining issue, who accused the government of not only failing to 
resolve the issue but also taking sides with the Kuchis. However, given the 
level of patronage and opportunism in the Wolesi Jirga, it is hard to draw a 
clear picture as to who was pro and who was anti-Karzai during the crisis.  
 
Within this power dynamics, the Wolesi Jirga became divided into two main 
groups following the SC verdict: a pro-Karzai and anti-Karzai grouping. The 
main opposition whole network in the Wolesi Jirga was the ad hoc Support for 
Rule of Law (SRL) coalition. The SRL was formed immediately after the 
Special Court’s decision to disqualify sixty-two MPs. While some MPs 
genuinely joined the SRL to defy the Court’s decision, (which they considered 
to be undermining the integrity of the Wolesi Jirga), others joined fearing that 
they might either get disqualified or incriminated for vote rigging. Whatever the 
reasons, the following MPs justification captures the dominant rhetoric used 
for constituency consumption at the time: “the creation of SC, putting pressure 
on the IEC to change the election result, failure to nominate candidates for 
ministerial posts, and ignoring the Wolesi Jirga resolutions are some of the 
systemic actions by the President designed to undermine parliament.157 For 
instance, the speeches on 16 August 2011 were dominated by the following 
rhetoric: “illegitimate government”, “dictatorship”, “mafia state”, “corruption 
government and its halaqat [circles]”, “Jabbarkhan and Mostakbaran [despotic 
rule]”, and “Hakemiyat-e-Sultani [Sultan style governance]”.  
 
The Court’s decision had affected the votes of two-thirds of parliamentarians 
who weren’t sure whether a criminal case would follow. It is not clear how 
many MPs initially signed up for the SRL; however, the estimate varied from 
                                                        
157 Speech by a Kabul MP, Observation in the House on 10 July 2011. 
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140 to 180 out of 249 MPs. As the crisis prolonged, this number was 
substantially reduced and fewer MPs were directly associating themselves 
with the SRL. There were two main reasons for this reduction. First, most MPs 
initially signed with the SRL for fear of being prosecuted. The SC verdict not 
only disqualified 62 sitting MPs, it found nearly 200 MPs including those close 
to Karzai of committing fraud to a varying degree. At the start of the crisis, the 
Attorney General and Supreme Court Judges had warned those MPs found 
guilty of prosecution. However, as it became evident that no prosecution 
would follow a significant number of MPs dropped out of the SRL. Second, 
more MPs were gradually co-opted by the Karzai network through intimidation 
and offer of rewards, which is discussed below.  
 
The most powerful central node in the SRL, around whom other dispersed 
anti-Karzai networks assembled, was Haji Zahir Qadir. He was the leader of 
the largest opposition Parliamentary Group in the Wolesi Jirga, the Peace 
Caravan, estimated to have had around forty MPs. Haji Zahir Qadir’s 
background is revealing. He belongs to the powerful Arsala family, one of the 
most influential, affluent, and prominent families in the Eastern region. As the 
son of Haji Abdul Qadir, the most famed Pashtun jihadi commander among 
the Northern Alliance and the former governor of Nangarhar, assassinated in 
2002, he held influential roles in Nangarhar including the head of border 
police. In 2005, Karzai, in an attempt to marginalise him in Nangarhar 
province, exiled him to Takhar province as the head of Border Police installing 
his close ally Gul Agha Shirzai as the strongman in the region 
(Mukhopadhyay 2009). Since 2009, he has established himself as a national 
figure in Kabul in opposition to Karzai. During and after the crisis, the Karzai 
network made several attempts to discredit him and his family by accusing 
him of being involved in drug smuggling, kidnapping and corruption. In 
January 2012, months after the crisis, he was elected the first deputy speaker 
of the Wolesi Jirga, winning 140 votes, further consolidating his power in the 
House. In 2013, the Minister of Finance, a close ally of Karzai, accused Haji 
Zahir Qadir of smuggling 269 million USD worth of flour from Pakistan. In 
response, the next day Haji Zahir Qadir declared to the parliamentarians that 
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he had more than 350 million USD in his bank account, reminding the MPs 
how he had financially maintained them during the crisis.158  
 
The SRL succeeded in building a powerful network against Karzai. It 
managed to draw support from some state officials, powerbrokers and tribal 
elders who were either disillusioned with Karzai’s corrupt practices or felt 
betrayed by Karzai’s false past promises. Amongst these was Abdullah 
Abdullah, Karzai’s main contender in the 2009 presidential election. Following 
his defeat in the election, he was quick to capitalise on his 30% voting-bank 
by establishing the Coalition for Change and Hope. A number of influential 
MPs, who are also members of Abdullah’s Coalition, played a key role in the 
SRL coalition. Another important leader who supported the SRL, albeit 
privately, was the second vice-president, Karim Khalili. Given Khalil’s formal 
position as the second vice-president as well as his influence within the 
Wolesi Jirga as the patron of Saday-e-Adalat (Voice of Justice) parliamentary 
group, his support provided confidence among the opposition. One 
explanation for his objection to the SC could have been that he knew the SC 
would reduce his clientele in the Wolesi Jirga, especially when Karzai 
demanded a re-election in Ghazni province. A closer look at the Court’s 
disqualified MPs reveals that more of Khalil’s network MPs was on the list 
than any other individual network leader. Since then, his relationship with the 
President has been strained.  
 
The reasons for SRL’s ability to defy Karzai’s network was due to its internal 
organisational structure, which enabled better coordination effort, and the 
leadership of its two speakers Latif Pedram, a leftist MP from Badakhshan, 
and Asadullah Saadati, the MP from Ghazni. The SRL had an inclusive 
leadership council, a 17-member team, two speakers who proved skilful in 
establishing close relations with the main daily outlets, and more than ten 
established shadow committees such as Internal Affairs, Cultural Women’s 
Affairs committees, with each network member belonging to a committee. 
Ethnographic research showed that the SRL was able to mobilise MPs, 
                                                        
158 Broadcasted live on the National Radio Television of Afghanistan (Httl://youtube.com 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nst8M0Ftec4), 2013.  
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arrange discussions and debate, organise campaigns through the following 
three main parliamentary groups: Karvan-e-Solh (mostly ethnic-Pashtuns), 
Saday-e-Adalat (predominately ethnic-Hazaras) and the newly established 
Resalat (largely ethnic-Tajiks) with each having its own offices. At its height 
the SRL were posing a real threat in dominating Parliament, evidenced from 
the following description of the SRL’s strategy to the author by its speaker, 
Latif Pedram.  
 
The coalition presently controls 13 of the 18 select committees in the 
Wolesi Jirga and 3 Parliamentary Groups [PG). The Parliament Executive 
Team [PET], which is responsible for determining the agenda of the 
parliamentary sessions, is compromised of both the head of Parliamentary 
Committees and PGs [italic mine]. We plan to create one or two more PGs 
in order to fully control the Wolesi Jirga’s agenda and its PET.159 
 
 
The SC crisis highlights two mutually reinforcing network practices as key 
features of post-2001 Afghanistan: 1) opportunism and bargains and 2) the 
instrumentalisation of identities.  
 
 
IV. Network Practices 
 
 
Opportunism and Bargaining  
 
 
Chapter 5 argued that since the 2004 presidential election, Karzai has been 
maintaining an expensive and expansive patronage system in parliament with 
payments made to MPs to pass bills or to secure the approval of parliament 
for the appointment of a new minister. Coburn (2011) in his paper on the 
political economy of the parliament found that financial considerations of MPs 
played an important and growing role in determining how the parliament 
functioned. The SC crisis provided an excellent moment for opportunism and 
bargaining. Evidence available suggests that the bargaining took place with 
multiple actors and layers of patronage, offering powerbrokers bargains in 
exchange for their skills to buy-in loyalties and support. During the crisis most 
bargains were made for financial gain, yet political privileges were also 
                                                        
159 Interview 21, 21 September 2011.   
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considered. Offers of government positions, state contracts, licenses and gifts 
were widespread. Although, one cannot estimate the amount of financial 
reward offered to extend patronage, it was certainly extensive.160 As one MP 
summarised it: 
 
“The Jihadi leaders, ministers and governors would attend MPs 
houses to make deals. These offers could include anything really 
from a simple bribe, to covering the expenses of their guesthouses, 
to offer of gifts like cars, and to installing their family members in key 
positions. This is obviously negotiated and agreed upon.”161  
 
 
Another female MP highlighted the expanding nature of these patronage 
practices stretching beyond Afghanistan’s key players to include regional and 
international countries (see below quote). In an attempt to expose a serious 
concern, the National Security Directorate in 2013 reported that almost one-
third of the House is under the payroll of either Iran or Pakistan. A similar US 
Embassy cable in 2009 highlighted the same concern in saying Iran has 
financed a range of Afghan religious and political leaders, grooming Afghan 
religious scholars, training Taliban militants and even seeking to influence 
MPs. The same cable noted that Omar Daudzai, Karzai’s Chief of Staff at the 
time had asserted that, “in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran 
had provided salary support for some [Afghan government] deputy ministers 
and other officials, including ‘one or two’ even in the [presidential] palace.162 
 
“This is a crisis for those who sold themselves in exchange for Toman 
(Iranian currency), for Kaldar (Pakistani currency), for Dollars and 
Pounds. They have put the country into lilam (bidding). They will divide it 
further and gradually sell parts of it….Tell me, if you do not have an 
agenda, bring in your mohra (nodes) and stay committed like a man. 
The House has become a Buzkashi (goat-pulling)* ground; whoever 
possesses more power and money abuses it….Tell me, is this the 
nation’s House, Mr. Karzai’s House, or Mr. Manavi’s [the head of 
Independent Election Commission] House? Is this the house of Zorgoya 
(despots), or the house of Iran, Pakistan or other embassies?163 
 
                                                        
160 Accusation made by several MPs during the Author’s ethnographic observation in the 
House on 24 August 2011 and confirmed at the end of the session with several MPs.  
161 Interview, 5, 24 June 2011.  
162 US Cables, 3 February 2010.  
163 Speech by a female Kabul MP, Observation on 5 September 2011.  
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Noah Coburn’s (2011) study of the political economy of the Afghan parliament 
documented similar layers of opportunism and bargaining among network-
patrons and the network-client leaders.  An informant reported to him that one 
powerbroker, usually considered of only moderate importance, “paid one car 
or 10,000 USD for each vote he could convince MPs to give to [a certain more 
influential MP]; [this influential leader] then gave this amount back to him” 
(Coburn 2011: 15). He also found that in some cases powerbrokers invested 
their own money knowing that they could get a higher return later from the 
patron.  
 
Interviews with several senior officials at the Ministry of Finance and other 
line-ministries indicate the extent of appropriation of public resources for 
personal gain.  In 2010, the Presidential Palace accounted for the highest 
amount of illegible (unaccounted for money) budget spent in the country at 
around 300 million dollars followed by parliament at around 50 million 
dollars.164 Although it is difficult to establish how this money is being spent, 
one could plausibly summarise, based on the key informant’s statements, that 
a substantial part of this money is spent for buying loyalties and making 
bargains.  The two quotes below, by senior officials at the Ministry of Finance 
and the Office of Administrative Affairs reflect the overall level of bargaining 
that became entrenched in post-2001 Afghanistan.  
 
“I cannot tell you exactly how this money is being spent but we are 
constantly under pressure by the presidential office and the minister 
[Minister of Finance] to provide money…. Definitely most of this money 
is being channelled illegally as extra payments to key individuals. This is 
not something new. But this is having serious consequences. This year 
the World Bank under the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund cut 70 
million of our funds.165  
 
Similarly, another senior official remarked.  
 
“Av az bala khed ast (the water is muddy from the top). The OAA [Office 
of Administrative Affairs] is Karzai’s right arm. Do you know why he has 
more than 100 unofficial advisers? It is just a title. From the tribal elder in 
Uruzgan to those who claim that they are opposed to him like Mohaqqeq 
                                                        
164 Office of National Budget Annual 2010-11 Report. Afghanistan Ministry of Finance.  
165 Interview 40, 4 December 2010.  
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and Dostum are all in his payroll. They are all part of the system. People 
call it mafia, but as someone who has worked in [….] department, I can 
tell you it is a functional system they created for themselves.”166   
 
 
These quotes point to the nature of statehood and governance that is being 
propagated by this system of payment and promise to buy loyalties. Of 
course, this does not include for the other unaccounted money that Karzai 
and his clients receive from neighbouring countries. In 2009, Karzai publicly 
admitted to receiving suitcases of money from neighbouring countries for his 
office expenses.167 He also confirmed in 2013 to having received payments 
from the US intelligence services for the past ten years, known as “ghost 
money” that “came in secret and left in secret”, which he claimed to have 
spent on his office expenses. 168  These statements also suggests that 
international donors are not only aware of these illegal practices but in some 
instances promote them, which goes against their rhetoric of liberal peace 
peacebuilding and human rights. This confirms the main criticism expressed 
against the liberal peace in pursuing illiberal practices in reaching their goals. 
The role of international donors in this duplicity and hypocrisy is discussed in 
detail in the conclusion of this thesis.  
 
The vote of confidence for the Minister of Finance and Interior on 19 February 
2012 during the SC crisis is another telling example of opportunism and 
bargaining. Reportedly, a few days before the vote, ministers had made deals 
with the powerbrokers and their associated MPs. What followed is best 
described by the Kandahar MP, Abdul Rahim Ayubi, who arrived in the Wolesi 
Jirga the day after the vote covered with chains in protest, accusing some 
MPs and the Wolesi Jirga’s executive committee of making deals.  
 
“They pre-planned the vote of confidence to make deals and once 
the bargain had been achieved they hastily closed the issue. They 
prevented MPs from asking questions, especially those who had 
evidence against the ministers. I have evidence that implicates 
                                                        
166 Interview 1, 21 April 2012. 
167 “Hamid Karzai admits office gets 'bags of money' from Iran” The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/25/hamid-karzai-office-cash-iran 
168 Rosenberg, “Afghan Leader Confirms Cash Deliveries by CIA”, New York Times, 28 April 
2013.  
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ministers with some MPs over corruption and bribes. Why would 
ministers visit MPs’ houses the night before the vote? Why would 
directors of customs, provincial governors, police chiefs, and the 
Attorney General get involved and lobby for ministers? Today, I have 
come to parliament in chains to protest against such practices and to 
honour the dignity of this house.169 
 
 
State officials are not the only ones who provide financial and political deals. 
While research for this thesis did not attempt to directly examine the role of 
business in parliamentary politics, most of the informants pointed out to a high 
level of engagement worth mentioning. During the SC crisis, following the 
rumours that Azizi Bank had gone bankrupt, MPs scheduled an inquiry 
session to investigate the Bank’s financial state. Some MPs provided 
compelling evidence suggesting that the Bank had been involved in illegal and 
corrupt business practices. As the day of the inquiry approached tensions 
intensified. Amazingly, on the day itself, despite most MPs’ earlier rhetoric of 
corruption and mismanagement, MPs voted overwhelmingly not to investigate 
the Bank’s financial dealings any further. Some MPs complained that deals 
had been made and some of them were threatened and intimidated by 
network nodes within the administration linked to the Bank. One MP put it:  
 
“I fear for my life. Azizi Bank has threatened me on many occasions. We 
have evidence that 450 million dollars was transferred to Dubai for 
purchasing property, and not a single penny has returned. The Bank has 
also been involved in corruption in the oil business.”170  
 
 
A senior Investigative Officer at the High Office of Oversight and Anti-
Corruption, who had examined some of the major Banks’ corrupt practices, 
also confirmed these practices inside the Wolesi Jirga.  
 
“Both Azizi Bank and Kabul Bank were heavily involved in bribing MPs in 
the parliament and in some cases made sure that nominated ministers 
were approved. We have evidence that Azizi Bank had bribed MPs to 
make sure that certain appointed ministers get elected. As you can 
imagine, once these ministers are appointed they have to get involved in 
                                                        
169 Tolo News, 20 February 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYopiK4q2dA 
170 Interview 7, 16 July 2011. 
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corruption and to pay back their debt. We know in one case, Kabul Bank 
spent nearly 200,000 USD to get its person elected.171   
 
 
Most MPs interviewed pointed out that if the investigation had gone ahead it 
would have exposed and implicated MPs and a wide network of top officials. 
In 2010, investigation into the corruption of the largest bank in Afghanistan, 
Kabul Bank, revealed that the bank officials had bribed the Wolesi Jirga when 
they had won the bid to process the government staff salaries.172 Of the total 
estimated seventy-five million dollar bribe paid by the bank, a substantial part 
had gone to MPs. Evidence shows that the Bank had become the “unofficial 
arm of the Karzai government” helping corrupt elites to transfer money to 
offshore accounts (Bijlert 2011a). Of the list of 200 people involved in 
receiving irregular loans from Kabul Bank, there were 103 former MPs, 
several governors, and ministers (Bijlert 2011a). The Kroll investigation 
responsible for auditing the Bank called the Kabul Bank a virtual “Ponzi 
scheme”.173  Both Azizi Bank and Kabul Bank expose the complexity and 
extensiveness of the connections across Afghanistan’s political, financial and 
administrative institutions and structures. It illustrates how some of these 
political networks cut across formal and informal, public and private, and licit 
and illicit structures of power, expanding their political and economic interests 
right under the nose of international statebuilders. A more detailed study of 
illegality as a key aspect of post-2001 Afghan politics is urgently needed, 
which was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The reason for the intensification of MPs deal making lies in the political 
economy of the Wolesi Jirga. The political economic explanation is that the 
new parliament has provided the necessary political protection needed for 
most politician-turned-businessmen to maintain themselves within the system 
(Coburn 2011). Coburn in his study of the political economy of Afghan 
parliament found that the role of business transactions have become more 
                                                        
171 Interview 10, 20 September 2011.  
172 Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” The New Yorker, 14 February 2011. 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/14/110214fa_fact_filkins (accessed 2 May 
2011).  
173 Matthew Rosenberg, “Audit says Kabul Bank began as a “Ponzi Scheme”, New York 
Times, 17 November 2012.  
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important in terms of political financing, protecting their resources and 
preserving business monopolies of corrupt networks (2011:7). Coburn 
(2011:3-4) also found that MPs not only have to cover the cost of maintaining 
an office, staff and other expenses, they also have to fulfil a number of 
traditional political obligations for their constituencies, including providing a 
place for the constituents to stay while visiting Kabul, attending weddings, 
providing expensive gifts, offering food on feast days, and fulfilling religious 
obligations such as paying for a religious figure to recite the Quran. This is 
nothing when compared to the current monthly salary of an MP, which is 
around 2,000 US dollars. The state also pays for two bodyguards and an 
assistant. It seems that bargaining and exchange is a practical strategy that 
allows MPs to function. Several MPs highlighted how some MPs have 
incurred debts to be elected. As one MP succinctly put it, “some MPs have 
borrowed a lot of money to come to parliament so they have to make deals to 
pay for their debt.”174 While another sarcastically complained how the crisis 
had failed to create more moments of opportunities for deal making “since the 
start of this crisis and the fact that not many laws have been passed or new 
ministers been introduced, MPs have not made any deals so they have 
become desperate.”175  In fact, these bargaining and opportunistic practices 
are not considered as corruption but more as a survival strategy that has 
become the norm in an environment of uncertainty, elite distrust and 
malfunctioning state institutions.  
 
However, there is also a cultural political dimension to their opportunistic and 
bargaining practices, which is a reflection of the Afghan society where actions 
are based on reciprocity and social obligations to the family, kin, tribes, ethnic 
groups and qawm. In his study of parliamentary election, Coburn (2010:3) 
highlighted that constituencies see their MPs first and foremost as part of the 
local patronage networks. Prior to the election, in many places he found 
competition taking place among different local powerbrokers, political-
economic and identity networks over who to send to parliament. Once in 
parliament, they are expected to help provide services including securing 
                                                        
174 Interview 18, 24 August 2011. 
175 Interview 17, 24 August 2011.  
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jobs, business contracts, helping local powerbrokers to grab land, and even 
exemption from exams through their state connections (Coburn 2010:4). Such 
high expectations put MPs in a difficult situation. This is evident from one 
MP’s reply when the author asked for his reason in joining the Karzai network: 
“They are the dominant network. They are in power. If I do not establish a 
close relationship with them how could I resolve my people’s [constituents] 
problems when they come to Kabul.”176 
 
Instrumentalisation of Identities 
 
 
Opportunistic practices of bargaining and exchange were mutually reinforced 
with the politicisation of identities, especially along ethnic lines, which was 
another key characteristic of the Special Crisis. The previous chapter showed 
how in moments of contestation, like the 2004 and 2009 presidential 
elections, political networks have politicised identities along tribal, ethnic and 
regional lines to mask their opportunistic practices of bargain and exchange. 
The below quotes demonstrate that instrumentalisation of identities is not 
limited to moments of rupture or crisis as it is practiced on a daily basis at all 
state levels.  
 
Another main issue for the current conflict in the Wolesi Jirga is the 
tribal, ethnic and linguistic fanaticism of the House. Whenever there is a 
serious issue to be discussed or voted on, it takes an ethnic line. Even 
open-minded and independent MPs adopt such lines.177 
 
 
However, as the SC crisis shows, ethnic divisions can be understood as a 
form of political network competition over the state, rather than a battle over 
primordial identities. From the very beginning, the crisis took an ethnic 
dimension starting with the demand by the Karzai network for re-election in 
Ghazni province to balance the ethnic composition within the province. 
Although Karzai’s primary concern might have been simply to try to expand 
his network within his southern constituency, the rhetoric used to justify his 
demand was couched along ethnic lines. In return, the Hazara political 
                                                        
176 Interview 19, 29 August 2011 
177 Interview 23, 25 June 2011. 
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network leaders, including the second vice-president, expressed their 
strongest objection, partly to safeguard their gain and partly to please their 
ethno-regional constituencies. Mohammad Mohaqqeq, the leader of Wahdat-
e-Mardom network, publicly situated the crisis within a historical context as yet 
another attempt by the Pashtun leaders to marginalise the ethnic-Hazaras, 
while he was making deals privately.  
 
Many Afghan analysts simply saw the crisis as an extension of a power 
struggle between the Pashtun dominated government represented by Karzai 
and the Tajik dominated opposition represented by Abdullah, who stood 
against Karzai in the 2009 presidential election. Others saw this as a rivalry 
between Hizb and Jamiat tanzims dating back to the civil war. Such simplistic 
accounts are widespread across Afghanistan as the following quote 
illustrates: 
 
Unfortunately, ethnicity is rooted and institutionalised in Afghan 
politics. The ethnic conflict has increased in the new parliament, 
particularly between the Pashtuns and Tajiks. During the crisis, the 
Pashtun MPs supported the government line, while the Tajiks 
supported the opposition.178 
 
 
On the face of it, one could make a crude analysis that the Sabah 
parliamentary group, representing Hizb and Sayyaf’s Dawat networks in the 
Wolesi Jirga, both predominately Pashtuns, supported Karzai during the SC 
crisis while the majority of the ethnic-Tajik MPs joined the opposition. 
However, as shown in the previous chapter during the 2009 presidential 
election, competing political network leaders were ethnicising politics to mask 
their opportunistic practices of bargain and exchange. The SC crisis 
reproduces this pattern. A more detailed analysis suggests that network 
powerbrokers and their associated MPs were skilful in portraying the events 
during the crisis as an ethnic tension to conceal their back door deals. Whilst 
it was beyond the scope of this article, a thorough analysis of the complex 
relationship between identity and opportunity is urgently needed. 
 
                                                        
178 Author Interview, Ghazni MP, 26 June 2011. 
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The election of the speaker of the House provides an excellent moment to see 
identity manipulations in the Wolesi Jirga. Immediately after the end of the SC 
crisis, the House became a site of conflict and compromise over the election 
of the new speaker in January 2011. The two main contenders were Yunos 
Qanuni representing the so-called opposition and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf 
representing the Karzai team. After three rounds of voting an impasse was 
reached which was largely portrayed as a Tajik-Pashtun ethnic impasse. The 
rhetoric and representation used suggests the ethno-regional features of 
powerbroker’s discourse and, by extension, their political strategies. The main 
reasons for the impasse were the MPs opportunistic demands (Coburn 2011). 
Subsequently, an ad hoc commission was set up to find a solution. The 
commission’s proposed suggestion was to have a candidate only from the 
ethnic-Uzbek group who is not affiliated to either political whole network. 
Eventually, Haji Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, an MP from the Northern province of 
Kunduz with close ties to Hizb and Junbish tanzims, was elected with an 
overwhelming majority. 179  Mohammad Mohaqqeq who headed the 
commission presented the outcome as an achievement in balancing ethnic 
groups in parliament.  
 
The SC crisis highlights a number of important characteristics about the 
nature of political networks, especially about whole networks and their day-to-
day practices. First, it suggests that whole network formations are spatial and 
temporal. They are fluid, unstable, and temporary. While a core set of 
individual networks   might be part of a broader network of common interests, 
they also compete with each other over influence, allegiances, state positions 
and resources. As shown during the SC crisis, networks reshape and 
restructure as events unfold, crisis continues, local socio-political balances 
change, and positions and resources shift. In an environment of uncertainty 
                                                        
179 Ibrahim was a Hizb-i-Islami tanzim commander during the jihad. During the civil war he 
joined the Junbish tanzim led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi 
belongs to a well-known family of Mujahedeen from Kunduz province in the North. His elder 
brother Amir Latif Ibrahimi has been governor of Takhar, Faryab and Kunduz in the past. 
He won 169 votes out of 176 present. 
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and political network distrust in post-2001 Afghanistan, it seems in the 
interests of individual networks and their clientele to keep their motivations 
and intensions concealed and remain publicly ambiguous, especially in state 
platforms like the Wolesi Jirga.  
 
The Special Court crisis and the 2009 presidential election confirm the point 
made in Chapter 5 that the post-2001 state and political networks have 
become mutually co-constitutive. As both these empirical chapters revealed, 
political networks are able to utilise and manipulate the newly established and 
internationally sponsored formal state institutions to legitimise their network 
practices and strengthen their power within the state. The Karzai network, 
having control over most of the states, was able to rely on institutional 
organisations such as the Attorney General Office (AGO) and the Supreme 
Court to defend and justify their decision in setting up the SC in the first place. 
He also utilised other religious and legal institutions including the Council of 
Ulama and the Council of Interpretation of Constitution to advance the Court’s 
decisions whilst discrediting their opponents.  This was particularly the case 
when the Council of Ulama decreed that Simin Barekzai’s (the only female 
MP in the list of 9 disqualified MPs) 14-day hunger strike was un-Islamic 
according to Quran, which paved the way for Karzai to use violence in 
removing her from her tent and coercively breaking her hunger strike. The 
Karzai network was also able to employ the state’s monopoly of use of 
violence in intimidating and threatening the parliamentarians. The violent 
replacement of 9 MPs in the Wolesi Jirga with army blocking roads and not 
allowing the opposition MPs to enter parliament as well as the brutal removal 
of Simin Barekzai demonstrate the extent to which Karzai’s network went to 
implement its despotic authority and power. However, this has not been 
limited to the Karzai networks. The SRL has used its own connections and 
networks within and outside the state, albeit a limited one, to exert their 
influence through the state institutions. 
 
The crisis also suggests that within the political system that is based on 
patronage and opportunism, MPs see the need for certain levels of 
connection within and outside the state necessary to operate within the 
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system. This goes beyond the analysis offered by Coburn (2011) that sees 
the MPs deliberately concealing their intensions and remaining publicly 
ambiguous. For instance, the ability of an MP to politically manoeuvre within 
complicated formal state institutions as well as informal local societal power 
structures and licit and illicit business networks is a determining factor in their 
survival success. A high-ranking IEC employee in the north once explained 
how he had manipulated the election data in favour of a candidate who had 
initiated the contact.180  The motive for the IEC staff was to get closer to 
Governor Atta Mohammad Noor’s lucrative illicit business network through the 
candidate. Another MP from Kandahar province explained how he had 
strategically set up a team of campaigners who could provide him with access 
to state institutions in the province to win the vote.  
 
In Kandahar, Karzai’s brother is the king. The entire province is 
divided between three main powerbrokers ,who made deals before 
the election on who to send to the Wolesi Jirga…. The people in my 
district asked that I stand in the election. I set up a team in Kandahar 
whose half was working within the government and the other half 
outside. This helped me get elected against the powerbrokers.181  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the power dynamics of political networks during the 
Special Court crisis and their network practices of patronage, deal-making, 
intimidation, and identity manipulations, shedding light on the nature of 
statehood and governance in post-2001 Afghanistan. I have considered how 
opportunism and politicisation of identities became mutually reinforcing during 
the Special Court crisis. The crisis suggests that competition and conflict 
among political networks has further consolidated the historically grounded 
‘network state’ in which competing political networks readily utilise state 
resources and international patronage to expand their interests. This is 
discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter of this thesis. The success 
of the Support for Rule of Law coalition to stand firm against the Karzai 
network’s authoritarian advance during the crisis and even forcing them to 
                                                        
180 Telephone conversation (Interview 94), 30 March 2012. 
181 Interview 10, 30 June 2011.  
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back down from removing the 62 sitting MPs, further strengthen the argument 
that we must seriously consider the fundamental role and power of political 
networks in post-2001 Afghanistan. The SC crisis also reveals that Karzai’s 
power is supreme to the extent that multiple individual networks that have 
fundamentally established in the system allow him to be. While Karzai and his 
political network has become more authoritarian in its governance, his failure 
to remove the 62 sitting MPs exposes the limits of his power. The anti-Karzai 
network groups were successful in sending a clear message to Karzai that 
they are an essential part of the system for which Karzai must share the fruits 
of international patronage.  
 
The political economy of the Wolesi Jirga suggests that the post-2001 
international effort to establish democratic political institutions in Afghanistan 
have been undermined. The key institutions of the state (e.g., IEC, ECC, and 
the Wolesi Jirga) that were established with considerable international support 
to safeguard the democratic processes have been readily utilised by political 
networks to expand their power and interests. The concluding chapter 
discusses the nature of statehood in post-2001 Afghanistan and its potential 
implications on security, political order and state survival in post-2014 planned 
NATO–led military withdrawal from Afghanistan in more detail.  
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Chapter 8: Post-2014, the International Military Exit, Political Stability  
                   and State Survival  
 
Introduction  
 
Concerns about political stability and the future survival of the Afghan state 
have intensified as the post-2014 NATO-led withdrawal approaches. The daily 
news headlines and much of the policy analysis offered highlight the 
increasing prospect of the state’s collapse and civil war. In a paper in late 
2012, the International Crisis Group (ICG) warned that if certain steps were 
not taken, the Afghan state was likely to collapse. The paper advised, “Afghan 
leaders [to] recognise that the best guarantee of the state’s stability is its 
ability to guarantee the rule of law during the political and military transition in 
2013-2014 … [If they fail at this] at worst, it could trigger extensive unrest, 
fragmentation of the security services and perhaps even a much wider civil 
war” (2012: 2). In another policy report for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, titled “Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan”, Giles 
Dorronsoro, an Afghan specialist, predicted a future as bleak, including the 
return of Taliban control to large parts of the country. It concluded, “At the end 
of the day, the most likely scenario is the collapse of the Afghan regime in a 
few years, after a steady period of weakening” (2012: 14-18). In an interview 
on 5th September with Voice of America, James Dobbins, the US 
representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, described the current war in 
Afghanistan a “civil war” that has been going on for some time. 182  His 
comments received an unprecedented condemnation from Karzai, his 
ministers.  
 
Most of these analysts draw upon a crude reading of Afghanistan’s past 
collapses, particularly the one which shadowed the Soviet Union’s exit and 
the subsequent civil war. At the same time, competing political networks and 
their elites have intensified their rhetoric of threat and fear, which many 
                                                        
182 Tolonews, Presidential Palace Chides Dobbins’ ‘Civil War’ Comment, 8 Sept 2013, 
(http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11850-presidential-palace-chides-dobbins-civil-war-
comment) 
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analysts simply take as signs of impending conflict. Yet, from a network 
perspective, the current intensification of political tensions and the violent 
rhetoric  (e.g. relapse to civil war, ethnic war) is yet another grand moment of 
re-negotiation in a system of bargaining and exchange. The escalation of 
identity-based rhetoric seems to be directed for ethno-regional constituency 
consumption in the present moment of uncertainty and ambiguity, a key 
feature of statehood in the post-2001 period  
 
This concluding chapter reflects on the concerns above by providing a more 
nuanced and multi-dimensional examination of the prospects for political 
stability and of the post-2014 the Afghan state. The power dynamics of 
political networks and their day-to-day practices can shed light on the 
prospect of state survival or collapse in the post-2014 period. Drawing on this 
study’s findings, I contend that political order and the network state, in its 
present form more or less, is likely to survive because of the interlocking 
power dynamics of political networks, and any attempt to destabilise the 
status quo would essentially undermine certain groups’ economic and political 
interests. Here, I am primarily targeting the policy-oriented field of 
international intervention and peacebuilding whose decisions will have a 
significant impact on the future of Afghanistan and its people. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to situate the findings within broader comparative and 
theoretical contexts; however, I consider some of the implications that stem 
from the theoretical and empirical claims of this thesis relevant to future 
studies of international statebuilding and the post-conflict state. At policy level, 
I argue that a successful international exit from Afghanistan and the post-2014 
political order and state’s survival is contingent on the stability of the 
empowered political networks that currently constitute the Afghan state as 
well as the strength of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the 
outcome of reconciliation talks with the Taliban. Although, this thesis did not 
have the space to discuss these two foci, I argue below that they have little 
implication on the hypothesis and propositions offered.   
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I. The Power Dynamics of Political Networks and Statehood in Post-2001 
Afghanistan  
 
This thesis began with a puzzle. I asked how the post-2001 state could 
survive and political order be constituted when its institutions are considered 
corrupt, fragmented and weak by liberal peacebuilding standards. The last 
four main internationally-funded elections (two presidential and two 
parliamentary) and its democratic institutions such as the parliament and the 
judiciary have questioned the relevance and impact of liberal peace 
interventions. It seems that prescribed liberal peace and democratisation 
efforts aimed at establishing strong democratic institutions have become less 
relevant. Despite the failure of the democratic transformation, this thesis 
reveals that political order has emerged in the post-2001 period through 
power dynamics amongst informal political networks composing the state. The 
liberal peace formal institutions (e.g. the Supreme Court and Parliament) 
rebuilt by international support have been effectively constituted by political 
networks and their clientele through those who use state capacities of 
coercion and administration to legitimize their actions and strengthen their 
influence within the state. Political order is achieved through the informal 
practices of patron-client relations, opportunism and illegality as well as the 
politicisation of identity-based divisions by political networks, which feeds into 
and feeds off the governance and state institutions of Afghanistan at all levels. 
This is in contrast to liberal peace statebuilding objectives. This is not to say 
that state institutions are irrelevant but they are made meaningful as the result 
of competition for power, conflict and compromise between rival political 
networks and their day-to-day performances. 
 
As the historical chapter highlighted, this is not a new feature of Afghan 
politics. The state and political networks (be them tribal, clan-based or modern 
organisational structures) have been mutually constitutive throughout 
Afghanistan’s modern state formation. The founder of the Durrani Kingdom 
established the foundation of a network state that his successors built upon 
and further expanded. Both political stability and instability was fashioned in a 
mixture of personalised, patron-client relations and division of identities by 
 217 
competing political networks. As a result the very nature of governance and 
statehood was shaped by power dynamics amongst rival political networks for 
the control of the state. Post-2001 international statebuilding and state 
formation efforts were not divorced from this earlier tradition of statehood. The 
state was re-assembled and transformed around key political networks and 
centres of power which came to compose the state-regime. Between 2002 to 
2005 Karzai and his closely allied Pashtun technocratic network skillfully used 
their position in the internationally-sponsored state and their access to state 
resources to coercively remove the former Mujahedeen political networks, 
effectively consolidating their power across the country. The difference here 
was clearly the material resources and legitimacy provided to the Karzai 
network by international donors. Since 2005, the power balance between 
different networks has shifted away from technocrats and royalists back to the 
jihadists who functioned as key individual-network powerbrokers either for 
Karzai or for those patrons outside the government. Since then, the Karzai 
network has maintained power through bargain and exchange with key 
individual-network leaders as well as utilising state resources for personal 
gain.  
 
The state and political networks are indistinguishable from one another; the 
empowered networks masquerade as the state. The post-2001 state is thus 
constituted as a state by its appreciation of informal exchange: political 
networks have formed an internationally supported government, which 
operates as a state in a system of patronage and illegality. The state has 
provided a framework for inter-network competition, compromise and 
accommodation made manifest in identity-based divisions, patron-client 
relations, opportunism and the expropriation of public resources for personal 
gain.  Indeed, the state itself has exacerbated this problem as it provides the 
primary incentive structure outside of the drug trade for inter-network 
competition. The 2009 presidential election and the political economy of the 
Wolesi Jirga revealed that the formal state institutions and state capacities of 
coercion and administration provided political networks with the legitimacy to 
strengthen their influence, particularly the Karzai network. These network 
practices and the subsequent instrumentalisation of identity-based divisions is 
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not isolated acts of strongman politics but have become instruments of power. 
These mutually reinforced network practices are in fact essential to the 
survival of political networks and hence the Afghan state itself and 
subsequently the establishment of political order. Thus, the nature of 
statebuilding in contemporary Afghanistan contains multiple layers of 
contradiction, ‘progressing’ to build a schismatic state riven by political 
networks and fostering profiteering and opportunism. 
 
The network state is not necessarily a “weak” or “dysfunctional” state. It glues 
together political networks and their clientele at all levels of government in a 
complex system where resources are distributed and administrative officials 
are mobilised and controlled. Whilst the whole-network patron depends on the 
support of individual-network leaders, these leaders rely on the backing of 
their local and regional clientele to mobilise support and exercise a degree of 
control over collection and allocation of resources. This relationship is 
reciprocal and mutual. The resource bargaining between the whole-network 
patron and the individual-network leader ensures the distribution of wealth 
and state resources amongst the network clients at the local and regional 
level. The provincial and district authorities depend on the support of their 
network leader in the centre to maintain their position and privileges. The 
outcome is a complex system of resource interdependency constituting the 
post-2001 state, which essentially helps produce political stability and order. 
As such, a new political order is being established in which there is an 
increasing understanding amongst political networks about the other’s sphere 
of influence (e.g. political and financial privileges and resources) which seems 
to limit violence. I am not suggesting that there will be no competition and 
conflict amongst the networks but I believe this will not translate into war. 
Cambodia and Tajikistan are excellent cases where competing political 
groups have managed to constitute a complex peace, which has gradually 
become more authoritarian and controlled by a single dominant network. This 
is discussed in more detail below.  
 
The empirical chapters underlined a crucial link between the post-conflict 
state’s survival (political order) and daily political network practices. The 
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power dynamics between political networks in post-2001 Afghanistan 
uncovered at least two of the following necessary functions: (1) networks must 
co-opt or eliminate rivals to consolidate power, (2) accumulate wealth for 
distribution, and (3) maintain strong ties with local communities to strengthen 
their constituency power base. In Afghanistan these functions are achieved 
through network practices of patron-client relations, illegality, opportunism and 
the manipulation of identity-based divisions. The empirical evidence suggests 
that the ability of political networks to achieve these functions varies. Although 
Karzai and his network enjoy an expansive patronage network and have 
accumulated a great deal of wealth and power, he lacks a strong link with any 
particular constituency. He maintains links by purchasing them from other 
networks, as shown during the 2009 presidential elections. The failure of the 
Karzai network in the 2010-2011 Special Court (SC) crisis to unseat the 62-
sitting MPs despite being the best resource-buyer in the system proved that 
this kind of power depends very much on other influential powerbrokers. 
Influential political networks sent a clear message to Karzai and his team that 
their power rests largely on their support. In other words, Karzai’s power 
depends on his ability to maintain equilibrium amongst competing individual 
networks, both in terms of sharing power and dispensing international funds.  
 
Gul Aga Shirzai was initially successful in Nangarhar because he bought 
loyalties and controlled the licit and illicit market for distribution, thereby 
winning the support of some of the tribes. However, in recent years his power 
has weakened because of his loss of constituency support (Foschini 2001). 
Without international support he is likely to remain vulnerable. Shirzai’s 
opponents have made several attempts to undermine his authority and even 
unseat him. In 2011, several MPs and one-third of the provincial council 
members organised a series of demonstrations demanding his removal 
(Foschini 2011). The protesters went as far as issuing him an ultimatum to 
resign.183 Realising his lack of tribal support, Shirzai has expressed on many 
                                                        
183 In a vicious attack on the Kabul bank the Taliban killed several people. The failure of the 
governor to provide security and his inept response to the attack provided an excellent 
excuse for Shirzai’s opponents to mobilise the population to unseat the governor (Foschini 
2011). Despite historical grievances between the Arsala family and Hazrat Ali, they joined 
efforts against the governor. Dozens of networked MPs, PC members and tribal leaders met 
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occasions to US representatives that he would like to return to Kandahar.184 
The author’s professional work on a USAID project on political entities 
revealed that the re-emergence of Hizb-i-Islami (both the Hikmatyar and 
Arghandival networks) is a more serious threat to his power. In the last 
parliamentary and presidential elections Hizb proved to be the most organised 
political group in the province, sending more than thirty MPs to parliament.  
 
Atta Mohammad Noor, on the other hand, remains strong in the north. In 
addition to having a monopoly over state resources and economy (both legal 
and illegal), which has allowed him to establish an expansive patronage 
system, he enjoys a significantly high level of community ties in the north and 
even in Kabul. Indeed, since his positioning as the anti-Karzai strongman in 
the 2009 presidential election he enjoys greater legitimacy among his ethnic-
Tajik constituency. Given that Karzai has not been able to remove Noor from 
his powerful position as the governor of Balkh indicates the strength of his 
network. 185  A recent Institute for the Study of War report on the former 
Northern Alliance considered Atta Mohammad Noor as the strongest node in 
the former Jamiat Tanzim network and a “king-maker” in the upcoming 2014 
presidential election (Tchalakov 2013). 
 
 
II. The Post-2001 State and International Statebuilding  
 
 
Where does the post-2001 network state stand in its relations with ongoing 
international intervention and statebuilding efforts? Given the main focus of 
this thesis, on power dynamics amongst local political networks, there was 
little discussion on the role of international statebuilding; however, I am not 
                                                                                                                                                              
with Karzai and demanded Shirzai’s removal. According to Foschini (2011) the anti-Shirzai 
powerbrokers, Hazrat Ali, Agha Jan (the head of PC), Haji Zahir and Haji Jamal, were so 
confident they would unseat the governor this time that in one of their meetings Hazrat Ali 
even proposed himself or another MP from Nangarhar, Fereydun Mohmand, as interim 
governor.  
184 US State cables, 20 January 2010. 
185 On several occasions, Karzai and his clientele failed to weaken Noor. In a serious attempt 
in 2009, the Interior Minister Hanif Atmar tried to dismiss three senior police chiefs in Balkh 
(Traffic Police Chief, Criminal Investigation Chief and Highway police chief) who were 
believed to be close to Noor. After a long standoff between Noor and Atmar, with Noor 
reportedly not allowing the policemen to leave their position, Kabul backed down. 
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suggesting that international interveners were passive players in this process. 
In fact the relationship between international intervention/statebuilding and 
local power networks is co-constitutive and intertwined. In the immediate 
international intervention in 2001, what enabled political networks to regain 
power was indeed the intervener’s strategy of relying on former Mujahedeen 
tanzims to help compose and reassemble the state. From then on, the 
unintended consequences of international statebuilding’s financial patronage 
and conferred legitimacy further enabled political networks and their elites to 
consolidate power. Scott’s (1998) logic of “authoritarian high-modernism” 
[emphasis added] seems relevant to liberal international statebuilding 
attempts. Intervention groups were able to impose liberal political and 
economic agendas such as elections, rule of law, property rights and the 
formation of parliament above local political networks.186  
 
Scott (1998) has reminded us that such grand schemes are commonly 
subverted as much as they are implemented, and this subversion often takes 
place under the noses of international statebuilders. What they have failed 
(and are still failing) to understand is that these schemes fail because they 
overlook local knowledge and power dynamics. From the very outset, 
international interveners in Afghanistan overlooked the historically grounded 
stubbornness of informal practices that had dominated Afghan politics 
throughout its modern state formation. The post-2001 outcome is a 
combination of  “compromised peacebuilding” (Barnett & Zurcher 2009) where 
political networks are able to protect their interests whilst preserving a veneer 
of stability, alongside ‘conflictual peacebuilding’ (ibid) in which the Taliban 
                                                        
186  According to MacGinty (2011a: 67-69), the liberal peace agenda has a series of 
compliance mechanisms in place to impose conformity and discipline, much like the 
international financial institutions’ terms of conditionality. There is an idea put forward that it is 
“the only deal in town”, that other versions of peace are not legitimate. The incentivising 
power of peace refers to the persuasive elements that donors could employ through its 
democratic and economic reform and programs. The local elites could resist, ignore, subvert 
or adopt liberal peace interventions. This depends on the extent to which local actors retain 
power during a liberal peace transition, the extent to which external actors are dependent on 
local actors (e.g. a client government), the extent to which national, regional and local 
institutions are intact in the wake of a violent conflict, and the extent to which local actors 
(whether at state, regional or local level) can marshal resources (taxes, tradable goods, etc). 
Finally, the ability of local actors to present and maintain alternative forms of peace and 
peacemaking refers to the ability of local agents to promote alternatives to peace such as 
customary dispute resolutions, Islamic sharia law and others. 
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continue to contest the post-Bonn settlement. This outcome is not a 
“sovereignty paradox” (Zaum 2007) where the means (international 
intervention) contradict the ends (national sovereignty). As the case of 
Afghanistan uncovers, once the concept of the state is freed from the 
“territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) we can see that international intervention 
generates a network state rather than the ideal of a vertically organised and 
territorially encompassing sovereign entity. This outcome is an unintended 
consequence of international interveners’ poorly constructed strategies and 
actions, one that is not necessarily in their interests.  
 
In its present stage, whatever the outcome, the circulation of discourses 
legitimising the Afghan state and statebuilding are essential to maintain and 
justify international engagement. Privately, key donors criticise the 
consolidation of the network state and its daily practices in Afghanistan; 
however, publicly they have little option but to justify and rationalise the 
outcome through their everyday discourses. The reply of a senior NATO 
coalition official provides evidence of this. When he was asked about Gul Aga 
Shirzai’s illegal practices he said: “We know he is corrupt. But we have to ask 
ourselves: Has he crossed a sufficient number of red lines that we’ve got to 
deal with it? So far, it doesn’t appear to have” (Hodge 2012). This also reveals 
the double standards of the liberal peace, which on one hand claim to be 
promoting liberal values and agendas, whilst at the same time they employing 
illiberal means to achieve their ends. As one political party leader commented, 
“the international community have sacrificed justice for security and stability. 
They have sacrificed democracy and human rights for security. For them it 
doesn’t matter if Mullah Raketi, a Talib fundamentalist, comes to power or a 
corrupt official, as long as there is stability.”187 For instance, during the 2010-
2011 Special Court crisis, the US and its allies privately backed and 
supported the Independent Election Commission’s decision to overrule 
Karzai’s attempt to remove sixty-two sitting MPs. However, arguably they 
could not do much in the face of strong Karzai network interventions. This 
                                                        
187 Interview 118, 7 September 2009.  
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depiction of Karzai by a senior Foreign Affairs official reveals his relation to 
international interventionists, at least since the 2009 presidential election. 
 
Karzai has taken everybody hostage, the Americans, the UN, the 
Afghans, and even the opposition. Imagine him sitting in the driver’s seat 
of a suicide-bomber’s car and accelerating. He tells the Americans if you 
put pressure on me, I will explode myself and you will get conflict and 
instability; he tells the Afghans, if I leave, the country will slip back into 
the 1990s civil war; and he tells the opposition that if they plot against 
him he will destroy the current system and expose their corruption and 
illegal businesses.188   
 
 
This representation sheds light on President Karzai’s distrust of the 
international donors, the Americans in particular, which is reflected in his 
wider anti-American rhetoric over the past year or so. It also suggests that as 
the international military withdrawal takes place, Karzai’s network seems to be 
losing leverage over the local political networks. The policy implications of this 
are discussed in section IV.  
  
 
III. Theoretical Implications: International Statebuilding and the State 
 
 
The nature of the statehood in Afghanistan has a number of theoretical 
implications for how we understand international peacebuilding attempts. It 
shifts the conceptual focus: (1) from the institutional and structural affect to 
the informal network character of statebuilding; (2) from the conflictive to the 
co-constitutive nature of peacebuilding; and most importantly (3) from the 
behavior to the performance of statebuilding.  
 
The peacebuilding literature has been dominated by recent studies that speak 
of “liberal peace”, “hybrid peace” or “post-liberal peace”. The theoretical and 
empirical chapters in this thesis emphasise that these matter little if one fails 
to theorise the whole relationship between the nature of peacebuilding and 
the desired outcome. This thesis offered a more nuanced study of 
international statebuilding by theorising the network character of statebuilding 
                                                        
188 Interview 55, 19 February 2012.  
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and its impact on existing political order and state survival. If the whole 
peacebuilding effort involves the following: its end (the state), the process 
(statebuilding), the agents and subjects of change (both international service 
and implementation network structures and local political networks) and the 
vehicle (network practices), this research offers some insights towards a 
theory of network politics in statebuilding. This thesis argues that international 
statebuilding must be seen as a “loosely structured network” and a 
“collaborative” process that facilitates the creation of service delivery and 
implementation structures that operate along network modes. A network 
approach goes beyond the subject-object approach which dominates the 
literature; it problematises the boundaries drawn between legal-illegal, private-
public and local-international.  
 
Also this thesis makes the case that post-conflict peacebuilding is a co-
constitutive process where power is assembled and flows through 
international administrative and policy networks as well as local political-
economic and identity networks. It argues that the co-constitutive nature of 
intervention and international statebuilding is key to our understanding of the 
post-conflict state and statehood. At the international level, the peacebuilding 
industry assembles a variety of actors and organisations into the post-conflict 
space, tying them into a complex network of resource interdependency. The 
network mode of organising and operation has primarily driven their day-to-
day functioning. The empirical chapters highlight that the co-constitutive 
nature of the relationships between endogenous political networks played a 
central role in constituting and transforming the post-2001 Afghan state. 
These co-constitutive interactions create interdependencies which connects a 
wide-range of actors, such as local businessmen, drug traffickers, private 
security firms, international contractors, military commanders, custom officials, 
criminals and even insurgents, thereby limiting violence. 
 
Most importantly, the ethnographic study of political network practices has 
shifted the focus from the behavioural aspect of statebuilding to its daily 
performance. In an influential study Mitchell (1999: 89) brought our attention 
to the concept of “the state effect”. He emphasised that we must analyse the 
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techniques and practices of the state which produce “two-dimensional 
effects”; that is, the practices that misleadingly contribute to constructing a 
world that appears to consist of a binary order: on the one hand individuals 
and their activities, on the other hand an inert “structure” that somehow stands 
apart from individuals and gives a framework to their lives. Political networks 
have come to masquerade as the state, producing the impression of an 
organisation which is a singular and vertical entity. Political networks within 
the state, particularly within the Karzai network, portray themselves as the 
state. Karzai’s expansive network was able to secure the post-Bonn state as 
an “image” through the symbolic and material organisation of social space, 
which helped his group to secure their legitimacy, naturalise their authority 
and represent themselves as superior to other institutions and centres of 
power. However, as the “networked” nature of the post-2001 suggests, the 
state does not stand apart from or in opposition to society, or is mutually 
exclusive of social spaces. This is in line with recent anthropological studies of 
the state in Central Asia that questions the nature of spatiality (Reeve 2007; 
Collins 2002; Schatz 2004). 
 
The proposed network state and the nature of its statehood help us to go 
beyond the empirical categorisation of the state as either “weak” or “strong”. 
In Afghanistan, the state has been characterised as “weak central power but 
strong local powers” (Saikal 2006) or “strong at the centre but weak at the 
local” (Weiner & Banuazizi, 1994). These categorisations are misleading. The 
post-2001 state in Afghanistan is both weak and unstable according to the 
empirical definitions of statehood – exercising autonomy and authority and 
exhibiting solid capacities to provide basic services to its citizens – and 
relatively strong and stable in its effects on everyday life. This is not a 
paradoxical situation if we use a network lens to understand post-conflict 
international peacebuilding and state formation. As the case of Afghanistan 
reveals, political order and state survival depend on the power dynamics of 
endogenous political networks and their daily performances. As Reeves in 
relation to the neighboring Central Asian Fergana valley has noted, ‘these 
paradoxes and puzzles [of state weakness] arise from an initial assumption 
that the state “ought”, in both a normative and descriptive sense, to be a 
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singular rather than multiple entity’ (2007: 11). The state in Afghanistan is 
multiple and networked.  
 
IV. International Military Exit and Political Stability Beyond 2014 
 
 
This section has policy implications for the planned NATO-led withdrawal from 
Afghanistan and political stability in the post-2014 period. Drawing on this 
study’s findings, I contend that a successful international military exit from 
Afghanistan is contingent primarily on the stability of the empowered political 
networks and how the power dynamics amongst them are being re-structured 
and re-organised. Political networks are both a source of conflict and violence 
as well as political order and stability. This analysis argues that the current 
emphasis on the strength of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and 
the outcome of present reconciliation with the Taliban, the two key foci of 
current international exit strategy, are secondary to political stability in the 
post-2014 period. The most robust ANSF presence, capable civil service, and 
sustained international assistance, cannot prevent a possible return to 
violence and political crisis, unless a political settlement is reached among 
competing political networks. The importance of this was echoed recently by 
the first vice-president’s speech who said, “Afghan people are not concerned 
about the security transition, they are more concerned about the political 
transition.”189  
 
Based on the experience of previous elections, one could argue that the 2014 
presidential election provides an excellent opportunity for political networks to 
reach a political settlement. As I complete this thesis, twenty-seven 
candidates have been registered with the Independent Election Commission 
(IEC). The confusion that followed in the lead-up to registration highlighted the 
paradoxical fluidity of Afghan politics at times of uncertainty and contestation 
as well as its inherent rigidity. All-encompassing political horse-trading took 
place across different camps to reach a consensus over a candidate-patron 
prior to the registration deadline. The political horse-trading was focused on 
                                                        
189 In Haseeb Maudoodi, “Political Transition More Concerning Than Security Transition: 
Fahim,” Tolo News, June 12, 2013. 
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assembling a government that could guarantee their interests in the post-2014 
period, rather than simply determining the next successful presidential ticket. 
The discourse used to justify their deal-making was the Ejma-yi-Millie 
(National Consensus) but with different understandings (Hewad 2013).190 Atta 
Mohammad Noor, the governor of Balkh, provided the most comprehensive 
understanding of this discourse. He published a paper in February 2013 under 
the title of “Ejma-yi-Millie” which proposed the creation of a High Leadership 
Council which would include the current president and his vice-presidents and 
all of the other Jihadi leaders. The Council would provide legal safety for its 
members.  
 
After the two-month or so intense negotiations, Karzai was not able to unite 
his clientele to support a single candidate. The Hizb-i-Islami network of 
Arghandival, the main supporter of Karzai in the government since 2009, went 
with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Karzai’s other key whole-network allies: Sayyed 
Ishaq Gilani, the leader of National Islamic Front; Gul Agha Shirzai, the 
governor of Nangarhar; President Karzai’s brother, Qayum Karzai; Anwar-ul-
Haq Ahadi, the leader of Afghan Millet; and Abdur Rab Sayyaf, the former 
leader of Etihad-i-Islami tanzim; filled separate nominations. Karzai’s favourite 
candidate, Zalmay Rasul, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, gathered a 
weaker team along with Ahmad Zia Massoud and Habiba Sarabi. The main 
opposition camps, the National Front, split with Ahmad Zia Massoud, 
Mohammad Mohaqqeq and General Rashid Dostum, standing as Zalmay 
Rasul, with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as their 
running mates respectively. On the face of it the above picture might suggest 
a failure to reach a “national consensus”, and the experience of previous 
elections has shown that the majority of the above candidates are most likely 
to be co-opted by the main candidate-patrons by the time election takes 
place. This could be a political network strategy for deal-making with 
competing candidates, as it was in the 2009 elections.  
 
                                                        
190 See Gran Hewad, Elections or National Consensus: Which one wins?, Afghanistan 
Network Analysts, 4 April 2013 
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Whatever the outcome of the election, I believe the Afghan state is likely to 
survive in more or less its current form in the post-2014 period for the reasons 
I have already mentioned. Empowered political networks have benefitted 
impressively within the post-2001 system, which they helped build, with the 
intention of guaranteeing their long-term interests. A reduction in external 
resource flows (e.g. military contracts and aid programmes) will certainly 
affect the magnitude of exchange and bargain but arguably will not weaken 
political networks’ relative ability to rent loyalties given their absolute control 
over the Afghan economy (both licit and illicit). A recent World Bank study 
found that the macroeconomic effects of transition and a reduction in 
international military and development spending might be less than expected, 
given how little of that money has actually entered the Afghan economy. 
Arguably, a drawdown in international spending would not drastically 
undermine the rentier dynamics of the state and political networks. Suhrke 
(2012) has argued that a reduction in international funding could actually be 
good for long-term political stability in Afghanistan. In another comprehensive 
report, Fishstein and Wilder (2012) found not only no correlation between aid 
and security, but that aid in some areas generates perverse incentives and 
harmful effects, which the story at the beginning of this thesis illustrates.   
 
While instability can raise the likelihood of violence, it can also decrease if 
violence is so destabilising that it threatens to destroy the political order. Once 
again, it seems that the Jihadi political networks would play determining roles 
in the post-2014 period. Although in the last twelve years these Jihadi 
networks have competed with each other over the control of the state, 
sometimes quite fiercely, they have also become more conscience and 
respectful of each other spheres of influence and their resource 
interdependencies. The post-2001 political and economic developments have 
further entrenched political and business interdependencies among them. 
After all, these Jihadi networks have dominated and shaped Afghanistan’s 
political developments in the last three decades. Except for Karzai, who was 
imposed by the Americans at the Bonn conference, hardly any new network 
leader has emerged outside the Jihadi networks, indicating the rigidity and 
exclusivity of the system. Even Ashraf Ghani, the former Finance Minister who 
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was considered the political mastermind behind the removal of most Jihadis 
from power between 2002-4, has been unable to build a support network, 
evident from his failure to win votes (less than 3%) in the 2009 presidential 
election. As Maley (1997) once noted, the core problem of Afghanistan is not 
reassembling a government but rebuilding a basic consensual framework in 
society. It seems that in post-2001 Afghanistan, that consensual framework is 
emerging in the form of a network state. 
 
However, the network state will only be stable over the long-run if it is aided 
by two external factors. First, the proposed international military presence in 
Afghanistan, especially the ongoing negotiation with the US government over 
its military camps in the country, must produce results to help curb the “bad 
neighbour” effect. In the 1990s, neighbouring countries supported competing 
political networks against each other, which intensified a decade of civil war. 
As the 2014 NATO military exit approaches the regional security aspect of the 
Afghan conflict is being discussed, in particular those of Pakistan, Iran, India 
and even Russia, are intertwined. Given their long-term interferences in 
Afghanistan, both Pakistan and Iran have some influence within the Afghan 
government. If these involvements intensify they could have destabilising 
effects on the current balance of power among political networks.191 The US 
military camps could be an excellent deterrent against interferences by these 
regional players. Second, international aid must continue to sustain the 
Afghan state, especially the ANFS numbering around three hundred 
thousand. Afghanistan’s current GDP will not be able to sustain the Afghan 
army for years to come. A recent congressional report suggested that the 
Afghan government is likely to need at least 10 billion USD annually, mainly 
towards maintaining the ANSF, until 2017 (Katzman 2013).192 After all, the 
Soviet backed regime collapsed in 1992 only when the Soviets stopped 
                                                        
191  As the political economy of the Wolesi Jirga uncovered, in post-2001 international 
statebuilding, political network connections stretch beyond Afghanistan’s national border. 
Reportedly, Karzai’s former Chief of Staff, Omar Daudzai, who was himself caught getting 
suitcases of money from Iran, had asserted to former deputy US ambassador, Francis 
Ricciardone, that “in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran had provided salary 
support for some [Afghan government] deputy ministers and other officials, including one or 
two even in the palace” (US Embassy Cables, February 2009). 
192 See Katzman, K. (2013), “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance”, 
Congressional Research Service Report RS21922, 14 August 2013. 
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supporting the regime financially, three years after their withdrawal. The aid 
reduction will not have a major impact on the power dynamics of political 
networks as long as it is gradual, predictable and orderly. 
 
The case of post-2001 Afghanistan suggests that international intervention 
and peacebuilding must pay particular attention to the role of endogenous 
political forces in their peace efforts. Failing to grasp the co-constitutive, 
interdependent, and network character of international-local power dynamics 
limits our ability to understand the nature of statehood and governance in 
post-conflict spaces. This thesis explored the fundamental role of endogenous 
political networks in the process of statebuilding and state formation, where it 
showed how their power dynamics and day-to-day practices shape political 
order and stability. The better we realise how international peacebuilding is 
grounded in local order, the better we can picture the limits of international 
intervention and the prospect for alternative ways of achieving peace. Further 
research is needed to further understand the complexity of power dynamics 
and relations among political networks at the local-district level and how 
political network contestation is affecting the bureaucratic structure of the 
state, which was beyond the scope of this PhD thesis. Much more research 
remains to be done to provide satisfactory answers to the research puzzle 
and questions proposed here, but I believe this research has contributed 
towards the essential basis of a political network approach for such future 
research.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 9.1: The List of the Main Political Networks since the 1990s.  
The Main 
Ethnic 
Groupings 
Former 
Mujahedeen 
Tanzims 
List of Key Leaders and Commanders (1992-
2001) 
Splintering of Tanzims & the Main Post-2001 Political Network Leaders  
 
 
 
 
 
Tajiks 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamiat-i-Islami 
 
 
Burhanuddin Rabbani (Political 
Leader). Famous Commanders: 
- Ahmad Shah Massoud (the 
Military leader of Jamiat 
known as Shura-yi-Nizar) 
- M. Qaseem Fahim (Chief of 
Intelligence Service) 
- Yunos Qanuni (Commander 
and Jamiat Spokesperson) 
- Abdullah Abdullah (Advisor to 
Massoud) 
- Ismail Khan (Independently 
Controlled Herat and its three 
neighbouring province) 
 - Rabbani remained leader until assassinated in 2012.  
- Massoud assassinated in 2001. His brother Ahmad Zia Masoud 
became Karzai’s vice-president (2004-9). He founded the National 
Coalition in 2011 with General Dostum and Mohaqqeq but split in 
2013.   
- M. Qaseem Fahim: The most powerful commander of Jamiat in post-
2001 and Minister of Defence (2001-2004). Karzai vice-President 
(2009-present).  
- Yunos Qanuni: Former Interior Minister (2001-2002). Run against 
Karzai in 2004 election. Established the New Afghanistan party.   
- Abdullah Abdullah: Former Foreign Minister (2001-6). Challenged 
Karzai in 2009 Elections. Established the Change and Hope Coalition 
in 2009. One of the main candidates in the 2014 presidential elections.  
- Ismail Khan: Strongmen of Heart province (2001-2004). Coercively 
co-opted by Karzai in 2014 to take the position of Minister of Energy. 
Backed Karzai in 2009 elections.  
 
 
 
Pashtun 
 
Hizb-i-Islami 
Gulboddin  
 
Gulboddin Hikmatyar (Political 
Leader) 
- Abdul Hadi Arghandival  
 
  
 - Hizb-i-Islami Gulboddin: Anti-government and his where about is 
unknown.  
- Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan: A number of senior Hizb members break 
away from Gulboddin setting up their party, which is currently led by 
Minister of Economy Abdul Hadi Arghandival. Karzai’s main political 
network ally in post-2005 period/ Sabbah parliamentary grouping in 
the Wolesi Jirga.  
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Hizb-i-Islami 
Khales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mawlavi Yonous Khalis: Famous 
Commanders 
- Abdul Haq in Kabul (Arsala 
Family in Nangarhar) 
- Haji Abdul Qadir / Governor of 
Nangarhar province (Arsala 
Family) 
- Jalaluddin Haqqani 
  
- Abdul Haq: Assassinated in 2001 by the Taliban.  
- Haji Abdul Qadir: Governor of Nangarhar. Assassinated in 2002. 
- Haji Zahir Qadir: son of Haji Qadir set up and became leader of the 
Support for Rule of Law coalition in 2010-2011 Parliamentary crises. 
Leader of Peace Caravan PG. He and his powerful Arsala family 
enjoys significant influence in Nangarhar 
- Haqqani: Known as the “Haqqani network” the most dangerous anti-
government group.  
Mahaz-e-Miilie Pir Ahmad Gillani (political leader). 
Key Commanders: 
- Gul Agha Shirzai 
 - Gilani: Little political influence in post-2001 period. He was allied 
with Abdullah Abdullah in 2009 elections.  
- Shirzai: Governor of Kandahar (2001-2004) then governor of 
Nangarhar (2005-present). Enjoys influence in Kandahar and to some 
extent in Nangarhar.  
Jabha-e Milli-ye 
Nijat 
 
Sebqatullah Mojaddadi (First interim 
President in 1992).  
 
 - The Leader of the Upper House (2005-2010). His son Mojaddadi 
became the governor of Kabul in 2009. 
Etihad-i-Islami Abdur Rab Sayyaf (Leader from 1980s 
–present)/ Allied with Jamiat-i-Islami 
 
 - Sayyaf: Member of Parliament since 2005 and a key ally of Karzai in 
post-2001 period. Enjoys influence within the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hazara 
 
 
 
Hizb-i-Wahdat   
 
 
Abdul Ali Mazari (Leader from 1991-
1995). Key commanders: 
 
- Karim Khalili   
- Momahhad Mohaqqeq 
(Northern Regional 
Commander) 
- Qorban Ali Irfani (deputy chief 
of Wahdat) 
- Mohammad Akbari 
 - Khalili: became leader of Wahdat in 1995. Karzai’s second vice-
president (2004-9). Supporter of Voice of Justice PG.  
- Mohaqqeq: Former Planning Minister resigned (2001-4)/ Set up the 
People Wahdat party/ Challenged Karzai in 2004 elections, came third 
(12.5%). Supported Karzai in 2009 election. Abdullah Abdullah’s 
second running mate in upcoming 2014 elections. Influence in Kabul, 
Mazar and Central Region.  
- Irfani: Opposition/ supported Karzai in 2009 election. Set up Wahdat 
Millie party. Some influence in Bamian province.  
- Akbari: Mainly with opposition. Little influence in Bamian province. 
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Hizbi Harakat  Asef Moheseni (leader 1979-Present). 
Key commanders:  
- Hussein Anwari (regional 
Commander) 
- Ali Javeed (regional 
Commander) 
 
 - Mohammad Asef Moheseni: Leader of the party but it has been 
divided into two branches.  
- Hussein Anwari: Former Minister of Irrigation (2002-2004)/ appointed 
governor of Kabul in 2005; then governor of Herat province (2005-7)/  
In 2009 election allied with Abdullah. 
- Javeed: Former minister (2001-4), Javeed is now the political leader of 
Harakat. 
 
 
Uzbeks  
 
Junbish (Later 
Junish-i-Islami) 
Party  
General Rashid Dostum (a former 
Militia commander in Soviet-backed 
Afghan army in the 1980’s, and has 
been leader since)  
 
 - Junbish is the only political network that has not experienced 
splintering. Junbish exerts significant influence in the Uzbek 
dominated provinces of the North, especially in Jawzjan. He was the 
forth candidate in 2004 election. In 2009 he supported Karzai but then 
his relations deteriorated. He is Ashraf Ghani’s first running mate in 
the upcoming 2014 presidential elections.  
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Table 9.2: List of Interviews 
 Name Position/ Organisation Place  Type Date 
1 Dr. Reza Jahangir  Head of Internal Policy at Office of Administrative Affair Kabul Interview 12 Apr 2011 
2 Amrellah Saleh Director of National Security Directorate  Kabul  Meeting 21 May 2011 
3 Eng. Anwar Director of Global Construction (ltd) Kabul Meeting 23 May 2011 
4 Abdul Rahman Safi Afghanistan Stabilisation Initiative Research Officer Kabul Meeting 12 May 2011 
5 Ramazan Bashardost Kabul MP Kabul Interview 24 Jun 2011 
6 Nabi Khalili Son of Karim Khalili (Second Vice-President) Kabul Interview 19 Jul 2011 
7 Arif Rahmani Ghazni MP Kabul  Interview 16 Jul 2011 
8 Ramazan Bashardost Kabul MP Kabul Interview 31 Jul 2011 
9 Massoda Karukhil Kabul female MP Kabul Interview 25 Jun 2011 
10 Lalay Hamidzai Kandahar MP Kabul Interview 30 Jun 2011 
11 Mr. Rezwani, Eqtedar-e-Millie Newspaper  Kabul Meeting 21 Jul 2011 
12 Khaled Pashtun Kandahar MP Kabul Interview 24 Jul 2011 
13 Abdullah Forough Ministry of Trade and Commerce Kabul  Interview 24 Jul 2011 
14 Dr. Mousavi Senior Advisor to Ministry of Higher Education Kabul Interview 23 Aug 2011 
15 Tarana Wafi Former Senior Advisor to Ministry of Trade and Commerce Kabul Interview 17 Aug 2011 
16 Homa Sultani Ghazni MP Kabul  Interview 31 Aug 2011 
17 Mirbat Khan Mangal Khost MP Kabul Interview 24 Aug 2011 
18 Dr. Saleh Saljoqi Heart MP Kabul Interview 24 Aug 2011 
19 M. Ali Alizada Ghani MP Kabul Interview 29 Aug 2011 
20 Davoud Moradian Former Director of the Centre of Strategic Studies Kabul Interview 18 Sep 2011 
21 Latif Pedram Speaker of Support for Rule of Law coalition (SRL)  Kabul Interview 21 Sept 2011 
22 Asadullah Saadati Speaker of Support for Rule of Law Kabul Interview 18 Sept 2011 
23 Asadullah Saadati Speaker of Support for Rule of Law Kabul Interview 26 Jun 2011 
24 Elham Gharji Former Research Policy Director of MRRD Kabul Meeting  24 Sep 2011 
25 Safoora Ilkhani Bamian MP Kabul Interview 8 Sept 2011 
26 Mr. Alizada Budget Officer at Ministry of Finance Kabul Interview 20 Sep 2011 
27 Dr. Ashraf Ghani 
Ahmadzai 
Former Minister of Finance  Kabul Meeting 9 Oct 2011 
 
28 Naseema Zeerak Activist for Young Women for Change Kabul Interview 18 Oct 2011  
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29 Mr. Mohseni Director of Asset Registration at Afghanistan High Office of 
Oversight and Anti-Corruption Unit 
Kabul Interview 24 Aug 2011 
30 Mansoor Naderi Head of Paywand-e-Millie Party Kabul Interview 16 Nov 2011 
31 Ali Ghanji Deputy Director of Brishna Electricity Kabul Interview 21 Nov 2011 
32 Khaleqyar Haidari Director of NetZone Kabul Interview 6 Nov 2011 
33 Hussain Hazara Director of Budget, Ministry of Finance Kabul Interview 21 Nov 2011 
34 Eng Nawyan A Founder of Haq and Adalat Party Kabul Interview 18 Nov 2011 
35 Janan Musazai Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kabul Meeting 9 Dec 2011 
36 Abrur Rahman 
Sheidani 
Bamiyan MP Kabul Interview 12 Dec 2011 
37 Glen Davis US Embassy Diplomacy Section Kabul Meeting 14 Dec 2011 
38 Dr Jonathan Terre US Embassy Diplomacy Section Kabul Meeting 14 Dec 2011 
 
39 Ehsan Zia Former Minister of MRRD Kabul  Interview 18 Dec 2011 
40 Hussain Hazara Office of Budget / Ministry of Finance Kabul Meeting  4 Dec 2010 
41 Davoud Moradian Former Director of Centre of Strategic Studies Kabul Interview 9 Dec 2011 
42 Ali Eftekhari  Speaker of Ministry of Labour  Kabul  Interview 11 Dec 2011 
43 Neerav Patel UK embassy Head of political Affairs Kabul Meeting 12 Dec 2011 
44 Shahrzad Akbar Afghanistan 1400  Kabul Meeting 18 Jan 2012 
45 Zahra Mobtakker Former Head of Jabhe Millie Weekly Newspaper Kabul Interview 16 Jan 2012 
 
46 Mr. Afghanzai Independent Election Commission Officer Kabul Interview 8 Jan 2012 
47 Mr. Nateqi Wahdat Party Kabul Meeting 17 Jan 2012 
48 Dr. Sima Samar 
 
Head of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commissions Kabul Meeting 1 Jan 2012 
49 Barna Karimi Former Deputy of IDLG Kabul Interview 22 Jan 2012 
50 Barna Karimi Former Deputy of IDLG Kabul Interview 6 Jan 2012 
51 Karim Khalili Second Vice President,  
 
Kabul 
 
Meeting 20 Feb 2012 
 
52 Fiona Grant UK Embassy Political Affairs Officer Kabul Meeting  9 Feb 2012 
53 Farkhunda Zahra 
Naderi 
Kabul female MP Kabul  Interview  11 Feb 2012 
54 Diana Bowen Director of Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistance Project Kabul Meeting 14 Feb 2012 
55 Dr. Davoud Moradian Former Director of the Centre of Strategic Studies Kabul Interview 19 Feb 2012 
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56 Bruce Tolentino Director of Asia Foundation Kabul Meeting 19 Feb 2012 
57 Roshan Mashal Afghanistan Women Network Kabul Meeting 18 Feb 2012 
58 Waheed Omar Former Spokesperson of President Karzai Kabul Meeting 16 Feb 2012  
59 Ted Lawrence USAID Kabul Meeting 13 Feb 2012 
60 Haneef Atmar Former Minister of Interior Kabul Meeting 18 Feb 2012 
61 Waqif Hakimi Spokesperson for Jamiat Kabul Interview 10 Feb 2012 
62 Nurollah Ulumi Former Kandahar MP Kabul Meeting 30 Feb 2012 
63 Roshan Mashal Director of Afghan Women’s Network Kabul Meeting 14 Feb 2012 
 
64 Mahmoud Saikal Former Ambassador to Australia Kabul Meeting 8 Mar 2012 
65 Fauzia Koofi Badakhshan Female MP Kabul Interview 9 Mar 2012 
66 Dr. Anwar Spokesperson of Hizb-i-Islami Kabul Interview 12 Mar 2012 
67 Alizada Office of Administrative Affairs Kabul Interview 13 Mar 2012 
68 Abdul Baqi Popal Director of Directorate for Principle Affairs  Kabul Interview 10 Mar 2012 
69 Mr. Ayam A Former Representative of the Zahir Shah 
 
Kabul Meeting 7 Mar 2012 
 
70 Abdullah Ahmadzai Chief Electoral Officer Kabul Interview 8 Mar 2012 
71 Dr. Abdullah Abdullah Leader of the National Coalition 
 
Kanul Interview 9 May 2012 
72 Ali Amiri Wahdat Political Party Official (Also National Front Coalition) 
 
Kabul Meeting 9 May 2012 
 
73 Arash Barmak Managing Director of ANSYO Kabul Meeting  10 May 2012 
 
Nangarhar Interviews 
74 Waslee Khan Malek 
kheil 
Nangarhar Head of Afghan Millet PP Nangarhar Interview 21 Feb 2012 
75 M. Alkozai Regional Manager of National Democratic institute Nangarhar Meeting 22 Feb 2012 
76 Abdul Razzaq Pacha Head of Mahaz-e-Millie  Nangarhar Interview 23 Feb 2012  
77 Mavlana Salaar Nangarhar Head of Hizb-i-Islami Nangarhar Interview 24 Feb 2012 
78 Mavlana Sor Nangarhar Hizb-i-Islami Member Nangarhar Interview 24 Feb 2012 
79 Zainuddin Hottak Head of Muttahid-i-Millie Nangarhar Interview 23 Feb 2012 
80 Yaqub Mohmand  Nangarhar Afghan Millet Member Kabul Interview 8 Mar 2012 
81 M. Yousof Saber Nangarhar Kuchi MP Kabul  Interview 12 Apr 2012 
82 Dr. Esmatullah Nangarhar MP Kabul Interview 14 Apr 2012 
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Shinwari 
83 Mr. Jalal USAID (Governor Programme) Kabul Meeting 14 Apr 2012 
84 Mirwais Yasini Nangarhar MP, Former Presidential Candidate Kabul  Interview 13 Apr 2012 
85 Habibullah Ismailzai Senior Officer at Ministry of Labour Nangarhar Interview 1 May 2012 
86 Nematullah Hamdard Civil Society Activist  Nangarhar Interview 2 May 2012 
87 Dr. Najibullah 
Sahebzada 
Civil Society Activist Nangarhar Interview 2 May 2012 
88 Zabiullah Zamrai Provincial Council Member Nangarhar Interview 4 May 2012 
89 M. Anwar Soltani Political Analysts Nangarhar Interview 5 May 2012 
90 Nafas gul Malekzai Female Provincial Council Member Nangarhar Meeting 6 May 2012 
91 Angeza Afridi Female Provincial Council Member Nangarhar Meeting 6 May 2012 
      
Balkh Interviews and Meetings 
92 Azizullah Aziz NDI project manager Balkh Interview 4 Mar 2012 
93 Hiedo Ikebe  UNAMA Political Officer Balkh Interview 3 Mar 2012 
94 Danesh Daneshwar Former IEC Regional Manager Balkh Telephone 
conversation 
30 Mar 2012 
95 Hairatan Hairatan Custom border city Observation & Interviews Balkh Observation & 
Interviews 
2-3 Mar 2012 
96 Zahir Wahdat MP Kabul Interview 15 Apr 2012 
97 Farid Arezoo Researcher Kabul Interview 15 Apr 2012 
98 Afzal Hadidi Head of Balkh Provincial Council (PC) Balkh Interview 21 Apr 2012 
99 Gulam Abbas Akhlaqi Deputy Head of Balkh Provincial Council Balkh Interview 21 Apr 2012 
100 Mahbooba Sadat PC Secretary Balkh Interview  22 Apr 2012 
101 Yasir Wares Civil Society Activist and former UNDP official Balkh Interview 16 April 2012 
102 Ustad Mohseni The former Head of Civil Society Organisations in Balkh Balkh Interview 18 Apr 2012 
103 Mr. Ahmadi Transparency International  Balkh Meeting 17 Apr 2012 
104 Mr. Alipoor Transparency International Balkh Meeting 17 Apr 2012 
105 Rajab Ibrahimi Director of Intelligentsia Academia Balkh Interview 19 Apr 2012 
116 Qazi Sayyed Sane Regional Director of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights  Balkh Interview 20 Apr 2012 
107 Haji Mahmoodi PC Member Balkh Interview 21 Apr 2012 
108 Mr. Amini Director of Afghanistan Institute of Democracy Balkh Interview 20 Apr 2012 
 
2009 Election Fieldwork 
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109 Zaki Lali Dr. Abdullah Campaign Manager in West Kabul Kabul Interview 4 Sept 2009 
110 Haidar Motahher  Arman Millie News paper Kabul Interview 7 Sept 2009 
111 Fahima Sadat Jawzjan female MP Kabul Interview 8 Sep 2009 
112 Mohammad Mohaqqeq Leader of Hizb-i-Wahdat Madam Kabul Interview 30 Aug 2009 
113 Dr. Yasa Wahdat Party Advisor Kabul Interview 28 Aug 2009 
114 Sayyed Hadi Spokesperson for Harakat Party secretary Kabul Interview 24 Aug 2009 
115 Shukria Barekzai Kabul Female MP Kabul Interview 13 Sept 2009 
116 Shinkai Karokheil Kabul Female MP Kabul Interview 12 Sept 2009 
117 Mr. Noorzai Kandahar Independent Human Rights Commissioner Kabul Interview 5 Sept 2009 
118 Akram Gezabi Spokesperson for Civil Movement of Afghanistan  Kabul Interview 7 Sept 2009 
119 Najiba Ayubi Director of Killed Group Kabul Interview 14 Sept 2009 
120 Wada Farah Ministry for Women Affairs Kabul Interview 22 Aug 2009 
121 Ramazan Bashardost Presidential Candidate Kabul Interview 27 Aug 2009 
122 Fayzullah Zaki Junbish Party Deputy Kabul Interview 14 Sept 2009 
123 Masooma Tawassoli Deputy to Mr. Pajman, Karzai Kabul campaign manager  Kabul Interview 2 Sept 2009 
124 Reza Jalangir Office of Administrative Affair, Policy Analyst Kabul Interview 23 Sept 2009 
125 Zaher Qadir SRL Opposition Leader Kabul Interview 10 Sept 2009 
126 Mr. Amini Cultural Head of Hizb-i-Harakat Kabul Interview 6 Sept 2009 
127 Dr. Ali Cheraq Dr. Abdullah Second running Mate Kabul Interview 10 Sept 2009 
128 Shafi Ayubi Karte Naw Karzai Manager Kabul Interview 5 Aug 2009 
129 Dr. Dawood Moradian Former Director of Strategic Studies Kabul Interview 12 Jul 2009 
130 Ghulam Mohammad 
Aylaqi 
Deputy Minister for Trade and Commerce Kabul Interview 17 Jun 2009 
131 Sardar ogli Faryab MP Kabul Interview 13 Sept 2009 
132 Mr. Ershat Former Adviser to President Karzai Kabul Interview 10 Oct 2009 
  
 
Focus Group Discussions 
1 Students  Kabul University Students Kabul FGD 30 Sept 2009 
2 Campaign Staff Karzai Kart-e-Naw Campaign Office Kabul FGD 28 Aug 2009 
3 Taxi Drivers Khairkhana Kabul FGD 26 Aug 2009 
4 NGO staff Employment and Capacity Building  Kabul FGD 24 Sept 2009 
5 Government Officials  Ministry of Water and Energy Kabul FGD 1 Sept 2009 
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